

Sovereignty and the Sea: President Joko Widodo's Foreign Policy Challenges

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Indonesia's new president, Joko Widodo, is new to foreign affairs and seemingly has little interest in diplomacy, a marked contrast with his predecessor Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who sought a role as an international statesman. Instead, Jokowi — as he prefers to be known — has declared that he will focus on domestic affairs as part of a broad reform programme, with a particular emphasis on strengthening Indonesia's maritime infrastructure and reasserting the authority of the state. However, an activist presidency in these areas, even if intended only as a domestic effort, will create unintended foreign policy challenges for Indonesia because the country's economic and maritime interests are so closely intertwined with those of its neighbours. This article examines Jokowi's statements on foreign affairs, offers a survey of his foreign affairs advisers and places the president in the country's historical and political context. It then examines potential flashpoints in Indonesia's relationships with its neighbours over Jokowi's agenda. It argues that under Jokowi, foreign policy is likely to become less clear, less conciliatory and less cooperative, with negative consequences for Indonesian leadership in the region.

Keywords: Indonesia, foreign policy, Jokowi, Joko Widodo, South China Sea.

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New Indonesian President Joko Widodo, who prefers to be known by the portmanteau Jokowi,¹ has declared that he will focus on domestic affairs, particularly improving the country's maritime infrastructure and reasserting the authority of the state, as part of a broad reform programme. In these areas, he could be a transformative president. However, an activist presidency in these areas, even if intended only as a domestic effort, will create unintended foreign policy challenges for Indonesia, because its economic and maritime interests are so closely intertwined with those of its neighbours. Moreover, Jokowi's focus on domestic policy will likely see him delegate management of foreign affairs, including responsibility for addressing these challenges, to several key advisers. Where consensus among these advisers does not emerge, Jokowi is unlikely to intervene to settle the debate and to clarify Indonesia's position, as his predecessor, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, often did when confronted with similar challenges.

This article first outlines the role that President Yudhoyono played in the conduct of the country's foreign policy in order to illustrate the change in experience and focus that Jokowi represents. Second, it reviews Jokowi's statements on foreign affairs and argues that his views on Indonesia's external relations are almost entirely a function of his domestic reform agenda, which emphasizes state strength and maritime affairs. Third, it identifies the key people providing advice to Jokowi on foreign policy, and how they might influence his views. Finally, it explores how this context might affect the conduct of Indonesian foreign policy in Southeast Asia and the broader Asia-Pacific region, highlighting the dilemma of the Indonesian position in the South China Sea. I argue throughout that Jokowi's focus on maritime affairs and questions of state sovereignty could lead to greater tensions with neighbouring states and China; and that his inexperience in foreign affairs could allow these tensions to persist in a way they did not under his predecessor, thus diminishing Indonesia's regional leadership role.

Yudhoyono's Departure Leaves a Void

When President Yudhoyono vacated the State Palace in October 2014, he left a void in the country's foreign policymaking system. As president, Yudhoyono energetically pursued a vision of Indonesia's place in the world as a rising power, and of himself as a globe-trotting

statesman respected and admired by his peers. In his pursuit of this vision, he took great care to cultivate opinion abroad, while minimizing the opportunity for institutional competition over foreign policy among his ministries at home.

The presidency was not Yudhoyono's first turn at foreign policy. Throughout his long army career, Yudhoyono demonstrated a keen interest in foreign affairs. Early in his presidency, as he strove to position himself as an international statesman and foreign policy intellectual, he adopted and promoted a foreign policy vision defined by the country's identity as a large Muslim majority democracy.² By the start of his second term, he had refined his view of Indonesia's place in the international system as a country with "a thousand friends and zero enemies" and an "all directions foreign policy".³ He sought to improve ties with both the United States and China, but also made a show of diplomacy with Iran and North Korea.⁴ He pursued warmer relations with neighbouring countries, including Australia, Singapore and Malaysia, resisting demands from the bureaucracy and legislature that he take a harder line in various disputes.⁵

In implementing his foreign policy agenda, Yudhoyono continued institutional reforms begun by his predecessor, Megawati Sukarnoputri, that consolidated foreign policymaking in the foreign ministry and the State Palace, thereby limiting institutional competition over foreign policy between various ministries.⁶ To drive his foreign policy agenda, Yudhoyono transformed the sleepy foreign affairs unit in the State Palace — which housed only two diplomats, including an interpreter, under his predecessor — into an engine of diplomatic engagement under his confidante Dino Patti Djalal.⁷ Dino was a professional diplomat who held the understated title of presidential spokesman for foreign affairs, but acted as the President's closest foreign policy adviser; his staff of handpicked young diplomats, backed by the President's imprimatur, exerted extraordinary influence.⁸ Through them, the President exercised his interest in foreign affairs with a particular focus on summit diplomacy.⁹

When his ministers and advisers' positions endangered Indonesia's international reputation or his friendship with foreign leaders, Yudhoyono often intervened in foreign and security policy, a prerogative that he exercised far less frequently in domestic affairs. For example, early in Yudhoyono's presidency he withdrew the appointment, made by his predecessor, of General Ryamizard

Ryacudu to be head of the armed forces. Yudhoyono and Ryamizard had repeatedly clashed over the separatist conflict in Aceh, with the latter favouring a harder line and the President preferring a negotiated solution.¹⁰ Yudhoyono also overruled his foreign minister, Marty Natalegawa, in sending Ambassador Nadjib Riphath Kesoema back to Canberra in May 2014, having withdrawn him six months earlier in the wake of the release of documents that alleged that Australia had eavesdropped on Indonesian officials.¹¹

We should not overstate Yudhoyono's foreign policy record. His approach to diplomacy prioritized the promotion of the country's profile overseas rather than progress on the most challenging diplomatic issues.¹² Though Indonesia under Yudhoyono was widely perceived to have become a rising power and an important emerging market, many of these accolades came Indonesia's way due to its innate size and strong economic performance. Yudhoyono's foreign policy vision was often short on details, and like many of his domestic policies, avoided hard choices. (A vision of "a thousand friends and zero enemies" and an "all directions foreign policy" avoids hard choices by definition.)

Within Indonesia, Yudhoyono's high global profile increasingly became a domestic political liability in his second term. Critics argued that his desire to be seen as an international statesman led him to make policy decisions that sacrificed Indonesia's interests in favour of friendly relations with other world leaders. Commentators specifically criticized Yudhoyono's efforts to improve the poor conditions of Indonesian migrant workers overseas, which they said lacked vigor suitable to the scale of the problem, and his apparent reluctance to order the execution of foreign citizens sentenced to death by Indonesian courts.¹³ When Yudhoyono's broader foreign policy record is taken into account, it becomes apparent that many of these latter criticisms were unfair. On many contentious issues, Yudhoyono refused to bow to international pressure, particularly when a failure to do so would have implied a violation of the country's sovereign prerogatives.¹⁴ He could, however, be persuaded to take foreign sensitivities into account, and in the nationalist cauldron of Indonesian politics, that left him open to attack.

It is into this nationalist cauldron that Jokowi has now been cast. With far less interest or experience in foreign policy, Jokowi will be far less desirous or capable of delivering a conciliatory and clear foreign policy as his predecessor.

