

SPEECH TO SYDMUN 2012

Sydney Model United Nations Conference, Sydney University United Nations Society
Sydney University
Closing ceremony, 2 December 2012

The UN Security Council seat and Australia's diplomacy for the Asian century

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It's been a big year for Australia's foreign relations. It's been a particularly big year for Australia's multilateralism and its position in the United Nations, with the win in late October of the seat on the UN Security Council after much speculation, controversy, partisanship and criticism.

I'm delighted to be here to help mark that historic event – many would say an historic achievement - and believe this convention is a very apt time to talk a little about:

- the history and context of the bid and its success
- the state of Australia's diplomacy and the health of our diplomatic institutions which have helped bring about this win,
- and finally about Australia's role on the council, and what it might mean for Australia's international engagement.

I'd first like to look just briefly at the history and context of this bid.

Australia was last on the Security Council in 1985-6, in the Hawke government years [Slide 2]. Australia had been on the Council four times since the creation of the UN in 1946 (the photograph on the top here shows the key Australians in the formation of the UN: Doc Evatt, Australian Labor politician who was President of the GA in 48-49 and instrumental in drafting the UN Declaration on Human Rights, Ben Chifley, Australia's Prime Minister from 45-49, and Clement Atlee, the British Post-War PM). We had held a seat on at first Security Council of 1946-1947, then ten years later in 1956-1957, 16 years later in 1973-1974, and then 11 years later in 85-6.

Ironically, 1985, the last time Australia was on the Council, was the year Sir Percy Spender died, the post-WWII Australian Minister for External Affairs (the equivalent of the now Minister of Foreign Affairs), who most of you will know was one of the principal proponents of the ANZUS alliance and also instrumental in bringing the Colombo plan into being. He was Australia's Ambassador to the US and Australia's first appointee to the International Court of Justice.

The death of Percy Spender in 1985, the last time Australia held that Security Council seat, may have been a sober portent ... as it was the precursor to a long, slow and somewhat fallow period for multilateral enthusiasts in Australian foreign affairs. Australia was not to sit on the council again for another 28 years.

Australia's 1996 bid, the last time we tried for a Security Council seat, came almost 20 years after its last term on the Council [Slide 3]. It was a Hawke government initiative, but the vote came just after the Howard government won power in 1996.

Australia is somewhat geographically inconveniently located in the Western European and Others Grouping in the United Nations. WEOG comprises members of the European Union, non-EU Western European countries, Scandinavia, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Canada, Australia and NZ are the "others". They all vie for 2 seats up for rotation every two years.

The way the voting occurs, in secret, and by government representatives who can vote against their own private diplomatic commitments and even against their own government's instructions and interests, with impunity. The bid, in essence, can be a lucky dip (or a lottery, depending on your perspective).

When Australia lost that 1996 bid, despite being confident it had won, Australia's UN envoy Richard Butler railed at his foreign counterparts (other countries' UN ambassadors) calling them "rotten lying bastards". Over 2/3 of them had committed their support, but around 70 states had changed their minds by the final vote.

This ignominious defeat deterred the Howard Government from bidding again. Alexander Downer in 2004 lobbied the Howard government to run again for the Council – but Howard and DFAT were unenthused, arguing against it on the grounds that it would distort policy and the lobbying would be too costly.

The bid for 2013-14, launched in 2008, was equally controversial [Slide 4]. It was commenced just after the election of the Rudd government, and FOI releases show that the Foreign Minister, Stephen Smith, fully recognised the challenges of running a bid at relatively short notice. Luxembourg had declared its bid in 2001 and Finland in 2002. Even had Downer succeeded in 2004 in convincing his government to run, Australia still would have been several years behind.

This is a copy of the second page of Stephen Smith's letter to Kevin Rudd in 2008, which acknowledged that

'running a successful campaign [in 2008] will be very challenging and we will need quickly to develop a four year strategic approach to the task'.

The clear inference in the letter was that a later bid, for 2017-18, had far stronger prospects for success.

Commentators like Greg Sheridan have not minced words in condemning this bid – highlighting the ridiculousness of a race in which the serious threats against Australia are Finland, population 5 million, and a tiny country like Luxembourg ...

“We ought to be a shoo-in. We are a much more important nation than Luxembourg .. It’s our turn”.

