How Defence Can Contribute to Australia’s National Security Strategy

Executive Summary

Australia’s First National Security Statement demands a defence force ready to respond to diverse security challenges, and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is well advanced in this regard. But the ADF also has much to offer in delivering another of the priority policy responses called for in the Statement: an unprecedented degree of coordination among the nation’s many security agencies and capabilities. The Defence experience has important lessons for the creation of a truly coordinated national security community.

In the context set out by the National Security Statement, the ADF necessarily must act in concert – both between the Services as well as with other agencies. Moreover, its mission must be recognised as supporting a broader spectrum of operations and activities, underpinned by an ability to transition rapidly between them.

Beyond this, Defence can actively support more effective interactions across the national security complex. Australia should draw on Defence and the ADF’s resident experience in interoperability and deliberate planning at high levels of scale, diversity and complexity. The machinery by which Defence establishes its strategic priorities and allocations can be adapted and exported. And the wider adoption of its planning culture, forged to operate under conditions of risk and uncertainty, could make a major contribution to any successful national security strategy.
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Redefining security for Australia and its interests

Australia’s long-awaited first National Security Statement met with mixed media commentary and analysis. Critics called it ‘generalised and wish-washy’ and ‘a missed opportunity that lacked detail and gave little guidance’, and the Statement and its agenda soon largely disappeared from public discussion. Nonetheless, the Statement does provide a useful foundation for new policy directions.

Responding to flux in global challenges, the Statement literally redefines the security of Australia and its interests, and clearly implies a contribution from the ADF beyond a narrow definition of ‘defence’. Defence must act to broaden the Government’s and its own understanding of its full capacity to contribute to national security, both in terms of its operations and activities as well as the lessons it could offer for more effective interactions among the national security community, to ensure Australia’s national security challenges are holistically met.

This Lowy Institute Analysis identifies that ADF and Defence contribution necessary to meet the three national security policy responses outlined in the National Security Statement: participation in an activist diplomatic strategy; delivering a versatile ADF ready to respond; and aiding in building a national security community and capabilities that work together.

In doing so, the paper will focus on the latter two responses. This permits a more comprehensive treatment of the remaining national security-related contributions the Statement seeks from Defence, beyond a narrower analysis of the ADF’s role in strictly defence or other national security-related operations, as outlined in the May 2009 Defence White Paper.

The Statement’s scope transcended portfolios and Commonwealth and State/Territory jurisdictions; tellingly, it demonstrates both the pervasiveness of the Statement’s guidance, and the extent to which the Statement draws on the Report of the Homeland and Border Security Review (Homeland Security Report). The roles of the ADF Services are discussed, as are those of the Australian Defence Organisation groups and executives that support them. Importantly, the Statement also introduced new concepts as policy. The ‘all-hazards’ concept allows a properly holistic discussion of national security, as does endorsing a risk-based approach, giving long-overdue government endorsement of a scientific basis for defining and ranking all hazards at the national level.

Challenges and policy responses

For the ADF and Defence, the Statement poses two fundamental questions. First, is the ADF’s mission still, as the Chief of the Defence Force put it in 2007, ‘to defend Australia and our national interests’? Second, is the ADF the only executive agent of that ‘defence’ mission, with the other parts of Defence and other arms of government limited to providing supporting functions? It has been accepted for some time that ‘defending’ in its narrowest sense does not explain all that ADF and Defence do, and that they are expected to safeguard, protect and promote national interests as well. Moreover, these roles are not unique to any one agency.
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The Statement and the Homeland Security Report explicitly acknowledge those functions beyond warfighting that Australia’s military has performed throughout its history, in both operational and non-operational settings, and both at home and abroad. In this way, form has begun to acknowledge the functional realities of the ADF’s recent and ongoing employment. To meet its rather scattergun list of ‘sweeping new challenges’ to Australian national security, the Statement identifies three key National Security Policy Responses:

- ‘An activist diplomatic strategy ... aimed at keeping our region peaceful and prosperous.’
- ‘An ADF ... ready to respond ... in a range of situations from combat operations to disaster relief.’
- ‘Building and maintaining national security agencies and capabilities that work ... together’.

There are both specific and implied contributions – existing and new – from the ADF and wider Defence organisation within these three whole-of-government areas of policy response. The Statement sets these against a national security backdrop that is necessarily broader than the 2009 Defence White Paper and its predecessors. It is against this larger canvas that Defence’s part in Australia’s national security must be better understood.

Defence’s part – an activist diplomatic strategy

Firstly, the Statement implies a non-operational contribution from Defence in diplomacy, which is reinforced in the 2009 Defence White Paper. The Lowy Institute’s recent Blue Ribbon Panel report, Australia’s diplomatic deficit, also acknowledges the importance of Defence’s non-military activities to advancing Australian interests.

Senior Defence leadership and the ADF Services presently carry out extensive dialogue and other forms of diplomacy with foreign counterparts. Although that is not the focus of this paper, it is worth stressing that harnessing and harmonising Defence’s efforts with those of other agencies will be key to success in Australia’s ‘activist diplomatic strategy’.