“Face of the Village, International Brain”

Jokowi represents a new model of political advancement in Indonesia. Unlike his six predecessors, Jokowi did not rise to the presidency through the military or the ranks of the political party system. Jokowi's rise began in 2005, when the successful entrepreneur was recruited by fellow business leaders to run for mayor of his hometown of Surakarta (or Solo) in Central Java.¹⁵

“For 24 years, I exported furniture”, Jokowi told business leaders in Jakarta during his presidential campaign. “I may have the face of someone who comes from the village, but I have an international brain.”¹⁶ The business that Jokowi founded in 1988 prospered over time, and his travels often took him to Europe, the United States and countries across Southeast Asia. He learned halting English. He sent his sons to school in Singapore and Australia. But while Jokowi's success offered him a glimpse of the world beyond Indonesia, he was never a member of the cosmopolitan and cozy Jakarta business elite, with its strong political connections. Rather, it was his turn leading his hometown — with a population of 500,000 — which set him on a path to the presidential palace.

As mayor of Surakarta, Jokowi slowly built consensus for his policies, winning over skeptical constituents and bureaucrats in order to build a public transportation system and enact a programme of slum clearance. In 2012, supported by tycoons and political leaders eager to harness the enthusiasm that Jokowi's success in Surakarta had engendered, he successfully challenged an old guard incumbent to become governor of the sprawling capital, Jakarta, a city of 10 million people. He immediately set about improving the city government, rolling out a city-wide healthcare scheme and finally starting work on a long-awaited urban rail system.

As soon as he was elected governor of Jakarta, the press began to speak of him as a potential presidential contender. He began his presidential election campaign in 2014 with strong backing in the polls. However, that lead was whittled away by his opponent, retired Lieutenant-General Prabowo Subianto. Prabowo's well-funded and well-organized campaign outpaced and outsmarted Jokowi at several turns. Nevertheless, Jokowi eventually prevailed. Exit polls later showed that Jokowi outperformed Prabowo in rural areas, where Prabowo's populist message did not have its hoped-for effect.¹⁷ Jokowi's humble origins and demeanour — the face from the village, rather than an international brain, in his words — allowed him to secure victory.

Jokowi's Vision: Indonesian Sovereignty and the Maritime Agenda

Jokowi is new to the practice of diplomacy. He does not come to the presidency with any strong views about the abstract concepts that undergird the profession, such as the regional security architecture or balance of power, much less Yudhoyono's interest in revising those concepts. Jokowi sees himself primarily as a domestic reformer, not an international statesman, for whom foreign policy is of interest only insofar as it might allow him to advance his domestic reform agenda.

In a rejection of Yudhoyono's focus on summit diplomacy and ceremony, Jokowi has sought to "bring diplomacy back to earth" (*diplomasi membumi*) — as his foreign minister, Retno Marsudi, put it shortly after she took office — and serve the people in practical ways, for example by ordering Indonesian diplomats to serve as marketers for Indonesian products overseas, support Jokowi would have no doubt liked to have received when he was a furniture exporter. He has also placed a particular focus on consular assistance for Indonesian migrant workers overseas.¹⁸ These are two direct ways in which Jokowi's domestic agenda informs his foreign policy. The following paragraphs trace the more indirect way in which two characteristics of Jokowi's domestic reform agenda — a belief in a strong state and emphasis on maritime affairs — will have outsized effects on his foreign policy.

At the heart of Jokowi's vision of Indonesia's place in its development as a nation is his vision of Indonesia as an archipelagic state whose identity and prosperity is tied to its insular waters, and his conviction that Indonesia's dignity depends upon the state's ability to defend itself from multifarious attempts to weaken it from within and without. These assumptions form the basis of Jokowi's foreign policy, which similarly focuses on Indonesia as a maritime nexus, and on the assertive defence of national sovereignty. Indonesian borders are mostly to be found in its waters, so these concerns often overlap, but they also stand on their own.

Jokowi's *visi-misi* or "vision and mission" statement makes this clear.¹⁹ Jokowi and his running mate Jusuf Kalla argue, on the first page of the *visi-misi* statement, that one of the top three problems facing the country is the degradation of state authority in a number of areas — the failure of the fight against corruption, the allowance for human rights abuses and the inability to manage social

conflicts — but also the failure to detect threats to its sovereignty or territorial integrity.²⁰ The authors then commit to a programme of action that promises to “bring back the state” and “reject the weak state”.²¹ In domestic policy terms, Jokowi’s determination to revive the authority of the state has been interpreted as an argument for strengthening the rule of law, and was met with praise from foreign analysts.²²

Yet in foreign policy terms, the *visi-misi* statement’s associated references to the importance of state sovereignty (*kedaulatan*) and autonomy (*kemandirian*), which are sprinkled throughout, suggest a deep intellectual commitment to the concept of sovereignty and its vigorous defence. Jokowi is the latest in a long line of Indonesian leaders to privilege state authority and sovereignty in his rhetoric. However, his lack of diplomatic experience compared to his predecessors appears to have left him with little appreciation as to how his fellow leaders might view such an assertive attitude, or react to it. He does not seem to understand that such an uncompromising assertion of sovereignty — particularly in matters where sovereignty is a matter of dispute — might be principled but maladroit, well-intentioned but ineffective.

As with his focus on sovereignty, Jokowi emphasized maritime issues early in his presidential campaign, proposing during a June 2014 presidential debate focused on economic policy an extensive programme of maritime infrastructure projects that would increase economic activity and development of the outer islands.²³ In the following debate later that month, focused on foreign policy, Jokowi further argued that Indonesia should function as a “global maritime nexus” (*poros maritim dunia*). Jokowi did not explain the nexus concept at the debate, but the slogan was further filled out in an August opinion piece by one of Jokowi’s foreign policy advisers, Rizal Sukma, which offered a three-pronged approach, and finally in Jokowi’s intervention at the East Asia Summit in Naypyidaw in November, which listed five pillars:²⁴

- (1) “Rebuilding Indonesia’s maritime culture. As a country of 17,000 islands, the Indonesian people must be aware of, and see themselves, as a people whose identity, prosperity, and future will be determined by how we manage the oceans.”
- (2) “We will guard and manage maritime resources, with a focus on building marine food sovereignty, through the development of the fishing industry.... Our maritime wealth will be used for the interests of our people.”

- (3) “We will give priority to the development of maritime infrastructure and connectivity, with the development of the sea corridor, deep seaports, logistics, shipping industry, and tourism industry.”
- (4) “Through maritime diplomacy, we invite all Indonesian partners to cooperate in the maritime field. Together we must eliminate the source of conflict at sea, such as illegal fishing, violations of sovereignty, territorial disputes, piracy, and marine pollution. The sea must unite, not separate, us all.”
- (5) “As the country that has become the fulcrum of the two oceans, Indonesia has an obligation to establish a maritime defense force. It is necessary not only to guard our sovereignty and maritime wealth, but also as a form of taking responsibility to guard the safety of shipping and maritime security.”²⁵

Jokowi’s signature policy in foreign affairs is thus at its core about domestic developments. The top three pillars of Jokowi’s maritime doctrine are primarily domestic, focusing on culture, fisheries and infrastructure. Only the latter two pillars, dealing with diplomacy and defence, are truly foreign policy issues.

To understand the foreign policy implications of the policy, however, one can dive back into the heart of the forty-six-page *visi-misi* statement, which lists five lines of action: first, maritime diplomacy to speed up the resolution of Indonesia’s border disputes, including land disputes, with the ten neighbouring countries; second, guaranteeing the territorial integrity of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia, including maritime sovereignty and the security and prosperity of the outer islands; third, securing natural resources in the country’s 200 nautical miles exclusive economic zone (EEZ); fourth, intensifying defence diplomacy; and fifth, dampening maritime rivalries between the major powers and pushing the resolution of territorial disputes in the area.²⁶

Some foreign analysts, accustomed to thinking about maritime issues only in terms of foreign and security policy, have focused almost exclusively on the brief diplomatic and defence clauses of Jokowi’s Naypyidaw intervention and *visi-misi* statement, and argue that Indonesia could play a more active role in the resolution of third party maritime disputes, particularly in the South China Sea.²⁷ Yet Jokowi has often struggled to explain Indonesia’s position in the South China Sea disputes when asked in meetings with foreign journalists and officials — leaning on aides to remind him of specifics — and his comments on diplomacy have been a far

less prominent feature of his public remarks on maritime affairs.²⁸ When Jokowi speaks of “returning to the seas”, as he urged his compatriots to do in his inaugural address, he means the country’s vast archipelagic waters, not the high seas. The heart of the policy, then, appears to be Jokowi’s detailed plans for the investment of billions of dollars in port and shipping infrastructure and improved management of fisheries, which are intended to lower costs for trade between Indonesia’s western and eastern islands, and to ensure that fisheries are managed to the benefit of the nation.

