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About the project

A focus on Pacific Islands has been a central component of the Lowy Institute’s work for more than a decade. We research contemporary challenges facing the Pacific islands region in areas including geostrategic competition, sustainable economic development, governance and leadership challenges, poverty alleviation, and Australia’s relationship with Pacific countries and organisations. We also hold major conferences, workshops, dialogues and exchanges. We have produced influential work on Australia’s Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, the 2006 Fiji Coup, normalising Australia’s bilateral relationship with Fiji, Australia’s bilateral relationship with Papua New Guinea, the future development challenges of Papua New Guinea, the economic benefits of greater labour mobility between Australia and the South Pacific, security and resilience dynamics in the Pacific, and foreign aid flows in the Pacific.

The Institute manages four major projects focusing on the Pacific:

The Pacific Research Program (PRP) is a consortium partnership between the Lowy Institute and the Australian National University’s Department of Pacific Affairs and Development Policy Centre, with the support of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The PRP is designed to be a globally pre-eminent centre of excellence for research on the Pacific. More details are available here.

The Lowy Institute Pacific Aid Map is supported by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and is designed to enhance aid effectiveness in the Pacific.

The Australia-PNG Network is a project supported by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, designed to foster people-to-people links between Australia and Papua New Guinea. More details are available here.

The South Pacific Fragile States Project was a project supported by the Department of Defence to produce independent research and forward looking analysis on the key drivers of instability in the South Pacific and the associated security challenges for Australia and the wider region. More details are available here.

THE MAPPING FOREIGN ASSISTANCE IN THE PACIFIC PROJECT

The Lowy Institute Pacific Aid Map is an analytical tool designed to enhance aid effectiveness in the Pacific by improving coordination, alignment, and accountability of foreign aid through enhanced transparency of aid flows. The Pacific Aid Map has collected data on close to 13,000 projects in 14 countries supplied by 62 donors from 2011 onwards. All data has been made freely available on this interactive platform, allowing users to investigate and manipulate the information in a variety of ways. The Pacific Aid Map is supported by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

The Lowy Institute Pacific Aid map is available here.

Country profiles from Pacific Islands countries can be found here.

See the Chinese Aid in the Pacific map here.

 

 

Latest publications

Australian aid budget: It could have been worse

A $300 million cut. That’s what the headlines will say about the impact of this year’s budget on the Australian aid program. But that cut won't happen for another two years and there will be an election between now and then. In the meantime, this year the Federal government's spend on aid will increase - a negligible increase it's true but it will be the first such since the Liberal-National Coalition came to power in 2013. For advocates of a robust and reputable aid program, this year's budget is not a great result but, given the Coalition’s track record, I expected worse.

Two years is a long time for the Australian aid program, where forward estimates have never been reliable. The former Labor government couldn’t keep up with the breakneck speed at which it committed to scaling up the aid program, while the Coalition has not kept its 2013 election commitment to increase aid spending in line with inflation. Now the Coalition has deferred cuts to an election year, it has laid down a challenge for Labor which, post-Kevin Rudd, has had a lacklustre commitment to its own earlier promises on aid.

It was interesting that no reason for the cuts could be given at the budget lockup on Tuesday other than that the savings would be used to fund ‘other policy priorities’ within the department’s portfolio. The Australian’s scoop that it would be used to fund Australia’s spy agency is the best we have to go on.

For an aid program that has been so badly mauled over the past few years, an $84 million increase does not go very far. Humanitarian assistance and the Middle East are the main areas to get a boost. Bilateral allocations have barely changed, while some multilateral commitments have come due. No other substantial policy allocations were made, with the government’s commitment to matching funding with performance clearly still not showing itself at the country allocation level.

Notwithstanding the extra funds this year, aid advocates have plenty of reasons to be angry. This government has consistently cut the aid program. As Stephen Howes notes, aid funding has been reduced, when adjusting for inflation, by one-third while all other expenditure is increasing by 16% over the same period. While it is hard to understand why the Coalition is so focussed on finding ‘savings’ at the expense of aid, it's clear there aren’t many in this government prepared to defend it beyond Foreign Minister Julie Bishop.

The cuts look even more severe when aid expenditure is expressed as a percentage of gross national income. This measure now sits at 0.22%, its lowest level since first recorded back in 1960. If the current forward estimates hold, it could fall to 0.2% by 2020-21, sending us further down world rankings of aid generosity. According to the OECD we are now in 18th position. On current trends, by 2020-21 we will be in the bottom third of the 32 OECD donors. Meanwhile total global aid flows continue to grow.