Defence’s part – an ADF ready to respond

The second part of Defence’s contribution is the deceptively simply-phrased goal of ensuring the ADF is ‘ready to respond’, from ‘combat operations to disaster relief’. This operational aspect is also properly the focus of the recent Defence White Paper, which reconfirms that the ADF is expected to do more than ‘defend’. The ADF must therefore possess – or have at its ready disposal – the capability to effectively perform all of those missions, but also the readiness to do so rapidly, and the agility to transition between operations. The Statement thereby dictates certain characteristics of the ADF that will affect its balance of capabilities between Reserve and Regular forces, its overall levels of readiness, and the enabling and strategic support needed to carry out such operations.

Domestically, the ADF already contributes to multi-agency activities, including in less
noticed ways, such as the Army Aboriginal Community Assistance Program, and latent domestic security capabilities including counter-terrorism and chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear-explosive incident response. The ADF also supports civil community endeavours, at varying levels of public visibility. These contributions involve major equipment, logistic and enabler support, personnel, training, mobility and, crucially, planning and coordination expertise — attributes that the ADF also brings to tasks in Australia’s region or globally.

The Statement encourages agencies of all jurisdictions — as does the Homeland Security Report — to continue augmenting those of their capabilities that are not uniquely military. However, Defence is duly recognised as a ‘contingency organisation’, because of its inherent size, self-sustainment, versatility, resilience, and faculty for planning and coordination at large scale: it will invariably be called upon to tackle events that other agencies lack the scale, projection, self-protection or self-sufficiency to handle. Notwithstanding the declared role of the recently-announced Australian ‘Deployable Civilian Capacity’, any notion of fielding a suitably comparable high-readiness, highly-deployable ‘civil defence’-style corps in dangerous or austere settings could invite correspondingly high cost.

The Australian Army is currently implementing deep changes to enhance the adaptiveness and ‘plug-and-play’ traits of its command and control structures, to deal with likely operational challenges in the complex future land environment. Many of the enabling capabilities it needs to operate autonomously also make it able to provide similar, rapidly customised support to other agencies. Many public and government services and functions must be carried out, regardless of whether conflict or instability is occurring. The congested and complex operating environments of the future will at times be too hazardous or extreme for non-military forces to operate safely or effectively — whether they are drawn from the proposed Deployable Civilian Capacity or not. The ADF’s land forces will therefore at times be expected to actively assist in delivering those same services and functions as would normally be delivered by non-ADF departments and agencies.

Thus, the ADF is intrinsically structured to perform or support tasks wider than combat operations. This is not to suggest that the ADF should develop niche capabilities beyond those required to operate and sustain itself in a threatening or hazardous environment. Rather, the ADF and its national security partner agencies need to focus on cultivating a willingness to engage early across their jurisdictional and departmental boundaries, to strike the optimum balance. This applies equally to newer, non-traditional threats, as the box below suggests. State governments must anticipate better those events that may be beyond their capacity, to provide warning to and initiate multiagency planning with Commonwealth agencies — especially the ADF. Similarly, the Commonwealth must continue to improve its ability to assess when States and Territories might require assistance. The necessary trust and confidence will only develop as agencies increase understanding of each others’ roles.
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Cyber-attack: a new test of coordination and early engagement

The advent of cyber-attack poses a vexing coordination problem. The ADF Services and Defence are likely targets themselves, and would play a substantial part in a national policy response. The White Paper’s announcement of a Cyber Security Operations Centre within Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) affirms this. Moreover, countering cyber-attack is clearly a mission that requires a variety of responses, including where attacks may necessitate those that are decidedly ‘executive’ in nature.

Defence through DSD, the Defence Security Agency and Chief Information Officer Group will play a substantive role in the response because it has unique capabilities and responsibilities in the field. But none of this means that Defence will be the leading – or only – part of the national security complex to respond, given the pervasive nature of such threats. Intelligence and other agencies such as the Attorney-General’s Department, as well as States and the civil sector, are also likely to have key roles. That the national response would need to be brokered at the earliest opportunity, and tailored to each such attack, drives home the importance of understanding Defence’s contribution in a broader national response context.

Defence’s part – sharing lessons for cooperative national security capabilities

The third response assigns Defence (along with its national security partners) an implied task of contributing collective effort and leadership to ‘building and maintaining ... national security agendas and capabilities that work together’. However, this is not so much leadership in an operational form, but rather a policy leadership with its national security complex partners.

Are Defence’s methodologies pertinent for wider application?

Before considering the utility of any Defence contribution to improving the collaborative processes across the rest of the national security complex, it may pay to review its validity and appropriateness as such a role model.

Validity. To the outsider, Defence’s organisation may seem as ‘one hierarchic, bureaucratically-organised Department’. However, reflecting both its ancestry of four separate departments and the diversity and complexity of its business, Defence’s structure is more a confederation of independent and disparate programs, with a common purpose but often with competing priorities to achieve their part of the goal. In this way, its structure has more in common with the interactions of government between portfolios, than it does with an individual department of comparable dimensions.