That is not to say that Indonesian diplomats, who had minimal involvement in the drafting of Jokowi’s policy, have not noted the maritime theme of his programme and sought to expand on it. Indeed, they have sought to fill it out with substantive foreign policy recommendations that are more outward facing. Among those recommendations are likely to be the elevation of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) annual meeting to a leaders’ summit, which Indonesia chairs in 2015. Indonesian diplomats believe that IORA could be an “APEC for the Indian Ocean”, although there are obstacles to turning it into a useful organization, particularly with its checkered membership around the region, and the lack of a defined mission.²⁹

Jokowi has left little doubt in his first months in office as to his commitment to his maritime agenda and a vigorous defence of the country’s sovereignty. He speaks on these issues frequently and with conviction, and they inform how he views foreign policy issues. Yet he still shows little interest in or any deep knowledge of international politics in the region. As such, he is unlikely to expend any significant energy in international diplomacy or in arbitrating internal debates over Indonesian foreign policy, particularly amidst a challenging domestic political environment that will demand all of his attention. Much of this will fall to Jokowi’s advisers and ministers with responsibility for foreign affairs. It is important, then, to understand the people advising Jokowi.

Jokowi’s Advisers Reflect His History and Vision

As Jokowi learns more about foreign affairs through the practice of it, his views on the subject may develop over time. But until he does, he will rely upon a team of advisers for foreign policy advice that will in turn shape his view of the world. They include long-time political supporters with expertise in the area, academics recruited to

tutor Jokowi as he prepared to run for the presidency, the leadership of Jokowi's political party, an experienced vice-president, military leaders and professional diplomats.

Luhut Panjaitan, Jokowi's Oldest Supporter

Jokowi's closest adviser on national security matters is retired General Luhut Panjaitan. Luhut was a special forces (*Kopassus*) commander during the New Order, who developed a particular expertise in counter-terrorism, becoming the first leader of the elite counter-terrorism unit Detachment 81 in the 1980s. After the fall of Soeharto, Luhut briefly served as ambassador to Singapore from 1999 to 2000 and minister of trade and industry under President Abdurrahman Wahid. He arrived in Singapore when tensions between Indonesia and Singapore were at a high, following recriminations between Indonesian President B.J. Habibie and Singapore's senior minister, Lee Kuan Yew.³⁰ Nevertheless, Singaporean diplomats have praised Luhut's approach to diplomacy with Indonesia's neighbours as reasonable and cooperative.³¹

Although Luhut was asked to stay on after Megawati became president, he decided instead to leave government to establish a resources business. As that business became highly successful, he became involved in Golkar Party politics, rising to become deputy chairman of its board from 2008–14. Golkar was once the party of Soeharto, but now exists as one of three large nationalist — as opposed to Islamic-based — parties. He resigned in May 2014 after Golkar backed the candidacy of Prabowo, with whom he had a long rivalry in the military.³²

Luhut's relationship with Jokowi goes back further than any of Jokowi's other advisers on foreign affairs and national security. In 2008, Luhut was looking for someone who could turn raw timber from his forestry concession in Kalimantan into finished products. An acquaintance introduced him to a furniture exporter who had recently been elected mayor of Surakarta. Luhut could not have known at the time that Jokowi would become the President of the Republic just six years later, but he has supported him throughout. His financial largesse helped keep Jokowi's presidential campaign afloat.³³ When Jokowi declared victory in front of the Proklamasi Statue on 9 July 2014, Luhut stood beside him.

While Luhut was denied a post when Jokowi's Cabinet was first announced after his inauguration — reportedly due to opposition from Megawati, because she was uncomfortable with his level of

influence over Jokowi — two months later Jokowi inaugurated Luhut as presidential chief of staff, a new Cabinet-level role in which he was given responsibility for coordinating the implementation of foreign and domestic policy and accelerating the development of policy. At the time of writing, Luhut had requested that the foreign ministry dispatch a career diplomat to serve as a deputy to the chief of staff for international affairs.³⁴ The placement of this deputy in Luhut's office, along with his other credentials, could allow Luhut to achieve even greater influence over foreign policy.

Rizal Sukma has the Ear of the President

By contrast, Rizal Sukma, the executive director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, had little familiarity with Jokowi before serving as a member of the group of academics which began preparing Jokowi for a run at the presidency months before his candidacy was announced. Sukma became a familiar figure by Jokowi's side as he led preparations for the campaign's lone foreign policy debate, and advised the candidate and his retinue on related issues. Sukma also played a leading role in crafting the foreign policy sections of Jokowi's *visi-misi* statement.³⁵

Sukma, educated at the London School of Economics and Political Science, has become one of Indonesia's leading scholars of international politics, though he has published on a wide array of related issues, including Islam and politics, the separatist conflict in Aceh and security sector reform. Sukma's early work focused on Indonesia's relationship with an emerging China, a subject on which he wrote his doctoral dissertation and has continued to track.³⁶ Sukma has repeatedly returned to the subject of the ideological framework for Indonesian foreign policy, arguing that the country should openly advocate for its interests and ideals despite fear of a backlash in the region.³⁷ In 2009, Sukma controversially called for a "post-ASEAN foreign policy", arguing that ASEAN's norms of non-interference were holding Indonesia back from playing a bigger role on the world stage.³⁸

Although Sukma was often talked about as a potential foreign minister during the transition period, he has remained at the head of CSIS. Those close to him say that he was ambivalent about taking up a role at the head of an unwieldy bureaucracy. Indonesian diplomats have also expressed apprehension at the prospect of being

led by someone who did not rise up through their ranks, suggesting Sukma would have struggled to gain acceptance from the ministry's senior leadership.³⁹ Nevertheless, Sukma is well-known to foreign diplomats and think-tankers in world capitals, who often praise his unsentimental approach to international relations and his forthright speaking style. As a result, many foreign diplomats, particularly those with poor relationships with the foreign ministry, view Sukma as the ideal conduit for carrying messages to Jokowi.⁴⁰

Sukma remains Jokowi's closest foreign policy aide, writing the President's foreign policy speeches and interventions at major international summits, and joining his meetings with foreign leaders in Jakarta and overseas. Yet he remains outside the Palace, and is said to be under consideration for an official role overseas.⁴¹ It is unclear how his relationship with Jokowi would be adjusted were Sukma to move abroad, where it would be more difficult for him to advise Jokowi, and how this would in turn affect Jokowi's instincts on foreign policy.