And he’s right – in a rational universe, the contest between Australia, Finland and Luxembourg would not have been regarded with any significant degree of concern.

As it turns out, the UN’s universe appears to even more than irrational, choosing Luxembourg over Finland, which though small has a very distinguished history of international engagement.

Taking a step back, it’s worth looking at some of the indices of Australia’s global significance, and the reason why we ought to have been a ‘shoo-in’ for this bid. We are a nation which is often underestimated in its global heft – by others, but also by ourselves [Slide 5].

Australia has a population of 22 million compared with Luxembourg’s ½ a million (1/3 of which are foreign expatriates) – to give you an idea, that’s just a bit smaller than Newcastle in NSW; Australia has the world’s 13th largest economy - (Luxembourg’s GDP is around \$60bn compared with Australia’s 1.4 trillion – around 4/100’ths of the size). Australia has the world’s 13th largest defence budget (for now ...that’s a controversial topic) and the 11th largest aid budget (for now ... another controversial topic): in fact, with an aid budget of over \$5 bn in this financial year, and with plans to grow that from its current 0.35% GNI to 0.5% GNI in 2016-17, Australia is on track to become the 6th largest aid donor in the developed world.

All of this means that Australia has a huge stake, a stake which is higher for us than for most other nations in the world, in maintaining the health of its international engagement.

So, what took us so long to get back on the Security Council?

When I was involved in a Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee inquiry into Australia’s overseas representation which started late last year and reported back to Parliament last month, I looked at the history of the non-permanent seats on the Security Council and Australia’s performance in it.

I'm showing you a fairly complicated chart [Slide 6] – the next one's even worse, for which, my apologies. No need to look at the detail.

What it is, is an attempt to place in context various nations using some crude measures of their global weight (like GDP and population), their representation in the OECD or G20, the number of times they have sat on the Security Council in the last 20 years, and the size of their diplomatic networks.

This chart shows all the G20 nations and the number of times they've held a SC seat in the last 20 years. As you can see, Australia is almost at the bottom. This next chart [Slide 7] is all the G20 AND OECD nations – there are 42 of them. The important result for me of this investigation, which you can see if you scan down the first main column, is that Australia does not even make it to the first page.

Ahead of Finland, yes, but behind the Slovak Republic, Ireland, Sweden, Austria, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Belgium ... all countries far smaller than Australia but apparently far more successful at winning representation on the Security Council.

The next chart shows Australia [Slide 8]. There we are, in an ignominious 35th place, based on our record in the last 20 years.

Politically, there have been many, from both sides of politics, who've argued that it's not worth the cost and effort to try to rectify this lowly record.

But As Kevin Rudd contended in September this year just before the vote – there are very strong reasons for Australia to put itself up for membership of the SC, apart from the fact that we haven't been there for 27 years.

Rudd argued (and this was reflected in the government discussion promoting the bid): We have deployed forces in East Timor and Afghanistan under security council mandates, and during Australia's proposed term on the council it is likely to review those mandates [Slide 9].

The security council is more active than at any time in its history. It mandates 29 peacekeeping and political missions around the world with more than 100,000 troops and police deployed, often in places where no one else is prepared to go. In many of these situations it is the only force maintaining peace.

Australia has contributed more than 65,000 peacekeepers to UN and multilateral peace operations. We remain a significant contribution to peacekeeping - with more than 3200 troops and police currently deployed in peacekeeping missions abroad. Our Aid program is positioning Australia to become one of the largest donors in the developed world.

And Australia is a highly globalised nation with one of the most multicultural populations in the world.

Just to side track a bit, and because Kevin Rudd mentioned it specifically: talking about Australia's multiculturalism is not just a cliché [Slide 10]. Australia is, in fact, the most multicultural society in all of the developed world – just how multicultural was shown in the recent 2011 Census which came out in the middle of this year. And this, as Kevin argued, was another reason for ensuring that Australia maintains its global engagement to the best of its abilities.

Dennis Richardson put the case for the bid another way earlier last year [Slide 11], when he made a speech for the Lowy Institute in Canberra around the time we published a report on Australia's languishing diplomacy:

“And as the fourteenth largest economy in the world, it is pathetic that we should have a debate about whether we should or should not run for the UN Security Council once in a while. We were last on the UN Security Council in 1986. It is surely not asking too much that once every 20, 25 years we might not run for the UN Security Council. Indeed, relative to our place in the world, one might argue we should run more often.”