What’s most baffling about our aid program’s reversal of fortunes is that we have such a remarkable economic story to tell. Now entering our 26th year of uninterrupted economic growth, Australia has not had to deal with the austerity programs that most of Europe has has to face. The UK is the most obvious counterpoint where the Cameron government, despite major pressure from its own backbench and while many areas of spending were slashed, legislated a minimum 0.7% aid spend.

The UK example demonstrates the importance of political champions. David Cameron was a true believer in the aid program and he held the line against internal pressure, dragging his party along with him. Public support for the aid program here and in the UK isn’t discernibly different but it's clear that public support isn’t enough to sway a government that does not view aid as an election issue and obviously does not see the value of a robust, reputable and effective aid program.

In 2005, nine years into its eleven-year reign, the Howard government committed to doubling the aid program by 2010. True, the budget was in surplus at the time and a slew of traumatic events in our near region (Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands, the 2004 Tsunami) had hammered home the importance of a robust Australian aid program but that decision shows there is precedent for a coalition government to change its tune on aid.

Advocacy efforts with all major political parties should be redoubled to demonstrate why our aid program is both in our national interest and an important reflection of our morality and values. We’ve only got two years.

Aid & development links: Australian Federal budget primer

The Australian Federal Budget 2017-18 will be handed down on Tuesday, 9 May. This is the most important date on the national aid and development calendar and has major implications for the volumes of foreign aid that will be delivered by Australia.

  • It’s been a tough few years for the Australian aid program. It has tumbled in the international rankings as a result of the largest cuts to the aid program in our history.
     
  • Last year’s budget did show signs the aid program was starting to find its feet again within DFAT but, according to the OECD, while development aid worldwide hit a new peak of $US146 billion in 2016, Australian aid continued to fall in the overall rankings.
     
  • The aid budget was expected to be increased this year at the rate of inflation, leaving the budget in real-terms at the same level as 2016-17. There have been recent reports, however, that the aid budget may again be cut to fund other priority areas.
     
  • Getting beyond the volume of the aid program, Bob McMullan and Robin Davies have provided five suggestions about how Australia’s finite aid budget should be more effectively allocated.
     
  • Jack Corbett has taken a long-term view of how decision makers over the past 40 years have struggled to justify the Australian aid program in his new book Australia’s Foreign Aid Dilemma. You can read a summary here.
     
  • When it comes to community perceptions of Australian aid, Terence Wood and Camilla Burkot draw on new survey data to argue that the best way to build Australian support is to sell the aid program on Australian values, not national interest.
     
  • The Campaign for Australian Aid ran an impressive campaign surrounding the public submissions to the Australian foreign policy white paper. Close to 700 submissions from individuals and organisations on the white paper have been made public, but an additional 8500, also publicly available, were submitted as part of the campaign in support for Australian aid.  
     
  • Equally as important as the volume of Australian aid is its performance, and last week DFAT released its scorecard of the aid program for 2015-16. The major reported headline was that the aid program (barely) missed its target of 80% of aid projects addressing gender inequality.
     
  • More worrying should be the revelation that more than a quarter of Australia’s aid programs are considered ‘at risk’ of not meeting their targets (38% in the Pacific). A certain degree of failure is to be expected; delivering effective aid is difficult. But these results also marginalise the justification of ‘doing more with less’ with Australian aid.

The Interpreter will post detailed analysis of the 2017-18 Budget later this week.

Harnessing Papua New Guinea’s rugby league obsession

You don't have to spend much time in Papua New Guinea to realise that the country is obsessed with rugby league. The atmosphere in Port Moresby on a State of Origin night could rival the most devout regions of New South Wales or Queensland. Rugby league is considered PNG's national sport. In a country of eight million people and 800 languages it has a unique power to bring Papua New Guineans together across cultural divides. Rugby league also has significant untapped potential to build the relationship between Australia and Papua New Guinea.

The highlight of PNG's rugby league calendar is an annual clash against an Australian select side, the Prime Minister's XIII. The experience is a much-needed eye-opener for the visiting Australian players, many of whom have little perspective of the popularity of the sport outside their own country. Recently, PNG has also established itself in the Australian rugby league landscape through the success of the PNG Hunters, the only overseas team in the Queensland Cup. Independently funded with very little support from Queensland Rugby League or the Australian NRL, the Hunters have made a splash in the competition, acting as fantastic ambassadors for PNG across Queensland and cultivating a sense of national pride among Papua New Guineans who would often identify with their home province over their home country. As of writing, they have won seven out of nine games this season, a remarkable feat for a team in its fourth year in the competition.