Senior Diplomats of the Foreign Ministry Vie for Pre-eminence

Jokowi's choice for foreign minister, Retno P. Marsudi, comes from the professional diplomatic corps, more specifically a group of Hassan Wirajuda protégés known as "Hassan's Boys", though Marsudi is the rare woman among the group. This group, which included her predecessor as foreign minister, Marty Natalegawa, was promoted quickly by Wirajuda during his eight-year tenure from 2001–09 as foreign minister.⁴²

Jokowi's choice of foreign minister is another example of the way in which Jokowi's domestic policy priorities inform his foreign policy. Jokowi's advisers shortlisted three Indonesian ambassadors: Arif Havas Oegroseno, the ambassador to the European Union (EU); Desra Percaya, the permanent representative to the United Nations (UN) in New York; and Retno. His choice was a surprise to many in the foreign ministry, who are accustomed to being led by a minister with substantial experience working with the ASEAN countries or in multilateral organizations.⁴³ While Havas, who made his reputation as a prominent maritime negotiator with Indonesia's neighbours, and Desra, who holds the most prominent multilateral role in the ministry, have experience that meets those expectations, Retno, a Europeanist, does not.

Jokowi is said to have chosen Retno because she impressed him with her commitment to *diplomasi membumi* or "diplomacy

brought down to earth”, promising to lead efforts to boost sales of Indonesian goods overseas, and to enhance consular service for Indonesian workers overseas.⁴⁴ (In this she received some support from Sukma, who explained the rationale behind the approach by telling a reporter, “You can’t eat an international image.”⁴⁵) Retno’s highly personable and open demeanor also mirrors the President’s and contrasts with that of Natalegawa, who was criticized by the ministry’s rank and file as being too aloof.⁴⁶

Retno’s background and focus on *diplomasi membumi* have raised concerns among foreign diplomats in Jakarta that Indonesia will not play the leading role within ASEAN that it did under Yudhoyono and Natalegawa. Reinforcing this impression, Rizal Sukma has suggested that while ASEAN was formerly “the cornerstone of our foreign policy” it would now be only “a cornerstone”.⁴⁷

PDI-P Stalwarts Rely on Megawati’s Influence

Jokowi is a member of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), led by Megawati Sukarnoputri. While Megawati and other leaders of the party are generally adherents of the status quo in the regional order, they often look to her father and Indonesia’s founding president, Sukarno, for rhetorical inspiration. Sukarno was president at a very different time, when Indonesia’s struggle for independence and tensions with its neighbours defined its foreign policy. As a result, the view of Indonesia’s place in the world espoused by Megawati and PDI-P members’ is often more adversarial at the margins than the mainstream of Indonesian foreign policy.

Over the past year, there has been widespread debate within Jakarta regarding the level of influence that Megawati and other PDI-P stalwarts will wield in Jokowi’s administration. During the election campaign, she and her daughter Puan Maharani, who led PDI-P’s caucus in the legislature at the time, sought to minimize Jokowi’s role in decision-making. Megawati told a press conference on the eve of the campaign that Jokowi was merely an official of the party tasked with carrying out its ideology, a statement that contributed to widespread concerns among the electorate that Jokowi was a “puppet candidate”.⁴⁸

While Megawati is unlikely to advocate for specific policies, she does want to be seen as the party’s matriarch and a senior stateswoman. She has also sought to place loyalists in key positions as a means of entrenching her patronage networks in the Jokowi administration. She appears to have enjoyed early success in this effort, maneuvering several close confidantes into cabinet posts,

not least among them, Ryamizard Ryacudu, her former army chief. Human rights activists have raised concerns about Ryamizard, citing his hard line against separatism and dissent when he was in office, and he is said to harbour anti-American views resulting from US officials' decision to pass over Ryamizard in choosing Indonesian officers to attend US military courses.⁴⁹

People close to Jokowi have repeatedly suggested throughout 2014 that he would begin to push back against Megawati's personnel choices as he came closer to assuming power, or as he began to consolidate power, but there has been little evidence of that so far.⁵⁰ In fact, Jokowi's appointment in January of Megawati's former police aide de camp, Commissioner General Budi Gunawan, as chief of police, suggests the opposite. Gunawan had come under suspicion of graft in 2010, and was named a corruption suspect by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) four days after Jokowi nominated him. The KPK decision led Gunawan's allies within the National Police to seek to eviscerate the KPK by naming all four of its leaders as suspects in spurious investigations. Despite extraordinary damage to Jokowi's reputation as a reformer, the President refused to defend the KPK by withdrawing Gunawan's nomination for six weeks.⁵¹

Closest to Jokowi among the PDI-P leadership has been Andi Widjajanto, formerly a defence scholar at the University of Indonesia, who resigned from his position to lead Jokowi's campaign team, and was named cabinet secretary after Jokowi took office. Though Andi's father was a loyal aide to Megawati, whose dying wish was that his son should help PDI-P recapture the presidency, Andi has since sought to demonstrate that he is loyal to Jokowi rather than Megawati.⁵² Andi's credentials extend beyond lineage, as one of Indonesia's most prominent advocates of the transformation of the armed forces. However, Andi's views on defence feature a strongly nationalist bent, and he is known to be among the least accessible of Jokowi's advisers to foreign diplomats.⁵³

Jusuf Kalla, an Experienced Vice-President

Jusuf Kalla has returned to the vice-presidency, which he held from 2004 to 2009, after five years. Though there are questions about Kalla's health, Jokowi would be wise to use Kalla — a veteran deal-maker who served as the chairman of Golkar while Vice-President — to negotiate difficult deals with members of his coalition and an obstructionist legislature. However, people close to the two men

say that Jokowi has reined in Kalla, fearful that his deals — which by their very nature protect or advance rival politicians' political or economic interests — are unethical, and will thus dilute the President's moral authority.⁵⁴

If Jokowi refuses to allow Kalla to make deals in the legislature, Kalla may turn to another area of interest, foreign affairs. As vice-president, Kalla played a major role in the conclusion of the peace agreement in Aceh in 2005, a process that involved several foreign governments.⁵⁵ Since then, he has offered his good offices as a peacemaker to opposing sides in conflicts in Southern Thailand, the Philippine island of Mindanao and Myanmar's Rakhine State, as well — all areas with large Muslim populations that suffer from sectarian violence.

Tension in Indonesian Foreign Policy

Much of the debate in Indonesian foreign policy turns on the participants' interpretation of a dictum from Mohammed Hatta, the country's first vice-president, that Indonesia's foreign policy should be "independent and active" (*bebas-aktif*). The dictum — so malleable that it was able to serve both the stridently anti-imperialist first president, Sukarno, and his successor, the fiercely anti-communist Soeharto — is still generally accepted as the foundation of the country's foreign policy.

Yet there is a tension between its two parts for an emerging power such as Indonesia. The country's limited economic and military resources constrain its ability to be "active" in shaping regional and global affairs. Indonesian officials could overcome these constraints by working more closely with the great powers, be it China or the United States, or other middle powers in the region like India, Japan or Australia. Yet many Indonesian officials and scholars are wary of such coalitions, because they fear they could compromise Indonesia's independence. Moreover, they argue that whatever influence Indonesia has in world politics is derived from the moral authority of its distinct and independent voice, and that this would be tainted by closer cooperation with the great powers or their partners in the region.⁵⁶

This tension can be seen among Jokowi's advisers, as well. Jokowi's closest advisers, particularly Luhut and Sukma, broadly support the "independent and active" policy, but are more comfortable with cooperation with other states on issues of mutual concern.

Though they will unabashedly pursue the country's national interests, they have little time for nationalist posturing on symbolic diplomatic and security issues. Sukma's writings and Luhut's actions in Singapore, both cited above, bear this out. Others, however, including some senior diplomats in the foreign ministry and leaders in PDI-P, are more enamoured with nationalist rhetoric intended to put neighbouring countries in their place, and favour a foreign policy that emphasizes independence from the great powers at the expense of more constructive diplomacy and security cooperation.