“But anyway, happy to take any questions on that. As you can see, I only have gentle views on the issue.”

And as Alexander Downer put it in his characteristically blunt manner (September 2011):

“If good countries like ours just abandon the Security Council, then that premier UN institution, which so defines the work of the UN, will be all the weaker for it.”

One of the principal criticisms of the bid has been its cost. All up it appears the bid has cost around \$24m. This is in the context of an annual budget of \$370 billion – and I'm afraid my calculator can't even work that out as a percentage, it's so small, and there are too many zeros [Slide 12].

Another criticism, and one that has been given rigorous treatment in my own workplace, is that it has distorted Australia's foreign policy. Various Senate Estimates hearings have probed the policy choices which the government has made in an apparent effort to boost support for Australia's bid. Commentators have focused on aid expenditure and the investment in new diplomatic posts to support that argument.

Which leads me irresistibly to a couple of observations: The first observation is on Australia's aid to Africa. Australia's expenditure on aid to Africa, most of which is directed to Sub-Saharan Africa, represents about 10% of our total country program

budget (as opposed to global projects) for 2012-13. Aid to Asia represents about 76% of the budget. There are 57 countries in Africa and with a population of over a billion people, it's the second most populous continent after Asia.

Africa is important to Australia, not just in terms of aid but in terms of our international engagement, trade and investment. There is a strong argument that Australia's attention and aid to Africa are simply catching up with its interest.

The second criticism of the bid has been the apparent distortion of our diplomacy and in particular, the opening of new posts in Africa, South America and China. What this criticism fails to comprehend is that Australia's network of diplomatic posts has long been in dire need of expansion – and this is something that I have been working on at the Lowy Institute and advocating for several years.

Four years ago, the Lowy Institute brought together a panel of eminent Australians [Slide 13]: former heads of Defence and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, leading foreign policy academics, bankers, financiers and our own Director Allan Gyngell, now the head of Australia's peak intelligence agency, the Office of National Assessments. Their brief was to help guide us, as researchers at the Institute, through an intensive investigation of Australia's international policy infrastructure, to assess its readiness to meet the challenges of the 21st century and to ensure Australia remains engaged, prosperous and secure.

What we found was a sobering picture: our Foreign Service was overstretched and hollowed out after decades of bipartisan neglect. It had been starved of funding, had suffered severe staff cutbacks and a hollowing-out of its overseas network.

This was the picture of Australia's diplomatic network in 2009 [Slide 14]. Not pretty.

Our overseas representation (then, 91 missions) compared very poorly with the OECD average of 150 posts over the (then) 192 member nations of the UN. The only countries with smaller representations were tiny nations a quarter the population of Australia (21 million). Australia's network was smaller than Finland's - 5 million, Norway's 5 million, Denmark's 5 million and Sweden's 9 million. The Netherlands, $\frac{3}{4}$ the size of Australia's population, had a diplomatic network of 150 posts compared with Australia's 91.

Though we suspected when we embarked on the investigation that the news wouldn't be good, this was a rude shock.

The countries that are ahead of Australia on this chart are largely countries located in much more settled neighbourhoods than Australia's, and enjoying the benefits of belonging to a regional bloc like the EU, or sharing a border with the world's most powerful nation, like Canada does with the US.

This is another way of looking at it [Slide 15]. Despite the growing demands on its services, DFAT's resourcing has not kept pace with the growth of other government agencies and functions. This chart [Slide 15] shows the growth in Defence and Aid spending, and shows again that expenditure on DFAT has almost flat-lined over the last 2 decades.

When trying to figure out just how Australia's network falls short, a good starting point is to actually look at the network of missions – its embassies, consulates, offices and multilateral missions.

What you see [Slide 16] is a diplomatic footprint that is out-dated and inadequate. You can see that in the global powerhouses – the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China) – our representation is sparse. We have a reasonable number of posts in South East Asia and the Pacific, but a marked density of representation in Western Europe and the Middle East.

Some of these concentrations are for very good reasons: traditional ties, trading relationships, the location of multilateral organisations and the like.