Appropriateness. In meeting the challenge of coordinating such diversity, Defence demonstrates certain exportable coordination mechanisms required by any complex organisational behaviour model. These include well-established, holistic military strategic and corporate governance policy, a working system of what is, in effect, multi-agency budgetary allocation, and functioning frameworks and processes to develop and procure capabilities. It is important to recognise – as the ANAO has recently done – that these exist, even if they are sometimes imperfectly applied.
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Defence is already extrapolating the ADF’s heritage of combined-arms and joint operations between the Services to working with other elements of the national security complex. Nonetheless, the Statement seeks to take that evolution further. Each department and agency clearly has something to learn from its partners: however, Defence has extensive recent experience and unique insights into interoperability and multi-agency coordination, through its mass, diversity, complexity and history. Defence and the ADF therefore need to make a priority of identifying where they have ideas to offer to the rest of the national security community, and share accordingly. There are arguments for this in terms both of security strategy and corporate strategy.

A shared national security strategy

Australia’s Military Strategy is a classified, regularly updated Defence text that marshals military judgements about the strategic environment. It links potential contingencies, national strategic objectives and military response options, to help set standing force preparedness levels. It also describes the key ‘components’ of military strategy – namely: deter, deny, defeat, assist, understand and shape. Only one – ‘defeat’ – is the exclusive purview of the military, whereas all others can be – and are – performed by other government agencies. The holistic nature of the suite of these components allows this document to offer the basis of a strategy for all of Australia’s national security complex.

Close relationships between national defence strategies and national security strategies exist in a number of strategically-minded countries.

In Russia and the US, a national security strategy provides guidance for subordinate defence strategies, while the UK national security strategy categorically states Britain’s intent ‘to improve connections between defence, development, foreign and domestic security strategies’. For Australia, moving to the next step of a true national security strategy not only needs to meet Australia’s strategic challenges through an approach that is relevant and applicable to all the national security community: it must integrate meaningfully with Defence’s own judgements on when and how to respond.

Corporate strategy

Although there is still much more to do, the ADF’s Services have made solid progress towards joint operations in recent years. Defence continues to refine coordination of its disparate internal programs, as well as its management of joint capabilities. Operationally, the creation of Military Strategic Commitments Division, construction of Headquarters Joint Operations Command and the ongoing successful execution of multiple overseas operations have generated a depth of Australian planning experience and ability – although specifically at the higher headquarters and unit level – unknown since the Vietnam War.

Limitations in multiagency deliberate planning

At the national level, the new Crisis Coordination Centre (CCC) amalgamates Emergency Management Australia and the Protective Security Coordination Centre, to create clear and direct communication with
commanders at the scene of an incident, with the aim of better decision-making and coordination of response.\textsuperscript{44} In contrast to Defence’s tackling of contingencies, however, limitations to the CCC’s operation exist. As envisaged, the CCC is not capable of coordinating protracted operations, or preparing deliberate plans against specific and grave contingencies.\textsuperscript{45} The CCC might not need to conduct deliberate planning when the incidents that it deals with are effectively random, isolated and/or short-term. But this approach stops working as soon as events attain levels of interconnectedness, organisation and scale that credibly pose grave threats to national interests.\textsuperscript{46}

Furthermore, the CCC’s responsibilities now encompass ‘fire, floods and counter-terrorism’, but distinctions blur with regard to hazards like lethal pandemics, whether deliberately spread or otherwise. The coordination of non-domestic\textsuperscript{47} operations is also vexed: to limit the Centre to purely domestic concerns belies the transnational nature of most national security hazards, and it’s not as if there are standing alternatives for strategic-level, multi-agency non-domestic coordination.\textsuperscript{48} The Strategic Policy Coordination Group at deputy secretary level may provide strategic oversight and direction across agencies,\textsuperscript{49} but its remit and agenda space is more given to issues as they arise, than stewardship of protracted operations.

A more effective alternative drawing on Defence practice might be a standing operations centre capable of planning and directing responses. This would need its own, well-resourced administrative hierarchy, and an agency or agencies tasked with its sponsorship, additionally resourced and empowered – effectively the multi-agency equivalent of Military Strategic Commitments Division for Defence’s Strategic Command Group. Despite its seeming improbability in an Australian context, efforts to enshrine such multi-agency, strategic-level planning have been made elsewhere, including even in the United Nations.\textsuperscript{50}

Likewise, the Services as capability managers and Defence as a whole have also developed policy management, shared terms and definitions, as well as common resource bidding and budgetary allocation techniques that could provide models for the ‘multi-agency coordination on research and capability development’ sought by the Homeland Security Report.

**Limitations in national security resource allocation**

The Statement warns that national security hazards may not neatly follow departmental jurisdictions, and could occur in both parallel and protracted circumstances. Yet, somehow, government resources must be allocated effectively to deal with them, taking into account competing interests and functions.\textsuperscript{51} The Statement lists ten national security priorities, but they lack detail or relativity of importance. Their successors will need to be refined, clearly described and ranked, to better guide both long-term and day-to-day operations, and to justify the apportionment of outlays across the national security complex, including Defence spending.\textsuperscript{52}

Division of responsibility and resources for major national security challenges – both crises and ongoing concerns – cannot be determined
by the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC) establishing little more than which agency will take the ‘policy lead’. The NSC’s coordinating limits have not been fully tested by the contingencies encountered since the body’s creation in 1999: the future will doubtless bring challenges engaging multiple agencies, potentially involving greater outlays and consequences - including mass casualties - than any experienced so far. The newly-created National Security Adviser’s (NSA) position will remain vexed unless it is accompanied by a clear mandate and mechanism for assigning policy authority, resources and priority of effort to drive cooperative actions across jurisdictions over protracted periods.