Moreover, nationalists in the legislature may also push Jokowi towards less conciliatory and cooperative policies. Several similar efforts by members of Commission I, the legislative body overseeing foreign affairs, successfully pushed Yudhoyono towards a more non-aligned stance over issues such as sanctions on Iran.⁵⁷ Legislators have pledged further such efforts, with one leading member of Commission I telling the author that the body must remain vigilant to ensure Jokowi does not sacrifice the independence of the country's foreign policy.⁵⁸

Jokowi's relative lack of exposure to these debates prior to his campaign for president means that he cannot be placed in either camp; but his ideological emphasis on the strong state, and practical emphasis on his domestic reform agenda, suggests that he will look favourably on those countries that are able to provide investment that funds his reforms — particularly China and Japan — and will look askance upon any violation of Indonesian sovereignty. (On contentious issues on which Jokowi does not take a position, his lack of interest in foreign affairs will magnify any disagreements, as he is unlikely to wade into the dispute to resolve it.)

Jokowi's commitment to the strong state and the politics of sovereignty in Indonesia could push Jokowi towards a less cooperative stance on specific issues that capture the imagination of the political and diplomatic elite. Issues that have done so in the past have included trade and microeconomic policy, which are likely to continue in a protectionist direction, and incidents in which Indonesian sovereignty is perceived to have been violated. As noted below, this has immediate implications for Indonesia's neighbours and for its role in the South China Sea dispute.

Implications for Indonesia's Neighbours

Proximity often leads to controversy in Southeast Asia. That is especially true for Indonesia's neighbours, for whom shared history, culture,⁵⁹ and commerce⁶⁰ have made it impossible to disentangle internal and external affairs. In the context of Jokowi's domestic focus and views on sovereignty, these entanglements could make the coming years under Jokowi particularly challenging for Indonesia's neighbours.

The issues of history stretch back to independence, for which Indonesia fought and which Malaysia, Singapore, Papua New Guinea and Australia negotiated. In the years that followed, Sukarno's policy of *Konfrontasi* (Confrontation) — legitimated, he believed, in part by Indonesia's struggle for independence — created memories of hostility for both sides that have not yet faded.⁶¹ Of course, Indonesian officials and scholars also nurse memories of hostility from distant great powers — American support for separatist movements and Chinese support for communist insurgents — but Indonesians are reminded of tensions with their neighbours far more frequently due to the greater people-to-people links that occur as a result of their proximity.⁶²

Many Indonesians bristle at a perceived lack of respect for the country's dignity (and by extension, sovereignty) from its richer neighbours. In recent years, Indonesians have protested Singapore's refusal to extradite those Indonesian nationals suspected of corruption; Australian intimations that its aid would be linked to clemency for two Australians facing the death sentence in Indonesia; and what Indonesians see as Malaysian theft of Indonesia's cultural heritage, for example by claiming batik cloth as a Malaysian heritage item.

The full list of recent slights is far too long to recapitulate here, but three recent examples are worth mentioning, given Jokowi's maritime focus. First, the dispute with Malaysia over the maritime border in the Ambalat block of the Celebes Sea continues to rankle Indonesians, who lost a 2002 International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on the sovereignty of two nearby islands (Sipadan and Ligitan), but remain claimants to Ambalat. Should Indonesian and Malaysian patrol ships collide, as they did in April 2005, it is not clear that calmer heads will again prevail.⁶³

Second, Australia-Indonesia relations have similarly suffered as a result of perceived encroachments on Indonesian dignity and

sovereignty in recent years, including revelations in documents stolen by American intelligence contractor Edward Snowden that Australia eavesdropped on Yudhoyono and his wife's phone calls, quickly followed by revelations that Australian government vessels illegally entered Indonesian waters in pushing asylum seeker boats back to Indonesia. Any further incursions by Australian vessels as part of its challenging efforts to intercept and turn back asylum seeker boats could result in a strong protest by Jakarta.

Third, shortly after taking office, Jokowi instructed his Minister for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs, Susi Pudjiastuti, to seize and sink any foreign vessels found fishing illegally in Indonesian waters. Since then, the navy has sunk Vietnamese, Thai, Malaysian and Papua New Guinean vessels. Susi's execution of the policy has not been without fanfare, and has become one of Jokowi's most popular policies. While the programme violates no international laws, it has upset Indonesia's neighbours, who have privately argued that Indonesia could enforce its laws in a less ostentatious manner.⁶⁴

For Malaysia and Singapore, membership of ASEAN has provided an opportunity for confidence-building with Indonesia. In the case of Jokowi, ASEAN's frequent summits could provide an opportunity to socialize Jokowi to his counterparts' concerns. However, as noted in a previous section, ASEAN diplomats worry that Jokowi's administration has devalued ASEAN in its foreign policy, citing his appointment of Retno Marsudi and reliance on Rizal Sukma. In the foreign minister's annual press statement at the beginning of 2015, Retno identified Indonesia's foreign policy priorities as: first, maintaining the country's sovereignty, including the intensification of diplomacy on maritime borders; second, enhancing protection of Indonesian citizens and legal entities, including migrant workers in other ASEAN countries and; third, intensifying economic diplomacy, to include ending illegal fishing.⁶⁵ Each of these priorities implies significant friction with Indonesia's ASEAN partners.

Yudhoyono often led an effort at the political level to overcome crises in the bilateral relationship with the country's neighbours. Jokowi, focused on domestic reforms, concerned with the defence of Indonesian sovereignty in its interactions with others, and beset by strident political opposition at home — political opposition that is looking for opportunities to criticize Jokowi as insufficiently nationalist — is less likely to make that effort. As a result, relationships with

Indonesia's neighbours may prove more difficult to manage under Jokowi than they were under Yudhoyono.

Jokowi's focus on domestic reforms is not all bad news for Indonesia's neighbours, however. Success in his fight against corruption and to improve the country's dilapidated infrastructure would not only grow the economy and improve living standards, it would also create greater opportunities for trade with and investment in Indonesia. If Jokowi can overcome opposition to his domestic reforms, his investment in these areas will pay significant long-term dividends in its bilateral relationships with its neighbours.

Indonesia, China and the South China Sea

Jokowi's focus on sovereignty and maritime issues, particularly illegal fishing, has created tension in the country's relationship with its neighbours, and is likely to create more. But for the regional powers, the United States and China, greater distances from Indonesia are likely to mean fewer tensions. One exception is the South China Sea, with its many overlapping claims of sovereignty and occasional maritime confrontations, including Chinese claims and American interest in the peaceful resolution of disputes over those claims. As described below, Indonesia's handling of Chinese claims has sent mixed signals, signals that Jokowi is unlikely to make any clearer.

As Chinese behaviour in the South China Sea has become increasingly assertive since 2007–08, Indonesia has sought to facilitate dialogue among the claimant states — China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia.⁶⁶ Jakarta's role in the South China Sea was often cited as an example of Indonesian leadership in regional affairs under Yudhoyono and Natalegawa. Yet Indonesia must manage its own tensions with Beijing regarding its behaviour in the South China Sea in the waters off the Natuna Islands, which are part of the Riau Islands province, and form the southern limit of the South China Sea. Though China does not claim sovereignty of the Natunas (unlike the disputed Spratly Islands), the EEZ generated by the islands overlaps with China's so-called "nine-dash line" which covers approximately 80 per cent of the South China Sea. Indonesian attempts to enforce its fisheries law in its EEZ have been met with Chinese opposition. Several times over the past four years, Chinese Fisheries Law Enforcement Command

(FLEC) vessels are reported to have threatened the use of force against Indonesian law enforcement vessels to compel the release of Chinese fishermen under arrest by Indonesian authorities in the country's EEZ.⁶⁷

In general, the foreign ministry's practice has been to downplay these tensions rather than allow them to complicate its efforts to facilitate dialogue among the claimant states. At their most outspoken, Indonesian diplomats have noted the questionable legality of China's nine-dash line and in 2010 requested clarification from Beijing regarding these claims.⁶⁸ No response has been forthcoming.