But when you look at Africa, South America and China, and Australia's representation on this map, the notion that Australia has distorted its foreign policy by placing new diplomatic missions in Africa, South America and China looks wrongheaded.

When we did our updated study in 2011, the picture was little better. The OECD has added 4 more nations – Estonia, Slovenia, Chile and Israel [Slide 17]. But Australia still languishes at 25th out of 34 in our new league table – hardly commensurate with our global standing on most meaningful measures.

We still lag in our diplomatic network behind Finland (population 5 million) Norway (population 4.8 million), Belgium (11 million), Sweden (9 million) and Czech Republic (10 million). These are much smaller countries located in a far more stable part of the world.

Since our 2009 report, Australia has added 4 more posts – Addis Ababa (where the new African Union headquarters is located), Lima (Peru – a re-opened post), and Mumbai and Chennai – former Austrade posts now managed by DFAT. But this is still a very small footprint compared with both the OECD. And of all the G20 nations, Australia has the smallest diplomatic network. If you recall that earlier complicated table where I showed you the number of times Australia has sat on the Security Council in the last twenty years – Australia was on the bottom of that table too. My conclusion: there has been a strong correlation between Australia's run-down diplomacy and Australia's standing in the UN.

This has not been, however, a calculated scaling back of our diplomacy in response to a falling demand for diplomatic representation: all the evidence was to the contrary – that Australia’s international engagement was rising, and demands on the Foreign Service were increasing exponentially, particularly for consular services. Yet Australia’s diplomatic network had not kept pace with either our interests or with the rapidly changing global landscape.

Australia is right in the middle of this rapidly changing landscape [Slide 18]. So much so that the government commissioned a White Paper to examine Australia’s role and opportunities in what has been dubbed the Asian Century.

Of course it’s not just Australia who thinks this is the Asian Century. Hillary Clinton’s said at the APEC summit earlier this year in that “*much of the history of the 21st century will be written in Asia*”. For the first time in Australia’s history, the global centre of gravity is shifting towards Australia, and transforming our region.

By 2050, almost two thirds of global GDP could be within 10,000 km of Australia. China and India have tripled their share of the global economy in the last 20 years, and China became Australia’s major trading partner sometime in 2007.

In terms of strategic and economic clout, the emergence of the G20 as the proper global economic forum shows the growing might of Asia – with 8 of the G20 members being Asian nations and Asia starting to assume its proper place in multilateral fora. The controversial US ‘pivot’ to Asia is just one indicator of the increasing strategic importance of the region.

The rise of the global middle class in developing nations, estimated at 400 million in 2005 but projected to number more than three billion by 2030, is driving the emergence of new regional centres of economic and political power, such as Shanghai, Mumbai and Sao Paulo (Brazil). Since 1970, close to four hundred million Chinese have moved to cities, with another 2-3 hundred million expected to do the same in the next twenty years. This emerging middle class is going to have huge implications for the globe, and Australia is located squarely in the region where all this growth is occurring.

Just to go back to some of those statistics on Australia’s international engagement [Slide 19]. By any measure, Australia is one of the most highly-globalised nations in the world. Foreign Policy’s 2007 Globalisation Index ranked Australia at 13th, based on measures of economic integration, human capital, information exchange and political engagement.

Yet as Australians, we are tempted to think of ourselves as an island nation. We tend to assume that we are ‘too far away to be affected, and too small to make a difference’, reluctant to engage internationally, and too remote to be affected by the world’s issues

and problems (as my former Director Michael Wesley argued in his book *There goes the neighbourhood* last year). Yet in fact, in the Asian Century, we have more reason than ever to promote and maintain the health of our international engagement.

Australians might ask why diplomacy is an important function in our international engagement, when trade, tourism and exports like education are available to promote the country.

Some might say the role of diplomacy is self-evident, given our global engagement and our increasing reliance on Asia. Others take a mercantilist approach and eschew diplomacy for trade.

This comment of journalist Dan Flitton a couple of years ago [Slide 20] is as good a description as I've seen on why diplomacy is important to Australia. Diplomacy fosters understanding between nations. Understanding leads to relationships, and strong relationships can preclude military options, and that's cheaper than war.

Which leads me back to the topic which you probably think I wandered away from: the seat on the Security Council is a unique opportunity to improve Australia's understanding of its fellow UN member nations, build its relationships and further its friendships.