As the Hunters start to hit their stride, the potential for talent development in PNG should become more evident to the Australian NRL. The Pacific is already seen as one of the major talent pools for the sport – 42% of professional players are of Pacific Island heritage, a number only forecast to grow. And yet of these players only a handful are Papua New Guineans, even though PNG makes up roughly 75% of the population of the Pacific states and Papua New Guineans are the most fervent supporters of the sport in the region.

New Zealand's Pacific migration system is a significant contributing factor to the prevalence of Polynesian players in the Australian NRL. A number of Polynesian countries have migration access to New Zealand and therefore, as a result of the open border policy with New Zealand, Australia. That means more Polynesian players than Papua New Guineans have access to training systems in Australia and New Zealand from a young age. For the majority of players to reach the elite level of the sport they need to be in in these high level training programs by the age of 16 or 17. Targeting youth is essential to growing the numbers of professional Papua New Guinean players.

With the right support and investment Papua New Guinean athletes would be an asset to Australian rugby league. Providing Papua New Guinean players with more opportunities in Australia will also have flow-on benefits for the sporting landscape and ecosystems in PNG, meaning that more Papua New Guineans who want to have a career in rugby league can achieve that without having to leave PNG.

PNG's rugby league fan base also presents commercial opportunities for Australia. NRL jerseys are a national uniform, and Papua New Guineans pride themselves on their encyclopaedic knowledge of the sport and its superstars. Already most Papua New Guineans who travel to Australia will make sure they find the time to attend a match during their trip. Both the NRL and the tourism sector should take advantage of PNG's growing middle class and their passion for rugby league, and target this market in their commercial strategies.

Rugby league tourism also has huge potential in Papua New Guinea. In 2017 PNG will host three Rugby League World Cup games, and the country also regularly hosts PNG Hunters home games for the Queensland Cup. Rugby league and tourism bodies should be collaborating to ensure that a variety of packages are available and easily accessible for fans around the world who want to attend a match and experience PNG's unique tourist attractions. Rugby league tourism can also spark new interest in PNG among Australian rugby league fans to build new people-to-people links between the two countries, while also supporting PNG's economic development.

Finally, there a number of innovative programs making use of the sport's popularity to achieve important development outcomes in PNG. These include League Bilong Laif ('League for Life'), a sport for development program launched in 2013 that uses rugby league as a basis for school and community activities. The program comprises outdoor and classroom sessions, features rugby league-themed reading resources, and promotes the importance of education and messages of respect and inclusivity. One of the most striking results of the program has been a growing realisation among children, teachers and parents that rugby league is 'not just a man's game'. In a country with staggering rates of gender-based violence, seeing women in unexpected roles such as teaching, playing and coaching rugby league seems to be having a wider impact on perceptions of women in society, and changing girls' own views about what they are capable of.

It is clear that there is momentum in many parts of the rugby league relationship between Australia and PNG, and it's a good story to share. But more can be done to build on the successes achieved to date. These organisations and programs often operate in silos and don't have enough opportunities to come together. On March 28 the Lowy Institute, through the work of the Aus-PNG Network, did exactly that. We assembled sport administrators, male and female rugby league players, journalists, tourism professionals, private sector managers, NGO founders, researchers, coaches, sports diplomacy and foreign affairs representatives for a day of discussion to tease out these issues and discuss new connections and pathways. The outcomes document from the day can be found here, and a podcast interviewing some of the workshop participants is available here.

Pacific links: Samoa's constitutional Christianity, Fiji's plea to Trump, tuna and more

  • Samoa is amending its constitution to formally declare itself a Christian country; on Devpolicy, Bal Kama considers the regional context and implications.
     
  • On the ASPI Strategist site Geoff Heriot makes the case for the continued relevance of international broadcasting in the Pacific.
     
  • This Devpolicy post outlines 'a partial solution' to the contentious issue of aid-funded, non-citizen technical advisers in PNG.
     
  • The University of Papua New Guinea's acting chancellor Nicholas Mann has defended the decision to introduce a 600 kina (about $250) graduation fee, telling ABC's Pacific Beat it is 'not too much'.
     