The establishment of clear, agreed strategic priorities and attendant allocation of all forms of resources is central in both contingency response and corporate development within Defence. And it is this machinery by which Defence establishes those priorities and allocations that can be adapted and exported across the national security complex. In the operational sense, these drive the effective prosecution of multiple and diverse missions for both crises and ongoing operations. Corporately, Defence uses a cascading policy framework and its committee structure to inform and implement ministerial and government decisions to support disparate and competing programs’ strategic needs and capability requirements.

One way of illustrating how Defence’s coordination mechanisms might have broader whole-of-government applicability is to consider the functional parallels that can be drawn between Defence’s programs and key Federal portfolios (see appendix 3). For instance, both Commonwealth and Defence frameworks have leadership, policy and governance, finance, intelligence, information technology, infrastructure, legal, human services and scientific divisions. Importantly, the ‘executive’ portfolios such as foreign affairs, trade and defence themselves have parallels in the three Services as ‘output’ groups.

Of course, the detail and specifics of role and function differ, but it is clear that basic organisational tenets are shared. It follows that a derivative of the inter-program coordination machinery Defence uses to conduct operations and corporate development successfully, could have potential application for the national security complex.

A ‘sound framework’

The distinction between defence procurement and acquisition, and the relative success with which the rest of Defence actually operates is also salient. It is often argued that room for improvement exists in the way Defence does its acquisition business, including for instance in its coordination with the Department of Finance for procurement and budgetary clarity. However, it is worth noting that the mid-2009 Australian National Audit Office report on Planning and approval of defence major capital equipment projects endorses Defence’s key management mechanisms as ones that ‘provide a sound framework’, allowing programs to internally communicate and coordinate. This is effectively saying that many of the shortfalls of Defence acquisition occur despite the sound processes laid down, and reinforces the validity of extrapolating such principles to other portfolios in the national security complex.
A professional culture of coordination is equally important. Defence still has some distance to go in this regard, but at least has started on the journey. Investment in professional development in the ADF is unmatched elsewhere in the Australian Public Service, although there are still gaps in extending education in such subjects as organisational theory, management and leadership – taught at the Australian Defence College – to all senior relevant military and civilian staff.\footnote{58}

The following provides a short list of Defence and ADF corporate practice and culture which could usefully be adopted more widely. Importing such tenets across the national security community would amount to a significant cultural change, demanding sensitivity and accommodation. But this should not be impossible.

‘Modernisation’ over ‘reactiveness’ – a deliberate planning culture

The sheer scale of Defence’s departmental outlay, the complexity of its core business and the lead times required to generate necessary capability ‘on line, in time’ demand adaptiveness. There are few parallels of stewardship of such vast, politically-charged, dynamic and interlinked outlays in capital investment in the private sector, let alone elsewhere in government. The ADF’s organisational culture of deliberate planning that has been developed in operational settings is equally applied here: it aims systematically to identify constants or certainty, reduce or hedge against uncertainty, and replace assumption with fact as early as possible. Such a planning culture, under conditions of risk and uncertainty, is key to any successful national security approach.\footnote{59}

However, a corresponding national-level strategic approach to security cannot occur unless it is directed by a common set of priorities, informed by composite intelligence assessments and policy judgements, and capable of deliberate planning. Such planning needs to set clear national strategic objectives and allocate responsibilities and resources accordingly. Furthermore, it needs to be able to orchestrate actions across many jurisdictions, against prolonged events spanning domestic and non-domestic settings. These are planning faculties, in addition to the coordinating arrangements that the Statement seeks to improve – capable of driving sustained multi-agency, strategic-level commitments. It’s a capability that will remain beyond Australia’s reach unless future Government policy directs its establishment, preferably within the auspices of the CCC, or conceivably within the new NSA Group.

Towards a shared capability development doctrine

Shared processes for how Defence capability is developed are now established among Defence programs. The Capability Life Cycle and agreed Capability Planning Principles are cornerstones in prioritising competing needs across the Department.\footnote{60} Similarly, Defence’s committee system of capability governance and oversight\footnote{61} is also worth considering for adoption in generic terms beyond Defence. Such standardisation of approach to the process of developing new capabilities need not
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prevent flexibility or innovation. Recent Defence-wide reforms are continuing towards more agile ‘rapid acquisition’ of capability in response to pressing operational needs.

Across Defence, the term Fundamental Inputs to Capability (FIC) is used to portray all those elements to be considered in ensuring a capability is fully effective. This allows the functional components of a capability’s ‘system’ to be described and compared with otherwise dissimilar capabilities, for the purpose of identifying where processes or components can be shared for greater efficiencies or interoperability. Adopting such common baseline terms and ideas as this beyond Defence would assist in bringing in new capabilities – including associated capital equipment – among national security entities. Correspondingly, this would also make it easier to identify and capitalise on instances where such inputs – for instance, personnel or training – might be common across agencies.

Shared institutional emphasis on education and training

Learning is fundamental to systemic modernisation. In circumstances where knowing everything is simply not possible, the only counter is to learn faster than the adversary; hence Defence considers high and continuous investment in education and critical thinking as fundamental. The curriculum list is long, and includes languages, foreign culture studies, organisational theory, leadership and management, project and capability management, governance, and strategic and international studies. If education and training is a truly serious pursuit of the national security complex, agencies must accept increased human resource investment in ‘off-line’ education, to better prepare staff and leaders.