Back to the bid [Slide 21]. But we won, didn't we? So there's nothing wrong with our diplomacy, right?

When one considers the success of Australia's bid for the Security Council, it's very tempting to run the argument that DFAT's effective work means that it is sufficiently well-resourced and Australia's diplomatic network and skills are in good shape, despite all the evidence to the contrary.

I wholeheartedly agree that DFAT did a good job. Bob Carr's diplomacy leading up to the bid was also very prominent, though there are some questions to be asked about the intense level of attention he paid to matters such as the Melinda Taylor case and the ramifications that may have in the future in committing political leaders to the same high level lobbying on behalf of Australian citizens caught in trouble overseas.

At the time, I argued that Australia's diplomats, such as our ambassador to Italy, David Ritchie, are highly experienced operators who would arguably do as well without high-level ministerial intervention – which might ultimately be unsustainable in the future.

Quibbles aside, what must not be forgotten is the final strategic move which surely clinched the deal: as reported by the Wall Street Journal reported on the day of the vote, Australia's secret weapon was a chocolate koala [Slide 22].

On a more serious note, though. My fear is that prospects for the future of Australia's diplomacy, now that we have won the Security Council seat, are no better, and possibly worse, than they were a few short months ago.

The 1500 meetings that Gary Quinlan, our ambassador to the UN, must attend over the next two years are just one indicator of the huge additional workload that Australia's diplomacy now faces – a workload that without adequate new resources for the department, might well hobble its ability to do much of its other crucial work.

And that's just the administrative burden. The really important tests, and the ones requiring the best analysis and creative thinking that Australia's foreign policy minds can muster, are the policy issues that the Security Council role will throw Australia's way over the next two years.

The events of this week and the vote on Palestine's observer status at the United Nations have hinted at the challenges that will test Australia's policy mettle and credentials over the next two years on the Security Council. As my colleague Hugh White has argued: being on the council has the potential to cause Australia quite some pain in terms of the relationships that matter most to us, particularly with the US and China ... it will throw up all sorts of issues Australia wouldn't normally adopt a position on [Slide 23].

There are security issues in our region which will undoubtedly feature.

In East Timor, for example, the International Stabilisation Force has started to withdraw and will have left East Timor finally by April 2013, after over 6 years of security operations following the 2006 civil disturbances which resulted in over 100,000 people being displaced internally. The situation in Timor will need careful monitoring in the handover to East Timor's still inexperienced security forces. RAMSI is a continuing commitment for Australia under the auspices of UN endorsement. Bougainville's referendum on independence is on the agenda in the next two years, possibly in preparing for a vote on independence in 2015.

In the South China Sea, Australia has a stake in ensuring stable maritime relations between China and Japan to preserve the vital shipping routes for commodities in Asia. In relation to China, Australia will face the challenge which has already been publicly thrown down by Chinese officials – that Australia must take an 'unbiased' attitude to disputes in the South China Sea, without continual deference to the United States.

Australia's position between the US and China will require a delicate balancing of the need to prove Australia's independence, while preserving the relationship with the US as our alliance partner.

Australia's decision this week to abstain from the vote on Palestine might be a hint of the government's intention not to align itself uniformly with the United States on all key Security Council decisions.

Other issues which will arise are the situation in Syria, sanctions against Iran and North Korea, and managing Australia's retreat from ISAF and withdrawal military engagement in Afghanistan.

And finally, Bob Carr has signalled at a speech to the Lowy Institute earlier this year that a global small-arms treaty and nuclear non-proliferation would be priorities for Australia on the Council.

This is a challenging and ambitious agenda.

What all this signals to me is that Australia's Security Council win is a wake-up call to government and political leaders on both sides of the political fence. If Australia is going to engage effectively with the outside world – which it must, given the extent of our international engagement already and the very complex and dynamic region in which we are located – then we will need to equip ourselves properly to do the job well. That means not just additional resources for our run-down diplomatic infrastructure, but applying the best and most creative minds to fashion an independent standing and position for this nation, to maintain what has been a proud tradition of middle-power diplomacy.