  • Conflicting reports have emerged about the health of Vanuatu's Prime Minister Charlot Salwai. Local media say the PM is recovering from a minor stroke while government representatives say he is back at work.
  • Fijian Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama has urged US President Trump to stand by the Paris Agreement.
     
  • On World Tuna Day on 2 May, Pacific representatives met to form a collective response to illegal fishing by boats from Vietnam.

 

Pacific links: Trade deals, French elections, malaria in PNG and more


Pacific links: Teresia Teawia, PNG’s budget, Fiji Times sedition charges and more

Pacific links: PNG election database, the solar-powered island of Ta’u, longboards and more

Developing PNG’s cybercrime policy: Local contexts, global best practice

With Papua New Guinea's national elections just over three months away, attention has turned to the government's legislative record. Last August the Papua New Guinean government passed the Cybercrime Act into law (despite the act being passed into law six months ago, it is not yet available for the public to read on the government’s website; a draft copy circulated in early last year can be found here). This act has had and will have major ramifications for the role the internet plays in PNG society.

With information becoming an increasingly valuable commodity, and the rising importance of network security and data integrity, it's positive to see cyber security is being taken seriously in PNG. Coincidentally, however, the law was introduced at a time when the government faced significant criticism online, raising concerns the act is simply government censorship under the pretence of security.

The Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime (ratified by 52 countries, and also known as the Budapest Convention) describes cybercrime as offences relating to computer-related data, fraud and network security, as well as copyright infringement. Cybercrime legislation and policy are established to protect citizens from such crimes and prosecute offenders, as well as to regulate and promote positive growth within the ICT sector. It is important for PNG to take local contexts into account alongside global standards, such as the Budapest Convention, as cybercrime offences often span both local and international jurisdictions. This includes best practice in both the policies and processes for drafting and enacting cybercrime legislation.

The fact that the PNG government has recognised the importance of cybersecurity is significant, given that cybercrime legislation is fairly patchy within the Pacific region. The draft bill outlines offences and penalties relating to data and network security, including cybercrime offences as recognised by the Budapest Convention such as unauthorised access, data and system interference. The policy also covers traditional offences committed via computer, such as electronic fraud and forgery (likewise recognised in the Budapest convention). This is relatively common practice; more and more personal information is held and transactions are carried out via electronic means. This particular element of cyber legislation could be criticised on the grounds that fraud and forgery are already crimes regardless of whether they are carried out online or not – while keeping concerns over potentially creating another level of bureaucratic legality in mind, the components of the legislation relating to data and network security are all quite reasonable.

It is when the draft legislation deals with content-related offences that lines become more blurred and concerns about censorship and restrictions on freedom of expression arise. Articles which may be interpreted as suppressive include 'offensive publications' and 'defamatory publications', among others. The Act thus may deter online dissent to government action, a view aired by prominent blogger Martyn Namarong (who has since shut down his blog in protest). An online defamatory publication, which the legislation defines as using an electronic system to intentionally make publicly available material that may harm the reputation of another person, could potentially land someone in prison for decades, if the punishments prescribed in the draft bill remain intact in the final legislation.

However, Zinia Dawidi, a lawyer who helped draft the document, has stated these were ceiling penalties and that the actual penalty applied could range from zero to a maximum of the figures stated. It is unclear how this policy will apply to whistle-blowers or those that reveal confidential yet criminally compromising documents. One other article that stands out refers to cyber unrest, which the bill defines as the use of electronic media to incite any form of unrest and various other criminal actions defined in PNG's criminal code act. More clarity should be provided around what sort of cases can and cannot be tried under these articles, and emphasis placed on the protection of the right to freedom of speech and peaceful protest.

The other issue that has drawn criticism from domestic commentators is the process with which the act was drafted and passed, and in particular the lack of emphasis on consultation and public awareness. There has been much concern about the timing of the bill being passed into law – the months preceding its passing saw widespread protests organised through social media against the government, culminating in a shooting at the University of Papua New Guinea in June.

However, though the bill was not passed until August last year, the policy was launched in October 2015. The International Telecommunication Union also notes that there was a public consultation held in Port Moresby in December 2012 regarding cybercrime policy upon request from the government. There is little else to suggest a thorough consultation and public awareness campaign, but it clearly has been discussed for some time. Broader community consultation would strengthen PNG's cybersecurity strategy.

Despite the passing of this new legislation, PNG faces considerable challenges with regards to its cyber maturity, as reflected in its rankings in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute's 2016 report on 'cyber maturity' in the Asia-Pacific. The same report notes that 'countries with lower cyber maturity continue to approach cybercrime as a means through which to implement strong online censorship'.