By contrast, the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) have recently highlighted the dispute. In early 2014, it announced plans to deploy fighter jets and attack helicopters to Natuna.⁶⁹ Air Commodore Fahru Zaini, on the staff of the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, made clear that the deployments were in response to Chinese claims.⁷⁰ Yet when Natalegawa was asked about the moves, he repeated longstanding official policy, denying that Indonesia and China had any territorial disputes, and even citing Indonesian efforts to attract Chinese investment to Natuna.⁷¹

Then, in April 2014, the TNI Commander, General Moeldoko — rumoured at the time to be under consideration as Jokowi's vice-presidential nominee — authored an opinion piece in *The Wall Street Journal* outlining a more hawkish position on the South China Sea.⁷² Moeldoko wrote that Indonesia was “dismayed... that China has included parts of the Natuna Islands within the nine-dash line”.⁷³ Despite the preceding controversy, Moeldoko did not consult President Yudhoyono or the foreign minister prior to publication.⁷⁴ Senior Indonesian diplomats privately expressed dismay at the article and its erroneous analysis, although the President declined to step in to clarify the Indonesian position.⁷⁵

Jokowi's statements on the matter commit him to ensuring the integrity of Indonesia's maritime sovereignty and to securing marine resources in its EEZ, while also committing him to dampening maritime rivalry among the great powers and to peaceful settlement of disputes. This position struggles to integrate both the TNI and the foreign ministry's approach to the issue, signalling less tolerance for Chinese encroachment in the Indonesian EEZ, while seeking to remain an honest broker in the broader dispute.⁷⁶ In the early stages of his presidency, however, there appears to be far greater

emphasis on securing Indonesian sovereignty than diplomacy, an emphasis that could lead to increased tensions between Jakarta and Beijing.

Disagreements between the armed forces and foreign ministries are commonplace around the world, but rarely are they aired so openly on such a critical issue. When asked to explain Indonesian policy on the dispute, diplomats and defence officials in Jakarta give varying weight to the TNI and foreign ministry positions.⁷⁷ Without a strong hand at the top of the Indonesian foreign policymaking system to settle such disputes, we are likely to see more of them under President Jokowi. Amidst this greater turbidity, Indonesian leadership in regional affairs will take a hit, and Indonesia could become more entangled in the South China Sea disputes than under Yudhoyono.

Conclusion

Jokowi comes to the presidency with little knowledge of foreign affairs. Moreover, he has little interest in continuing to develop the international reputation that was a focus of his predecessor, President Yudhoyono. In fact, Jokowi's approach to foreign policy is primarily a function of his domestic agenda, which focuses on reasserting the authority of the state and on increased investment in maritime affairs. Despite their domestic focus, these policies will create greater tension with Indonesia's neighbours, as Jakarta pushes issues of sovereignty, particularly in the maritime domain, in a way that impinges on what its neighbours view to be their own sovereign prerogatives.

Though Jokowi's key advisers are pragmatic about working with the country's neighbours and great powers, the Indonesian political context will reinforce the trend towards greater nationalism. Jokowi faces a hostile opposition coalition and rebellious members of his own party in the legislature, with both sides ready to criticize the new President if he is seen as insufficiently nationalist. This nationalism will in turn make it more difficult for Indonesia to play a leadership role in ASEAN or on South China Sea issues — a role that Jokowi's senior advisers seem uncertain they still want.

Under Jokowi, then, we are likely to see a less clear, less conciliatory and less cooperative foreign policy, offering less leadership in Southeast Asia and the world.

NOTES

- ¹ Associated Press, “Call Me Jokowi, says Indonesia’s informal new president, Joko Widodo”, *South China Morning Post*, 23 October 2014.
- ² Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia Finds a New Voice”, *Journal of Democracy* 22, no. 4 (October 2011): 110–23.
- ³ Inaugural Address, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Jakarta, 20 October 2009. Yudhoyono’s wording varied between “a *thousand* friends and zero enemies” and “a *million* friends and zero enemies”.
- ⁴ Ties between the United States and Indonesia had been strained by events in East Timor and other reports of human right abuses, by the American reaction to the 1997–98 Asian Financial Crisis, and by the reluctance of Yudhoyono’s predecessor, Megawati Sukarnoputri, to address the threat of terrorism in Indonesia to American satisfaction. Indonesian leaders have historically approached China with a coolness born of Maoist era fears (which were slow to dissipate) regarding communist subversion in Indonesia. Extensive discussion of Indonesia’s relationship with both the United States and China can be found in Daniel Novotny, *Torn between America and China: Elite Perceptions and Indonesian Foreign Policy* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010). For discussion of Indonesian relations with North Korea, see Zachary Keck, “Why is Indonesia Courting North Korea”, *The Diplomat*, 2 November 2013, available at <<http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/why-is-indonesia-courting-north-korea/>>. For discussion of Indonesian relations with Iran, see Iis Gindarsah, “Democracy and Foreign Policy-Making in Indonesia: A Case Study of the Iranian Nuclear Issue, 2007–08”, *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 34, no. 3 (December 2012): 416–37.
- ⁵ For example, Yudhoyono resisted calls from the legislature to take more assertive actions with regard to the dispute with Malaysia over the sovereignty of the Ambalat block in the Celebes Sea, discussed later in this paper. He also resisted calls to downgrade relations with Australia, or keep them downgraded for longer periods of time, at several points in his presidency, including over the issue of Papuan asylum seekers in Australia in 2006, and Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s boats policy in 2013.
- ⁶ Greta Nabbs-Keller, “Reforming Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry: Ideas, Organization, and Leadership”, *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 35, no. 1 (April 2013): 56–32. The former Department of Foreign Affairs was renamed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2009. To avoid confusion, this paper refers to it by its current title throughout.
- ⁷ Author interview with Indonesian diplomat, Jakarta, August 2014. This office was known during Yudhoyono’s first term as the Presidential Staff for Foreign Affairs, or SPHI. In the second term, under Dino’s successor, Teuku Faizasyah, it became the *Special* Presidential Staff for Foreign Affairs, or SKPHI.
- ⁸ Author interview with Indonesian diplomats, Sydney, September 2014. Such was Dino’s status in Yudhoyono’s first term that, though he had only recently been appointed to director-general rank in the hierarchical foreign ministry, he addressed the foreign minister as an equal in formal settings. Dino would address Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda as “Yang terhormat saudara Menlu”,

rather than “Yang terhormat *Bapak* Menlu”, as a diplomat of his rank would normally do. Author interview with Indonesian diplomat, September 2014. *Saudara* can mean *brother*, but in this case more closely translates to *colleague*, while *Bapak* can mean *father*, but in this context more closely approximates *mister*.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Allene Masters, “The Aceh Peace Accords: One Year Later and Still Holding”, PacNet no. 46, 13 September 2006, available at <<http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/pac0646.pdf>>.

¹¹ Author interview with foreign diplomat, Jakarta, August 2014.

¹² For example, Yudhoyono did not focus on groundbreaking negotiations or chart a bolder course in foreign policy that would have required difficult choices between partners amidst the geopolitical tensions in the region and challenging international negotiations over trade and climate change during his presidency. Rather, he sought to promote Indonesia's good offices while rarely offering them up.