If I can leave you with one thought, from a paper prepared by the Institute of International Affairs (in an article by Thom Woodroffe) on Australia's role and contribution to the Security Council should it win the seat. It's actually a quote from a speech at the Lowy Institute in 2009 by Colin Keating, NZ's ambassador to the UN in the early 90s:

'For a medium sized state like Australia, which does its homework, which is professional and focused, which is balanced and fair minded ... which shuns grandstanding but is always unafraid to speak the truth as it sees it, will get much more respect from the P5, from friends and allies and from wider constituencies [...] than a Council member which chooses the passive option.'

This week, I think that's an apt line to finish on.

[ends]

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The UN Security Council seat
and Australia's diplomacy for the Asian century


Alex Oliver, Research Fellow

2 December 2012

History of the bid

- Total times on Council: 4
- Last on the Council 1985-6
- Failed bid in 1996

Reasons?



Percy Spender (Image: Wikimedia commons)



*Doc Evatt, Ben Chifley and Clement Atlee
(Image: Wikimedia commons)*

1996 bid

- WEOG
- Australia vs Portugal and Sweden

Later attempt by Downer 2004



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In making this recommendation, I do not underestimate the size of the task. We will be running against Finland and Luxembourg. While both are smaller states than Australia, they are well-regarded in the UN and both are EU members. They have already been campaigning for several years already.

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As discussed, I will raise the prospect with the New Zealand Prime Minister during my visit to New Zealand this week.


Running a successful campaign will be very challenging and we will need quickly to develop a four year strategic approach to the task. I would propose to bring a Submission forward to Cabinet in the next few months. This would involve a whole-of-government approach as well as extensive representation activity and promotional travel. I would anticipate that my Department would develop a New Policy Proposal in the context of the 2009-2010 budget to support the bid that Prime Ministerial and Ministerial travel would be used to underpin our candidacy

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Yours sincerely



Stephen Smith

Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade
- DECLASSIFIED -
DATE
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Australia's global significance

- 13th most globalised nation (Sydney 12th most globalised city)
- 13th largest economy
- \$A the 5th most traded currency (2012)
- 13th largest defence budget
- 11th largest aid budget



Table 1: All G20 nations - Membership of the Security Council

Ranked by number of times on the Security Council from 1992.

| Member | GDP rank | GDP | Number of times on UN Security Council | Number of times on Security Council from 1992 | Number of diplomatic missions** |
|--------------|----------|------------|--|---|---------------------------------|
| France | 5 | 2,560,002 | PM | PM | 277 |
| Russia | 11 | 1,479,819 | PM | PM | 263 |
| US | 1 | 14,582,400 | PM | PM | 259 |
| China | 2 | 5,878,629 | PM | PM | 248 |
| UK | 6 | 2,246,079 | PM | PM | 242 |
| Brazil | 7 | 2,087,890 | 10 | 4 | 217 |
| Japan | 3 | 5,497,813 | 10 | 4 | 204 |
| Argentina | 27 | 368,712 | 8 | 3 | 144 |
| Germany | 4 | 3,309,669 | 5 | 3 | 214 |
| India | 9 | 1,729,010 | 7 | 2 | 176 |
| Italy | 8 | 2,051,412 | 6 | 2 | 222 |
| Mexico | 13 | 1,039,662 | 4 | 2 | 145 |
| Indonesia | 18 | 706,558 | 3 | 2 | 119 |
| South Africa | 28 | 363,704 | 2 | 2 | 117 |
| Canada | 10 | 1,574,052 | 6 | 1 | 133 |
| Turkey | 17 | 735,264 | 4 | 1 | 193 |
| S Korea | 14 | 1,014,483 | 1 | 1 | 146 |
| Australia* | 13 | 1,355,791 | 4 | 0 | 108 |
| Saudi Arabia | 26 | 375,766 | 0 | 0 | 108 |