Commitment to interoperability

Interoperability takes many forms, from common equipment and terminology to procedural standardisation. The most sought-after is ‘cultural’ interoperability, stemming from inter-organisational understanding, trust and confidence. This requires close and ongoing training, liaison and exchanges. Shared learning and education delivers much of this, so the Statement’s notions of a ‘national security college’ and an ‘executive development program’ have great merit. However, such ventures will only be effective if the real – though intangible – value of these products are acknowledged and sought by the national security complex as a whole – from senior leadership down.

Development of standardised terminology

Terms used in the Statement such as ‘lead agency’ and ‘policy lead’ lack commonly accepted definitions. Wider consideration should be given to building common agreement on relationship terms such as ‘supporting’ and ‘supported’. These distinctions can help establish which agency is ultimately held to account for a particular undertaking, and determined more by where decisions are best made, rather than budgetary outlay or scale of involvement.
**Analysis**

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**Recommendations**

The Statement lays out the Government’s assessment of Australia’s national interests, along with national security priorities and principles that will form the basis for future national security budget commitments.

Although the Statement has not altered the ADF’s primary role, it has identified specific and implied Defence contributions as part of an overall national security policy response, and provided a broader whole-of-government context for the array of missions and tasks that the ADF could undertake to fulfil that role. In particular, the Statement makes clear that the ADF has parts to play beyond operational tasks, including in supporting diplomacy and helping build broader national security capabilities.

The following recommendations identify ways in which the Government might draw on Defence’s experience and processes to improve future national security policy and build on the foundations of the first National Security Statement:

- direct and further promote interoperability and early engagement among Commonwealth and State/Territory agencies, including through considerable re-investment in multi-agency professional development and education in line with that proposed in the Statement;
- develop properly articulated and ranked national strategic priorities, to set conditions for future national security planning and budgetary allocation;
- commission the NSA to develop a comprehensive national security strategy, integrating with and possibly drawing inspiration from approaches in Australia’s Military Strategy and allied strategic policy.
- provide the NSA a clearer mandate to broker cooperation for national security responses;
- expand the resources and remit of the new CCC to encompass all hazards and non-domestic events, be capable of directing ongoing national-level responses to protracted events, and to support appropriate levels of deliberate planning; and
- examine and adapt elements of the Defence Department’s military and corporate strategic frameworks as a basis for developing multi-agency approaches.
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The author also gratefully draws upon the professional interactions with his colleagues from across the national security complex during his appointments in the Directorate of Strategy and International Engagement, Australian Army Headquarters since 2004.
Appendix 1 – Introducing an all-hazards perspective

The Homeland Security Report uses the term ‘all-hazards’ to describe a key aspect of its perspective on national security. This is an omnibus term for all dangers posed to national security, including natural or man-made hazards and deliberate threats from states or non-state entities.  

Until recently, security analysts tended to overlook links between these various types of dangers. Hence, for instance, the strategic tasks set out in the 2000 White Paper distinguished clearly between ‘peacetime national tasks’ and ‘defending Australia’. These may be useful to describe the types of tasks Defence performs in budgetary outlay terms, but such divisions are contrived, and unsuitable as a realistic basis for preparing, planning or conducting complex operations across the national security complex. The way that tasks are set out in the 2009 Defence White Paper goes some way to redress this deficiency.

In recent years, Australian strategic doctrine has begun to conceive of the ‘multidimensional nature of conflict’, and the idea is becoming less cryptic for, and derided by its traditionalist detractors. Similarly, it is more widely accepted that many catastrophic, naturally-occurring events could rapidly give rise to conflict and damaging economic or social effects – and vice versa - with repercussions on Australia and its wider interests. Furthermore, hostile state or non-state actors could harness and exploit such hazards, potentially combining them with conventional military assault. Against such possibilities, an all-hazards perspective is very useful to improve understanding of portfolio contributions to national security responses.
Appendix 2 – Adopting a national risk-based approach

By proposing a risk-based approach, the Statement gives long-overdue government endorsement of a scientific basis for defining and ranking all hazards at the national level. In this, each risk is examined according to likelihood and consequence. Two key changes occur if such an approach were to be genuinely and universally applied across the national security complex:

- First, a more consistent and comprehensive understanding of the likelihood of each hazard would be developed, by merging assessments from organisations across the Australian Intelligence Community.
- Second, the consequences of each hazard would be weighed, not only in material terms, but also taking into account the ‘political appetite’ for non-material impacts such as damage to business confidence, societal panic and damage to national prestige.

To the extent that such an approach can be achieved, this should deliver a more consistent prioritisation of the risks facing Australia. This in turn would aid the development of national-level strategies to meet these risks, and a suitable apportionment of resources.