¹³ Indonesian migrant workers, many of them domestic staff in wealthier countries, are often subject to poor living conditions and capricious legal systems. The Indonesian press often picks up particularly egregious treatment of Indonesian citizens, turning it into a major political issue. With regard to executions, Indonesia under Yudhoyono did not execute any prisoners from 2008 to 2013, though dozens had been sentenced to death for crimes from drug trafficking to homicide. For examples of criticism of this nature, see “Politik Pencitraan SBY Gagal” [SBY's Image Politics Fail], *Kompas*, 24 April 2011, available at <<http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2011/04/24/15412766/Politik.Pencitraan.SBY.Gagal>>. See also, “SBY's Foreign Policies 'Failing his People'”, *Jakarta Post*, 13 October 2014, available at <<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/10/13/sby-s-foreign-policies-failing-his-people.html>>.

¹⁴ For example, Yudhoyono was the first Indonesian president to recall his ambassador to Canberra, and he did so twice, in 2006 in response to Australia's grant of temporary protection visas to Papuan asylum seekers and in 2013 in response to allegations of Australian espionage. He also cancelled a state visit to the Netherlands in 2010 at the last minute in protest at a lawsuit filed in a Dutch court by an exiled Indonesian separatist group that demanded his arrest, even though the lawsuit was spurious and quickly dismissed. For the 2006 incident, see Rodd McGibbon, *Pitfalls of Papua*, Lowy Institute Paper no. 13 (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2006). For the 2010 incident, see Marlise Simons, “Indonesian President Postpones Netherlands Trip”, *New York Times*, 5 October 2010, available at <<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/06/world/asia/06indo.html>>. For the 2013 incident, see Ben Packham, “Indonesia Recalls Ambassador to Australia in Spying Row”, *The Australian*, 18 November 2013, available at <<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreign-affairs/claims-australia-spied-on-sby/story-fn59nm2j-1226762454888>>.

¹⁵ For a more in-depth look at Jokowi's earlier years, see Michael Bachelard, “Joko Widodo: Man with a Mission”, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 14 June 2014, available at <<http://www.smh.com.au/lifestyle/joko-widodo-man-with-a-mission-20140609-39rui.html>>.

- ¹⁶ Ben Bland, “Indonesia: The Political Outsider”, *Financial Times*, 25 June 2014, available at <<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/cb090784-f704-11e3-9e9d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3FvjZxqEq>>.
- ¹⁷ Marcus Mietzner, “How Jokowi Won and Democracy Survived”, *Journal of Democracy* 25, no. 4 (October 2014): 115.
- ¹⁸ Darmansjah Djumala, “Ketika Diplomasi Membumi” [When Diplomacy Comes Back to Earth], 15 November 2015, *Kompas*, available at <<http://internasional.kompas.com/read/2014/11/15/05320031/Ketika.Diplomasi.Membumi>>.
- ¹⁹ Though I address the contents of the *visi-misi* statement throughout this article, I have purposely chosen in this section to emphasize some, but not all, of the foreign policy content of the *visi-misi* statement, because much of it was written by advisers rather than Jokowi himself, and because I believe his later and more succinct remarks provide a better key to understanding Jokowi’s true foreign policy priorities than a workshopped and prepared forty-six-page document released when he was in the relatively weaker position as a presidential candidate atop a coalition.
- ²⁰ Jokowi and Jusuf Kalla, “Jalan Perubahan Untuk Indonesia yang Berdaulat, Mandiri, dan Berkepribadian, Visi Misi, dan Program Aksi, Jokowi — Jusuf Kalla 2014” [Path to Change for a Sovereign, Independent, and Distinctive Indonesia, Vision and Mission and Program of Action, Jokowi — Jusuf Kalla 2014], Jakarta, May 2014, p. 1.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 8.
- ²² See, for example, Greta Nabbs-Keller, “Canberra’s Indonesia policy: Imperatives collide in fate of Chan and Sukumaran”, *The Strategist*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 11 February 2015, available at <<http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/canerras-indonesia-policy-imperatives-collide-in-fate-of-chan-and-sukumaran>>.
- ²³ “Prabowo angkat ekonomi desa, Jokowi angkat tol laut” [Prabowo to lift the rural economy, Jokowi raises sea corridor], BBC Indonesia, 15 June 2014, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2014/06/140615_debatcapres.shmtl>.
- ²⁴ Rizal Sukma, “Gagasan Poros Maritim [The Maritime Nexus Idea]”, *Kompas*, 21 August 2014, available at <<http://bisniskeuangan.kompas.com/read/2014/08/21/080000726/artikel-detail-komentar-mobile.html>>.
- ²⁵ Jokowi, Remarks to the Ninth East Asia Summit, Naypyidaw, Myanmar, 13 November 2014, available at <<http://www.rappler.com/world/regions/asia-pacific/indonesia/74928-pidato-jokowi-indonesia-poros-maritim-dunia>>.
- ²⁶ Jokowi and Kalla, “Jalan Perubahan Untuk Indonesia”, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
- ²⁷ See, for example, C. Raja Mohan, “Chinese Takeaway: Modi and Jokowi”, *Indian Express*, 22 October 2014, available at <<http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/chinese-takeaway-modi-and-jokowi/2/>>; Rory Medcalf, “Jokowi’s Maritime Inaugural Address”, *The Interpreter*, 21 October 2014, available at <<http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/10/21/Jokowis-maritime-inaugural-address.aspx>>.
- ²⁸ Author interviews, Jakarta, August 2014, September 2014, January 2015.
- ²⁹ Author interview with Indonesian diplomats and advisers to Jokowi, Jakarta, September 2014. The organization’s New Delhi-centric character limits its

- membership. Most littoral countries are members, but Pakistan, Myanmar, Somalia, Djibouti and the Maldives remain outside the organization.
- ³⁰ Ken Ward, Lowy Institute Paper, 2015, forthcoming.
- ³¹ Author interview with Singaporean diplomats, June and August 2014.
- ³² Author interview with retired Indonesian military officer, Jakarta, May 2014.
- ³³ Ibid.
- ³⁴ Author interviews, Sydney, February 2015.
- ³⁵ Author interviews with advisers to Jokowi, May–July 2015.
- ³⁶ See Rizal Sukma, *Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship* (London: Routledge, 1999); Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia-China Relations: The Politics of Re-engagement”, *Asian Survey* 49, no. 4 (July/August 2009): 591–608.
- ³⁷ See, for example, Rizal Sukma, “The Evolution of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy: An Indonesian View”, *Asian Survey* 35, no. 3 (March 1995): 304–15; and Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia Finds a New Voice”, *Journal of Democracy* 22, no. 4 (October 2011): 110–23.
- ³⁸ Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia Needs a Post-ASEAN Foreign Policy”, *Jakarta Post*, 30 June 2009, available at <<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/06/30/indonesia-needs-a-postasean-foreign-policy.html>>.
- ³⁹ Indonesian diplomats have frequently expressed their displeasure by warning that “it would be a mistake to repeat the Alwi Shihab experiment”. Alwi was the first foreign minister from a political party background since the Soeharto era, appointed by President Abdurrahman Wahid. Alwi did not distinguish himself as minister. The comparison is thus unflattering and unfair to Sukma, who is a scholar of international relations rather than a politician. Author interviews with Indonesian diplomats, July, August and September 2014.
- ⁴⁰ Author interviews foreign diplomats, Jakarta, September 2014.
- ⁴¹ Author interviews with advisers to Jokowi, Jakarta, January 2015; author interviews with Indonesian diplomats, Sydney, February 2015.
- ⁴² Abdul Khalik, “‘Hassan’s Boys’ Shape RI’s Current Diplomacy”, *Jakarta Post*, 12 October 2009, available at <<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/10/12/hassan039s-boys039-shape-ri039s-current-diplomacy.html>>.
- ⁴³ Author interviews with Indonesian diplomats, Sydney, October 2014.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid.
- ⁴⁵ Joe Cochrane, “Indonesian Leader in Global Spotlight”, *New York Times*, 21 October 2014, available at <<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/21/business/international/many-hope-joko-widodo-indonesias-new-leader-will-raise-countrys-regional-stature.html>>.
- ⁴⁶ Greta Nabbs-Keller, “The Very Public Flaying of Marty Natalegawa”, *The Interpreter*, 19 September 2014, available at <<http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/09/19/Indonesias-diplomatic-corps.aspx>>.
- ⁴⁷ Prashanth Parameswaran, “Is Indonesia Turning Away From ASEAN Under Jokowi?”, *The Diplomat*, 18 December 2014, available at <<http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/is-indonesia-turning-away-from-asean-under-jokowi/>>.