| | Member | GDP rank (2010 current prices World Bank) | GDP 2010 (current prices World Bank) | Population [^] (millions) | Rank based on population [^] | OECD | G20 | Number of times on UN Security Council | Number of times on Security Council from 1992 | Number of diplomatic missions ^{**} |
|----|--------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|------|-----|--|---|---|
| 1 | UK | 6 | 2,246,079 | 63.1 | 22 | / | / | PM | PM | 242 |
| 2 | China | 2 | 5,878,629 | 1343.2 | 1 | | / | PM | PM | 248 |
| 3 | US | 1 | 14,582,400 | 313.8 | 3 | / | / | PM | PM | 259 |
| 4 | Russia | 11 | 1,479,819 | 138.1 | 9 | | / | PM | PM | 263 |
| 5 | France | 5 | 2,560,002 | 65.6 | 21 | / | / | PM | PM | 277 |
| 6 | Japan | 3 | 5,497,813 | 127.4 | 10 | / | / | 10 | 4 | 204 |
| 7 | Brazil | 7 | 2,087,890 | 208.7 | 5 | | / | 10 | 4 | 217 |
| 8 | Argentina | 27 | 368,712 | 42.2 | 32 | | / | 8 | 3 | 144 |
| 9 | Canada ^a | 10 | 1,574,052 | 34.3 | 36 | / | / | 6 | 3 | 133 |
| 10 | Germany | 4 | 3,309,669 | 81.0 | 16 | / | / | 5 | 3 | 214 |
| 11 | India | 9 | 1,729,010 | 1205.1 | 2 | | / | 7 | 2 | 176 |
| 12 | Italy | 8 | 2,051,412 | 61.3 | 23 | / | / | 6 | 2 | 222 |
| 13 | Belgium ^l | 21 | 467,472 | 10.4 | 82 | / | | 5 | 2 | 132 |
| 14 | Chile | 43 | 203,443 | 17.1 | 63 | / | | 4 | 2 | 120 |
| 15 | Mexico | 13 | 1,039,662 | 115.0 | 11 | / | / | 4 | 2 | 145 |
| 16 | Indonesia | 18 | 706,558 | 248.2 | 4 | | / | 3 | 2 | 119 |
| 17 | Portugal | 37 | 228,538 | 10.8 | 77 | / | | 3 | 2 | 129 |
| 18 | South Africa | 28 | 363,704 | 48.8 | 26 | | / | 2 | 2 | 117 |
| 19 | Poland | 20 | 468,585 | 38.4 | 33 | / | | 5 | 1 | 135 |
| 20 | Netherlands ^b | 16 | 783,413 | 16.7 | 64 | / | | 5 | 1 | 150 |
| 21 | Denmark | 31 | 310,405 | 5.5 | 110 | / | | 4 | 1 | 97 |
| 22 | Norway | 23 | 414,462 | 4.7 | 120 | / | | 4 | 1 | 110 |
| 23 | Turkey | 17 | 735,264 | 79.8 | 17 | / | / | 4 | 1 | 193 |
| 24 | Spain ^l | 12 | 1,407,405 | 47.0 | 27 | / | | 4 | 1 | 229 |
| 25 | Austria ^d | 25 | 376,162 | 8.2 | 94 | / | | 3 | 1 | 108 |
| 26 | Sweden ^{e,f,g} | 22 | 458,004 | 9.1 | 92 | / | | 3 | 1 | 100 |
| 27 | Ireland | 42 | 203,892 | 4.7 | 119 | / | | 3 | 1 | 74 |
| 28 | New Zealand | 55 | 126,679 | 4.3 | 126 | / | | 3 | 1 | 54 |
| 29 | Hungary | 54 | 130,419 | 10.0 | 87 | / | | 2 | 1 | 93 |
| 30 | South Korea ^h | 14 | 1,014,483 | 48.8 | 25 | / | / | 1 | 1 | 155 |
| 31 | Greece | 32 | 304,865 | 10.8 | 78 | / | | 1 | 1 | 144 |
| 32 | Czech Rep | 46 | 192,152 | 10.2 | 84 | / | | 1 | 1 | 107 |
| 33 | Slovak Republic | 60 | 89,034 | 5.5 | 113 | / | | 1 | 1 | 80 |

