Extremists are weaponising drones and governments need to adapt fast

Domestic extremist actors are increasingly incorporating drone technology into attack planning, and existing counter-drone policies are failing to keep pace, according to a new Lowy Institute Policy Brief.

The ungoverned sky: Drones and the domestic extremist threat, authored by James Paterson and Lydia Khalil, shows that the number of plots by domestic extremist groups involving drones has increased, with extremists taking direct inspiration from battlefield innovations, particularly in Ukraine.

"What was once the exclusive domain of state actors now rests within reach of nearly anyone with a credit card and a data signal," the authors write. "The combination of easy accessibility and payload potential, and the limitations of domestic counter-drone systems, presents a growing challenge."

Paterson and Khalil warn that advances in 3D printing, AI-assisted navigation, and open-source design files are dramatically lowering the barrier to extremists looking to weaponise commercial drones.

The brief also reveals significant regulatory gaps. For example, in November 2025, Chinese company DJI, which dominates the global consumer drone market, announced it would remove certain geofencing restrictions from its products, shifting the onus of compliance from manufacturers to consumers.

Paterson and Khalil argue that no single counter-drone system can protect the full range of potential civilian targets, and that legal constraints, including Australia's restrictions on jamming devices, limit the tools available to law enforcement.

To meet the growing challenge of extremist drone use, the authors recommend countries establish dedicated national counter-drone task forces that bring together law enforcement, aviation regulators, and intelligence agencies to coordinate domestic counter-drone responses.

Paterson and Khalil recommend that governments pursue internationally coordinated safety-by-design regulation, rather than rely on manufacturer cooperation to ensure compliance.

The authors also suggest that a shared database of prohibited 3D-printed drone component schematics should be established and made accessible to partner states through existing counter-terrorism cooperation frameworks.

"Domestic extremists have all three elements required for a real threat: intent, capability, and opportunity," the authors conclude. "It is not a matter of whether they will accelerate their use of drones, but whether governments will have done enough to stop them."

• Read the Policy Brief, The ungoverned sky: Drones and the domestic extremist threat

KEY FINDINGS

• Domestic extremist actors are incorporating drone technology into operational capabilities and attack plots, taking inspiration from the battlefield. The number of violent plots utilising drones has increased sharply over the past five years.
• Domestic counter-drone frameworks are mismatched to the threat. Effective protection requires layered, multi-system approaches across potential civilian targets and critical infrastructure.
• Easy-to-access technologies, such as 3D printing, open-source design files, additive hardware, and AI-assisted navigation are lowering the barriers to modifying and weaponising drones.

MEDIA CONTACT
Andrew Griffits
Head of Media and Communications
media@lowyinstitute.org