- ⁴⁸ “Megawati: Jokowi assigned to implement PDIP’s ideology”, *Republika OnLine*, 14 May 2014, available at <<http://www.republika.co.id/berita/en/national-politics/14/05/14/n5kplw-megawati-jokowi-assigned-to-implement-pdips-ideology>>.
- ⁴⁹ Author interviews with US officials, Washington, D.C., December 2014. For human rights concerns, see, for example, Yulisari Perdani, “No Crooks or Human Rights Abusers in New Cabinet: Activists”, *Jakarta Post*, 26 July 2014.
- ⁵⁰ Author interviews with individuals close to Jokowi, April, May and September 2014.
- ⁵¹ At the time of writing, a temporary resolution to the dispute had been announced by Jokowi. In a compromise, Gunawan would accept the role of vice chief, while one of his allies would become chief, and two KPK commissioners would step down in favour of temporary replacements. The resolution risks coming undone when all the KPK commissioners must be replaced at the end of 2015.
- ⁵² Interviews with PDI-P cadres, Jakarta, January and February 2015.
- ⁵³ Author interviews with foreign diplomats, Jakarta, September 2014 and January 2015. For a sense of Andi’s most recent policy analysis in this area, see Andi Widjajanto, “Indonesia’s Military Doctrinal Stagnation”, *Strategic Review*, 1 May 2013, available at <<http://www.sr-indonesia.com/web-exclusives/view/indonesia-military-doctrinal-stagnation>>.
- ⁵⁴ Author interviews with Indonesian journalists and foreign diplomats, Jakarta, September 2014.
- ⁵⁵ Edward Aspinall, *The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis for Peace in Aceh?* (Washington, D.C.: East-West Center, 2005), pp. 14–21, available at <<http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/PS020.pdf>>.
- ⁵⁶ For a fuller discussion of the role of “moral force” in Indonesian foreign policy, see Evan Laksmana, “Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profile: Does Size Really Matter?”, *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 33, no. 2 (August 2011): 157–82.
- ⁵⁷ Iis Gindarsah, “Democracy and Foreign Policy-Making in Indonesia: A Case Study of the Iranian Nuclear Issue, 2007–08”, *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 34, no. 3 (December 2012): 416–37.
- ⁵⁸ Author interview with member of Commission I of the House of Representatives, Jakarta, January 2015.
- ⁵⁹ Indonesia shares extensive cultural links with Malaysia and Singapore, though not with Australia. Melanesian cultural links exist between Papua New Guinea and the two Indonesian provinces of Papua.
- ⁶⁰ Singapore and Malaysia are among Indonesia’s top five trading partners, with Singapore accepting 9.1 per cent of Indonesian exports and Malaysia accepting 5.34 per cent. Fourteen per cent of Indonesian imports come from Singapore, while 6.11 per cent come from Malaysia. Australia has a smaller trading relationship with Indonesia, accepting only 3 per cent of Indonesian exports and sending only 2.8 per cent of Indonesia’s imports. Indonesia, Observatory of Economic Complexity, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, available at <<http://atlas.media.mit.edu/profile/country/idn>>, data from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database.

- ⁶¹ Timor-Leste, of course, fought for its independence, as well. Though this article does not deal with the Timor-Leste relationship, at the end of Yudhoyono's presidency, the relationship was ironically among Indonesia's warmest.
- ⁶² In the case of Singapore and Malaysia, proximity often enables the high volume of business and tourist travel between the three countries. In the case of Australia and Papua New Guinea, proximity enables networks of illegal activities, such as people smuggling, drug trafficking, and (in the case of Papua New Guinea) insurgent activity. For a fuller discussion of this dynamic, see the forthcoming monograph by Ken Ward on the Australia-Indonesia relationship, to be published by the Lowy Institute for International Policy in 2015.
- ⁶³ John G. Butcher, "The International Court of Justice and the Territorial Dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia in the Sulawesi Sea", *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 33, no. 2 (August 2013): 235–57.
- ⁶⁴ Author interview with foreign officials, January 2015.
- ⁶⁵ Retno Marsudi, Annual Press Statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta, 8 January 2015.
- ⁶⁶ "A Conversation with Marty Natalegawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia", Council on Foreign Relations, 20 September 2010, available at <<http://www.cfr.org/indonesia/conversation-marty-natalegawa-minister-foreign-affairs-republic-indonesia/p22984>>. Taiwan is also a claimant state, but Indonesia does not recognize Taiwan.
- ⁶⁷ For a recent review of these incidents, see Scott Bentley, "Mapping the Nine-Dash Line: Recent Incidents Involving Indonesia in the South China Sea", *The Strategist* (blog), Australia Strategic Policy Institute, 29 October 2013, available at <<http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/mapping-the-nine-dash-line-recent-incident-involving-indonesia-in-the-south-china-sea/>>.
- ⁶⁸ Diplomatic Note, Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations to the Secretary General of the United Nations, 8 July 2010, No. 480/POL-703/VII/10, available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/idn_2010re_mys_vnm_e.pdf>.
- ⁶⁹ Ridzwan Rahmat, "Indonesia to Station Su-27, Su-30s on South China Sea Islands", *Jane's*, 31 March 2014, available at <<http://www.janes.com/article/36214/indonesia-to-station-su-27-su-30s-on-south-china-sea-islands>>.
- ⁷⁰ Air Commodore Fatur was quoted as saying, "China has claimed Natuna waters as their territorial waters... This dispute will have a large impact on the security of Natuna waters." "China Includes Part of Natuna Waters in Its Map", ANTARA News, 13 March 2014, available at <<http://www.antaraneews.com/en/news/93178/china-includes-part-of-natuna-waters-in-its-map>>.
- ⁷¹ Evan Laksmana, "Why There is No 'New Maritime Dispute' Between Indonesia and China", *The Strategist* (blog), Australia Strategic Policy Institute, 4 April 2014, available at <<http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-there-is-no-new-maritime-dispute-between-indonesia-and-china/>>. Strictly speaking, Natalegawa is right, in that the waters off Natuna are not "territory".
- ⁷² Moeldoko, "China's Dismaying New Claims in the South China Sea", *The Wall Street Journal*, 24 April 2014, available at <<http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304279904579515692835172248>>.

- ⁷³ As outlined above, China's claim extends to the waters northeast of Natuna, but not to the islands themselves.
- ⁷⁴ Author interview with Indonesian diplomat, Jakarta, May 2014.
- ⁷⁵ Author interview with Indonesian diplomats, Jakarta, May 2014. Moeldoko's tenure as head of the TNI is scheduled to come to an end when he reaches the mandatory retirement age of fifty-eight in July 2015, although it could be extended. While his replacement may be less outspoken about Indonesian rights in the South China Sea, the underlying difference in emphasis regarding the nature of Indonesia's South China Sea problem will remain.
- ⁷⁶ Jokowi and Kalla, "Jalan Perubahan Untuk Indonesia", *op. cit.*, p. 13.
- ⁷⁷ Author interview with foreign diplomats and defence officials, Jakarta, September 2014.