Taking the initiative to legislate against cybercrime is an important first step from the PNG government. However, there are areas where PNG can strengthen its approach to cybersecurity. With persistent concerns about censorship hovering over the policy, further definition around certain articles is needed to prevent exploitation and cyber censorship. This should be done in consultation with stakeholders from business, civil society and academia and involve international organisations that work towards enhancing global cooperation on cybersecurity. Harmonisation and effective implementation of cyber legislation will help protect citizens against cybercrime and contribute to stability and growth in a changing global economy.

LGBTQ+ refugees in Australia’s offshore detention centres

Asylum seekers who have fled states that outlaw their sexuality or gender identity are escaping the threat of abuse, imprisonment and even murder, but the public debate over asylum seekers and offshore detention centres largely overlooks their plight.

LGBTQ+ asylum seekers detained in centres on Manus Island and Nauru are especially vulnerable to violence. The Refugee Council of Australia notes that 'there have been consistent and alarming reports of abuse (sexual and otherwise), including of those living in the community in Nauru and of gay and lesbian people'. Similarly, Human Rights Watch noted in their recently released World Report 2017 that 'gay asylum seekers on Manus Island have reported being shunned, sexually abused, or assaulted by other asylum seekers'.

Homosexuality is still criminalised in Papua New Guinea, and if LGBTQ+ asylum seekers were released in Papua New Guinea, they would face a strong likelihood of experiencing 'violence, intimidation, imprisonment and possible death', according to Human Rights Watch.

The murder of a gay Papua New Guinean man, Harry Peter, in Alotau in October 2016, allegedly targeted because of his sexuality, highlights the potential danger to LGBTQ+ asylum seekers in PNG (and is a sad reminder that local LGBTQ+ people in the Pacific face similar threats and challenges every day). Advocates in the Pacific condemned his murder and claim the crime has not been properly investigated by local police. As in most countries, there are slightly safer neighbourhoods for LGBTQ+ people in Papua New Guinea and attitudes are changing in some sectors of the community, but homophobia is still predominant.

There are parallels in Nauru, where homosexuality was only decriminalised in 2016 and homophobia is similarly prevalent. There are currently two Iranian refugees detained in Nauru who are in fear for their lives after being physically and verbally abused for their sexuality and their relationship with each other. While their story was picked up by Australian media last year around the same time as Mardi Gras, this issue generally goes all but unnoticed.

In Australia, there is a general culture of tolerance, as demonstrated by the majority support for marriage equality, but the unintended consequences of our actions in the Pacific are often not considered. Most Australians would likely be appalled to learn of the situation of these vulnerable refugees. Dennis Altman, a leading academic and campaigner for queer rights, recently discussed the fact that, while the majority of Australians now accept LGBTQ+ rights and support same-sex marriage, most are not aware of this issue, even within the LGBTQ+ community in Australia:

It's interesting how many people have leapt on the bandwagon (supporting same-sex marriage) but remain silent about the fact we are holding men in detention in Papua New Guinea who have fled because of their sexuality. Were they to be released in Papua New Guinea, which the government says they could be, they face huge possibilities of violence, intimidation, imprisonment and maybe death. While I understand the passion of people who want to get married, I think sometimes a bit of humility is called for – a bit of recognition that for most people in the world this is not the most important issue.

The 1951 Refugee Convention focuses on political persecution and does not include discrimination against sexual and gender-based identity groups. This is still a developing area for both human rights and migration discourse. However, Australian refugee policy should ensure the safety of LGBTQ+ asylum seekers, in line with our culture of tolerance and protection of sexual and gender minority groups.

There should be improvements to the current processing system to appropriately assess LGBTQ+ applicants in a manner that does the least harm. When seeking asylum in Australia, applicants have to prove the well-grounded fear of persecution as part of the process. Sexuality is undoubtedly particularly challenging to prove for both the applicant and the host country. But LGBTQ+ applicants should not have to declare and prove their homosexuality in the current manner. This reflects an institutional culture of suspicion and demonstrates a lack of understanding of the complex and deeply personal nature of sexual and gender identity.

Any LGBTQ+ asylum seekers should be moved to countries that welcome and protect LGBTQ+ people. They should not be considered for release in states that criminalise homosexuality or possess the harmful homophobic attitudes that these asylum seekers are trying to escape in the first place.

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