Part 1 of this two-part series here.
I would argue that, for the Obama Administration, a nuclear deal with Iran is central to its recalibration of America's policy and posture in the Middle East. Of course it is not explicitly articulated that way, and for obvious reasons cannot be, but it's not difficult to make the case.
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, World Economic Forum, 23 January 2014.
Obama's approach to the Middle East can be crudely summed up as 'get out of the wars America is fighting in the region and don't get into any new ones'. By withdrawing American forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, Obama has fulfilled the first part of this policy. The second is evident in the way his Administration has either been extremely limited or exceedingly reluctant in its use of military force in Libya, Syria and now Iraq (although in many ways the rise of Islamic State in Iraq is the most serious challenge to his policy).
This second aspect of the policy has also been articulated quite explicitly by Obama, most notably in his West Point speech, where he set out the kinds of things that the US will do in the Middle East, but also the things it won't.
I think Obama also understands that if the US is going to stop fighting wars in the Middle East, it has to come to terms diplomatically with its most difficult adversary, Iran, on the most challenging issue, the nuclear question. There are two key dimensions to this. [fold]
First, a nuclear deal is the key to ending 35 years of enmity between Iran and the US that has on many occasions flared into serious clashes and military conflict. Of course, a deal won't on its own end that enmity or resolve all the difficulties in the relationship. But in the same way as the Rouhani Government wants to remove the nuclear issue as an obstacle to ending Iran's political and economic isolation (see part 1 of my series), I think Obama wants to remove the nuclear issue as an obstacle to gradually normalising relations with Iran.
But there is another dimension. Both enhanced sanctions, and now the nuclear negotiations, are not just designed to stop Iran from getting the bomb, they are also designed to stop some of America's allies in the region taking unilateral military action against Iran. In particular, what I think Obama fears is that any military strike by Israel will risk drawing America into any subsequent conflict between the two. To a lesser degree, by diminishing the nuclear threat, Obama also reduces the reliance of regional Gulf allies, in particular Saudi Arabia, on US security guarantees. This again helps him recalibrate American policy and posture in the region.
The problem, however, is that a comprehensive nuclear deal (even one that places very strong limits on Iran's ability to build a nuclear weapon) will leave Iran a stronger regional player. Ending Iran's political and economic isolation will allow it to better pursue its regional ambitions and to realise its economic potential. As I said in Part I, this is what the Rouhani Government hopes for.
But this is precisely what regional adversaries such as Israel and Saudi Arabia (as well as their supporters in the US Congress) fear. This is not to say that they do not fear a nuclear-armed Iran. They do, but they also recognise that the utility of nuclear weapons is limited and that a nuclear-armed Iran would be isolated and sanctioned, and would bring even stronger regional security guarantees from the US.
The Israeli and Saudi preference, therefore, is to see Iran sanctioned and contained. As I argued in part 1, even if a nuclear deal leaves Iran less isolated and more influential in the region and internationally, I think over time, the end of its economic isolation will pose a more direct threat to the regime and to the interests of hardliners than the current sanctions regime. But for those regional countries like Israel and Saudi Arabia with justified fears about what a more powerful Iran means for their interests and the security of their citizens, this is unlikely to prove reassuring.
What this means is that if we do get a nuclear deal next Monday, or more likely, an extension of the current negotiations, there is going to need to be an effort to address these broader concerns as well. The Rouhani Government and the Obama Administration are right that the nuclear issue needs to be addressed first. But it should only be seen as a first step in building a more stable and less conflict-prone region.
Photo courtesy of Flickr user World Economic Forum.