| | Member | GDP rank (2010 current prices World Bank) | GDP 2010 (current prices World Bank) | Pop-ulation ^ (millions) | Rank based on pop-ulation ^ | OECD | G20 | Number of times on UN Security Council | Number of times on Security Council from 1992 | Number of diplo-matic missions ** |
|----|--------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|------|-----|--|---|-----------------------------------|
| 34 | Slovenia | 74 | 47,763 | 2.0 | 146 | ✓ | | 1 | 1 | 57 |
| 35 | Australia* | 13 | 1,355,791 | 22.0 | 54 | ✓ | ✓ | 4 | | 108/(95) * |
| 36 | Finland | 34 | 238,801 | 5.3 | 116 | ✓ | | 2 ^a | | 96 |
| 37 | Switzerland ^b | 19 | 523,772 | 7.7 | 96 | ✓ | | | | 138 |
| 38 | Saudi Arabia | 26 | 375,766 | 26.5 | 46 | | ✓ | | | 108 |
| 39 | Iceland | 115 | 12,594 | 0.3 | 179 | ✓ | | | | 23 |
| 40 | Luxembourg | 69 | 55,096 | 0.5 | 173 | ✓ | | | | 25 |
| 41 | Estonia | 102 | 18,674 | 1.3 | 156 | ✓ | | | | 47 |
| 42 | Israel | 41 | 217,334 | 7.6 | 97 | ✓ | | | | 94 |

= smaller GDP than Australia, larger number of posts (based on DFAT count – 108 posts for Australia which includes Austrade posts which provide only consular services)


= smaller GDP than Australia, larger number of posts (based on LI count – 95 full diplomatic posts for Australia)

Arguments for participating in the Security Council – Rudd 2012

- Military engagement
- Peacekeeping
- Aid
- Multiculturalism



% born overseas



Dennis Richardson, DFAT Secretary, October 2011

"If we accept that the UN Security Council has a force and relevancy sufficient to provide the mandate for Australian troops to fight and die overseas - and we accept it has the mandate enabling us to impose sanctions on other countries - then it is an important institution and it is reasonable for us from time to time to seek temporary membership of that council," he said. "The fact we haven't been on that council in 25 years only highlights the legitimacy of the bid we're making this time round."



Image: Lowy Institute

Incoming brief to Foreign Minister Bob Carr, March 2012

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE
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[REDACTED]
UN SECURITY COUNCIL CAMPAIGN

Objectives

- Australia elected to the UN Security Council in October 2012 for a 2013-14 term, in order to advance our regional and multilateral interests.

Proposed action

- Make clear the Government's continued commitment to the campaign [s 33 (a)(iii)]
[REDACTED]
- Extensive travel up to the vote, [s 33 (a)(iii)]
[REDACTED]
- [s 33 (a)(iii)]
[REDACTED]

Diplomatic Deficit - 2009


- Funding
- Staffing
- Overseas network

“I do feel that the Department of Foreign Affairs ... has been allowed to run down to a dangerously low level ... we can't go on doing more with less ... these sorts of undertakings do need to be properly resourced”


Richard Woolcott, former Secretary, DFAT; 2008



Number of diplomatic missions – OECD nations



Defence, DFAT and ODA spending 1996-2015




Australian diplomatic missions


■ Embassy or High Commission
■ Consulate-General or Consulate

▲ Embassy and Permanent Mission
▲ Consulate and Permanent Mission

■ Permanent Mission



Number of missions - OECD nations - 2011



Global power shifts

- Strategic
- Economic
- People movements




Flickr user Beltzner, creative commons licence

“When a person first gets a car, a computer and a mobile phone, it changes their life. When hundreds of millions of people first get these things, it changes the world”

Julia Gillard, September 2011

Australia's international engagement

- 13th most globalised nation (Sydney 12th most globalised city)
- 13th largest economy
- \$A the 5th most traded currency (2012)
- 1 in 5 jobs depend on exports
- 13th largest defence budget
- 11th largest aid budget



Cover: *There goes the neighbourhood*, Wesley, 2011

Diplomacy and international engagement

2012-13:

- Defence \$24 billion
- Aid \$5 billion
- Diplomacy \$0.95 billion



“The most important function of the diplomat is to understand their patch with Australian eyes – with Australian interests top of mind ... to achieve outcomes in Australia’s interests, we will need to find friends among this diverse range of countries as power shifts to Asia, India, South America and Africa. It is more important than ever to know how these nations think ”

Daniel Flitton, *The Age*, 2010

Factors in success:

- Vigorous diplomacy by Prime Minister and Foreign Minister
- Foreign Minister's role in the ICC/Taylor detention case?
- Effective work by DFAT



Factors in success:



Australia's policy agenda in 2013-14

- Maritime security in Asia region
- Security in East Timor, PNG, Solomon Islands
- Afghanistan
- Syria
- Small arms
- Nuclear non-proliferation

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