There are, of course, many challenges to implementing such an approach. Consensus on the value of those ‘non-rational’ factors applying to each hazard will be unlikely, and political judgment can never be entirely discounted. Furthermore, an objective, whole-of-government resolution that is not hampered by having to accommodate diverse agendas could become harder as more agencies become involved, each with its own interests and priorities.
Appendix 3 – Functional parallels between Federal Government Portfolio and Department of Defence Programs

1. Note: these parallels are for indicative purposes, and do not purport to be comprehensive.
NOTES
1 For instance: ‘...it appears generalised and wish-washy to security analysts searching for concrete parameters and direction. Many issues ... that should have been discussed months ago have been thrown together in haste as a reaction to the recent Mumbai attack’. Peter Coates. Free flowing security statement. On Line Opinion 15 December 2008: http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=8287&page=1; and ‘... Kevin Rudd's much- awaited inaugural national security statement has been roundly criticised as a missed opportunity that lacked detail and gave little guidance to security agencies for dealing with ever-growing threats against the country’: Jonathan Pearlman and Cynthia Banham, PM’s security statement a 'damp squib'. Sydney Morning Herald, 5 December 2008.

2 For example, it marks a new way for Australia to generate truly national security policy, departing from segregations along portfolio lines such as defence, foreign affairs and domestic jurisdictions, and elevates several departmental initiatives to whole-of-government status. Also, while not providing a national security strategy, it prepares the ground for one.


5 Ric Smith, Report of the review of homeland and border security - summary and conclusions. Canberra, Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet, 4 December, 2008.

6 Pursuant to the constitutional and legislative basis for the authority of the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) and the Chiefs of Service, and the domestic as well as external defence roles set out in the Defence Act 1903. Commonwealth of Australia, Defence Act 1903. Act No. 20 of 1903 as amended. Canberra, Attorney-General’s Department, 16 December, 2005 Part II, Sections 8 & 9.

7 The Services, Groups and Executives of the Australian Defence Organisation are currently configured as per Strategy Coordination & Governance Group, Defence senior management organisational chart. Coordination & Governance Division, 7 July, 2009.

8 However, it is important to understand that the budgetary program entities of Navy, Army and Air Force (e.g. Department of Defence, Portfolio budget statements 2009-10: Defence Portfolio. Canberra, Defence Publishing Service, 9 May, 2009, p 37) do not describe the legislative extent of the command authority and responsibility of each of the Chiefs of Service. For example, an Army officer serving in the new Joint Operations Command Headquarters is no longer part of Army as a Program, but assuredly is still part of Army as a Service, and as such remains under the aegis and command of the Chief of Army.

9 The significance of these concepts to a multiagency approach to national security is explained more fully in Appendices 1 and 2.


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12 ‘Our purpose is very clear: we are responsible to the Government of Australia for the protection of Australia, our people and our national interests, whenever and wherever those interests lie. In undertaking this mission the ADF enabled by the Defence Organisation might act independently, or it might contribute to a broader effort of other Australian or international civilian agencies or military forces.’ Department of Defence, JO21C, p 1.
13 For example: the ‘protect’ task is embraced within the role of Customs & Border Protection, Defence, Attorney-General’s and some (but not all) of the member organisations of the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC). ‘Safeguard’ occurs within Customs, Defence and Attorney-General’s; and ‘promote’ occurs within basically all Commonwealth departments and agencies, but especially Foreign Affairs & Trade (DFAT), Immigration & Citizenship, Attorney-General’s and Defence.
14 Smith, Homeland Security Report, p 6; Rudd, Statement, p 13. This notion is supported in the Defence Act, where: ‘The Governor-General may, subject to the provisions of this Act do all matters and things deemed by him to be necessary or desirable for the efficient defence and protection of the Commonwealth or of any State’. Commonwealth of Australia, Defence Act 1903. 60 Part VI, Section 63.
15 Rudd, Statement, pp 10-11, 17-27 passim. These are also mirrored in Chapter Four of the new White Paper.
16 Ibid. p 13. Several more tasks may be inferred from elsewhere in the Statement.
17 Ibid. pp 13-20 passim.
20 These include activities within and in addition to formal engagement exercises and activities such as the Defence Cooperation Program, and embody the roles of mentor, trainer, supporter, dialogue partner and broker of information. Such links help to share ideas and information, building trust and confidence among peer professionals – many of whom hold considerable influence in other countries’ political architecture.
21 Rudd, Statement, p 12. The recent memoranda of understanding between Defence and the AFP, and with AusAID are welcome developments in establishing groundings for multi-agency engagement coordination. Department of Defence International Policy Division and AusAID Global Programs Division, Strategic partnership agreement between Defence and the Australian Agency for International Development. 2009; Department of Defence and Australian Federal Police, Memorandum of understanding between Department of Defence and the Australian Federal Police on interoperability. Canberra, 26 September, 2008.
22 Notwithstanding the views of some commentators that the new White Paper has a ‘strong traditionalist mindset’, the section that matters in terms of policy on use of armed forces is quite clear in its balance: ‘It is the Government’s policy that the main role of the ADF should continue to be an ability to engage in conventional combat against other armed forces. This is not to say that the ADF cannot or will not be used for other purposes’. Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2009, pp 20-22.
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24 For example, such as a Naval vessel conducting hydrography operations, EEZ sovereignty protection, and non-combatant evacuation tasks on a single voyage.

25 Accordingly, the new White Paper addresses these impacts on capability balancing: Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2009, pp 74-75.

26 For example, the ADF missions of: support to the Northern Territory Emergency Response (Operation OUTREACH); contribution to the whole of government focus on domestic maritime security activities (Operation RESOLUTE); and contribution to the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (Operation ANODE).

27 State police counter-terrorism capability is one example.


30 Lieutenant General Ken Gillespie. CA Speech to ASPI. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, 27 August 2008.

31 Bergin and Breen, Rudd’s Army, p 3.

32 As recognised by the landmark conceptual publication Adaptive Campaigning (which was endorsed by the Chiefs of Service Committee in December 2006).

33 When those capabilities are the core business of a State or Territory to provide for its populace, it is the right and the duty of that government to provide them to the best of its abilities.

34 The tragic 2009 Victorian bushfires are an example of the importance of apposite timing for such interactions.


36 Rudd, Statement, p 13.

37 For example, the Defence - AusAID Partnership and the, Defence-AFP MOU on Interoperability. International Policy Division and Global Programs Division, Defence - AusAID Partnership. Department of Defence and Police, Defence-AFP MOU on Interoperability.


39 Understanding is the cornerstone of judgement and decision, is two-way, and fosters empathy between the operator and the operating environment. Shaping activities are called persuasion in other
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forums (for example, Gyngell, Broadbent, Maley, Orgill, Shergold and Smith, Australia’s diplomatic deficit. p 1; Rudd, Statement, p 9.) They are both key planks in what the Statement terms as ‘creative middle power diplomacy’, and foster conditions conducive to Australia’s national interests and avert or circumvent conditions opposing them. The new White Paper presents similar views: Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2009, pp 20-21.

An added benefit of Understanding and Shaping is their economy. Investment in these two components is the basis of a very cost-effective strategy, returning genuine savings in Defence. Outlay for a mission is never so inexpensive than never having to resort to conduct the mission in the first place.


The White House, The national security strategy of the United States of America. Washington, 16 March, 2006; Department of Defense, National defense strategy, pp 1-2; Presidential Decree of the Russian Federation, Strategi: National security of the Russian Federation until 2020 Moscow, 2009, paras 26, 28; Cabinet Office, The national security strategy of the United Kingdom: security in an interdependent world. Norwich, March, 2008, p 60. Albeit ideally, national strategies should be a precursor to any subordinate strategy, in reality such documents are cyclical and iterative in their generation. In Australia’s context, theoretical extrapolation from the AMS to a future national security strategy is therefore plausible, especially given its dimensions are not uniquely military.

See for example, successive publications such as Chief Capability Development Group, Defence capability development manual. Canberra, Defence Publishing Service, 2006, pp 10-11; and Department of Defence, Strategy planning framework handbook 2006. Also, see Strategy Coordination & Governance Group, Defence senior management organisational chart.

It is through such changes in functional response responsibilities and policy frameworks that the Statement will have most visible impact on the direction taken by the forthcoming Counter-Terrorism White Paper. Rudd, Statement, p 39; Smith, Homeland Security Report, p 3.

Deliberate planning here is taken as the identification of key planning considerations – plausible, likely and immutable – pertaining to a given future scenario, and a consequent concept devised for possible operations in response. Depending on where in the future they are set, such documents are set against a mix of intelligence-driven indicators and warnings, agreed strategic-level change drivers, and projections based on current and historic trends.

Events that either pose a credible hazard to those national interests listed in the Statement, or fall under the ASIO Act, for instance: ‘Espionage, sabotage, politically motivated violence, promotion of communal violence, attacks on Australia’s defence system, or acts of foreign interference - whether directed from, or committed within, Australia or not.’ Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979. Act No. 113 of 1979 as amended. Canberra, Attorney-General’s Department, 25 August, 2007, p 5.

The term ‘non-domestic’ is used, rather than, say, ‘foreign’, because of lack of legal clarity or consistency in terms such as ‘offshore’, foreign’, ‘abroad’, or even ‘sovereign territory’, particularly when concerning notions such as EEZs, dependencies, offshore territories and nautical limits.
The ADF’s new Joint Operations Command at Bungendore has representation from across the national security complex, but it is not mandated as a strategic-level, multi-agency command centre; and the embryonic Asia-Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence has no command or directional part to its role, notwithstanding its multi-agency makeup and non-domestic focus. Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence, Role and responsibilities as approved by Government 2008; Department of Defence. Headquarters Joint Operations Command Project fact sheets. Headquarters Joint Operations Command Project 15 October 2008: http://www.defence.gov.au/id/hqjoc/fact_sheets.htm.

Defence and Trade Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs. Australia’s involvement in peacekeeping operations. (26 August) Parliament of Australia 26 August 2008: http://www.aph.gov.au/SENATE/COMMITTEE/FA_DT_CTTE/peacekeeping/report/c13.htm. There is a considerable difference between a staffed planning and coordination centre, and a series of ad hoc meetings between Deputy Secretaries. The SPCG does not have the dedicated analysis capacity to treat these complex problems in depth - hence the raising of supporting Interdepartmental Committees (IDC). Even so, IDCs by their nature are discretely scoped and bounded to selected issues, and would be challenged by multidimensional contingencies.

‘The Integrated Mission Planning Process is intended to help the United Nations system arrive at a common understanding of its strategic objectives in a particular country by engaging all relevant parts of the United Nations system.’ Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, United Nations: Peacekeeping operations principles and guidelines. 18 January, 2008, pp 55–56. While extracting any consequent executive political decision from the UN may still be arduous, its Integrated Mission Planning Process at any rate ensures that the relevant planning factors have been considered.

Functions such as: intelligence, command, information & communications technology, command & control, capital equipment, education & training, infrastructure.

This is the nub of the ‘national security budget’ challenge heralded in the Statement; for in every instance that a national security priority necessitates a specific policy response, it is almost certain that this response will cross over departmental and jurisdictional boundaries.

While Australia’s National Crisis Management Machinery may be effective, its emphasis is on singular crises, rather than protracted or multidimensional contingencies.


A schematic demonstrating functional parallels in gross order terms between Government portfolios and Defence Department Programs is at Appendix 3.

‘Collectively, the DCDM and its supporting documents and tools provide a sound framework to deliver more effective administrative outcomes over the original two-pass approval process, provided the framework is adhered to and underpinned by adequate and appropriate resourcing, support and training for CDG staff.’ Australian National Audit...
Office, Planning and approval of defence major capital equipment projects - Department of Defence. Canberra, 30 June, 2009, pp 16, 22.

57 Indeed, the Audit report specifically recommends closer procedural alignment between Finance and Defence. Ibid., pp 19-20, 25-26.

58 This is supported in the ANAO audit on Defence – e.g. Ibid., pp 16, 20.

59 As noted in the ANAO audit on Defence – e.g. Ibid., p 27.


61 That is, the roles and membership of Defence Departmental forums such as the Options Review Committee, Defence Capability Committee and Defence Capability Investment Committee.


64 The Army’s growing focus on ‘teaching soldiers how to think, not what to think’ is permeating other parts of Defence. Army considers it vital to ensuring each soldier and commander is mentally prepared for the increasing uncertainty of their operating environment, though the corollary is an accepted drop in numbers of fielded ‘in-line’ personnel, due to increased time given to education.

65 For example, the nascent Army Learning Environment initiative and its supporting DSTO longitudinal research program are assisting development and implementation of methods and approaches to monitor and improve Army’s learning, education and training capability at the individual, collective and organisational levels. See M. Drobnjak, S. Talbot, and D. McDowall, The Learning Organisation - Fact, Fiction or Myth?: Unpackaging the Competing Discourses within the Learning Organisation Literature, in press.

66 This echoes many of the key deficiencies in DFAT as identified in the Lowy Institute’s recent Blue Ribbon Panel Report. Gyngell, Broadbent, Maley, Orgill, Shergold and Smith, Australia’s diplomatic deficit, pp X-XIII.

67 Rudd, Statement, p 36.

68 The US Department of Homeland Security has also recognised interoperability as fundamental to its operations, and developed an Interoperability Continuum that encompasses five principal elements, to drive interoperability across all its constituent agencies: Governance, Standard Operating Procedures, Technology, Training & Exercises, and Usage. The Continuum has broad endorsement in the law enforcement and emergency management communities in North America and the UK. Unsurprisingly, combined training and combined exercises figure prominently in its investment in human interoperability returns. SAFECOM and Office of Emergency Communications, Interoperability continuum - a tool for improving emergency response communications and interoperability. (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2008), pp 2-4.

69 An additional plus in adopting such military terminology in the national security domain is that corresponding departments in allied countries are also likely to use them.

70 Where hazards are posed by naturally-occurring events (such as floods, tsunamis and earthquakes) as well as inadvertent anthropogenic events (such as broad-scale toxic contamination and pandemics);
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71 This way of thinking saw ‘Peacetime National Tasks’ and ‘Defending Australia’ as effectively binary activities, and unable to coincide or correlate. Department of Defence, Defence 2000: our future defence force. Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, 2000, pp 46-53. To some extent, this division of tasks (i.e. segregating out ‘national support tasks’ still exists in the breakdown of Defence Outcomes as described in the Defence Portfolio Budget Statements. Department of Defence, PBS 2009-2010, pp 38, 87, 92.

72 In the new White Paper, the Supporting Domestic Security and Emergency Response Efforts sub-task forms part of the Deterring and Defeating Attacks on Australia. Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2009, pp 53-54.

73 The AIC includes: Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), Office of National Assessments (ONA), Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO), Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO), and Defence Signals Directorate (DSD).

74 There are other elements of ‘political appetite’ which might be impossible to assign accurate values in any formal process, such as those related to the value preferences of Ministers and to the ideological, interest group and electoral considerations associated with the party in government. However, their existence can at least be acknowledged and anticipated, if not predicted.

75 For example, Department of Defence, Future warfighting concept. Canberra, Defence Publishing Service, 2003; and Department of Defence, JO21C.

76 Rudd, Statement, p 10.
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Since 2004, Nick has served chiefly on the Australian Army Headquarters staff in Canberra, in its directorate of Strategy and International Engagement. In 2005-2006 he deployed to Iraq, working as a Coalition Plans Officer in the Multi-National Corps – Iraq Headquarters, and as partner to the Chief Planner in the Iraqi Ground Forces Command. On his return to Canberra, he was appointed as Deputy Director Strategy – Army until the end of 2008.

He holds a baccalaureate in History, and a Master of Letters with Distinction in Palaeoanthropology/Archaeology and History from the University of New England. He also holds a Masters in Defence Studies Management from the University of Canberra.