The 2016 Defence White Paper

By Kate Grayson, a PhD candidate in the School of Government and International Relations at Griffith University.

So far, much of the analysis of the Australian Defence White Paper 2016 has focussed, rightly so, on the strategic outlook, force acquisition and defence spending. However, in a departure from previous Defence White Papers, DWP2016 publicly acknowledges Australia's role in the Five-Eyes intelligence community, Australia's 'security alliance' with the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand. FVEY is important because it enables Australia and its other members to benefit from global intelligence gathering and sharing through the worldwide satellite network. Its inclusion in DWP2016 is a significant development.

Specific reference to FVEY is made on three occasions in the international defence relationships section with the US, UK and Canada including:

• 5.24- The alliance, and Australia's membership of the Five-Eyes intelligence community (comprising Australia, the United States, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Canada) provides Australia with information superiority and intelligence cooperation that is a vital input into our defence planning.
• 5.81- We cooperate closely as members of the FPDA and the Five-Eyes intelligence community.
• 5.85- Australia and Canada cooperate closely as members of the Five-Eyes intelligence community. Although geographically distant, our strategic outlook and approach towards security and defence matters is similar and is reflected in a growing relationship, including: intelligence cooperation, operational cooperation, working level exchanges, senior-level dialogue and science, technology and materiel cooperation. 

Though there is no detailed examination of what FVEY provides in the White Paper, one of the stated aims is to maintain and build on Australia's security relationships, including existing bilateral defence relationships and multilateral security arrangements. Importantly, its inclusion signals a marked shift and adds weight to the claim that the DWP2016 'is the most rigorous and comprehensive in Australia's history.

The interesting question is: why now? Why, after 40 years and seven Defence White Papers, have strategic defence planners finally acknowedged FVEY? The inclusion may be symptomatic of a wider change in the politics, policy and posture of defence and national security thinking by openly acknowledging Australia's intelligence credentials as show of strength in the Indo-Pacific region. Perhaps it is also an outcome of Edward Snowden's revelations about FVEY, and reflects a desire to openly acknowledge and own Australia's role, one silenced in the past.

Whatever the reasons, for this keen observer at least, the decision to acknowledge the security alliance marks an interesting shift from previous form. It is a welcome addition to the Defence White Paper discourse.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Stefson

The 2016 Defence White Paper is the first Australian White Paper that gives France its due weight as a strategic partner, particularly in the South Pacific where it has a sovereign presence.

There are several references to France in the White Paper with a Pacific emphasis. The first lists France along with the US, New Zealand and Japan as partners with Australia as leaders of our immediate Pacific neighbourhood, with a separate reference to its role, along with the US and NZ, in cooperation in South Pacific maritime security and disaster relief.

Elsewhere the Paper ranks France as one of our important global partners, highlighting collaboration on terrorism and piracy, and referring to cooperation in the South Pacific and Southern Oceans (where France, like us, claims a stake in Antarctica). There are two other non-Pacific references. One to its current bid to supply Australia with submarines and another in its role as one of the five permanent Security Council members and the plan of action on Iran's nuclear program. 

Since the White Paper rates a secure maritime Southeast Asia and South Pacific as our second strategic defence interest (after the overall security and resilience of Australia), the fact the Paper identifies France as a South Pacific partner is important. Interestingly there is no mention of cooperation in the Indian Ocean, where France is also sovereign in Reunion and Mayotte.

Although France retains modest military resources in the South Pacific (around 2500 personnel, two surveillance frigates, three patrol boats, four surveillance, four tactical transport aircraft, and six helicopters), it has the capacity to draw speedily on other military assets from metropolitan France. While the nature of its future status in New Caledonia is currently under discussion, France retains military assets in French Polynesia which s the headquarters of its Pacific Ocean fleet. [fold]

It's no accident that this belated acknowledgement of France's role comes in the context of the Paper's strategic preoccupation with China. As the nature of the roles of the key strategic players in our region changes, so does our need to identify and use the partnerships we already have. I have argued elsewhere that France, like Australia, confronts change in its regional environment in the South Pacific. Specifically, this change stems from the marked increase in China's regional presence, an increase in the number and range of international players in the region, and from shifting regional patterns in dealing with these players. This means that France, like Australia, is increasingly only one of many actors pursuing its interests in the Pacific, albeit, again like Australia, a special player given its sovereign regional presence. 

The French have been ahead of us in articulating our shared strategic interests. They referred to a strategic partnership with Australia in their 2013 strategic white paper, while our Defence White Paper that year did not even mention France. Also, in 2014, the French produced an elegant statement of their interests in the Asia-Pacific.

Commercial benefit has increasingly featured in France's idea of strategic partnerships. In late February 2016, a visit by French Defence Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, to Australia was styled as 'seeking enhanced strategic partnership with Australia'. The trip focused on his tour of the Adelaide shipyards and the French bid for the submarine contract. Similarly, in his recent Press club speech, the French Ambassador to Australia referred frequently to the bid.

French defence commercial interests in Australia are considerable. Between 2003 and 2012 France sold armaments worth around $1.93 billion to Australia. Major French defence companies in Australia include Thales, which took over Australian Defence Industries in 2006, Dassault and EADS. That, plus the fact that Australian merchandise imports from France ($4.6 billion in 2014-2015) are worth four times more than our exports, means we are already a pretty good market for France.

In 2012 France and Australia agreed to a fairly vague Joint Statement of Strategic Partnership, which included the Pacific, not only in the area of defence but also in political, security, economic and development fields.  

French and Australian military and emergency services have long worked with other South Pacific countries, specifically New Zealand in the FRANZ arrangement; the US and New Zealand in the Quadrilateral Defence Coordination Group; conducted joint armed forces exercises with some Melanesian countries; and naval visits to the French territories. A Bilateral Status of Forces agreement was signed with France in 2006. But negotiations since have been slow for a related Mutual Logistics Support Arrangement that would formalise existing support from New Caledonia, perhaps because pro-independence forces find it premature pending an independence referendum.

The underlying premise of our 2016 Defence White Paper, finding new partnerships and strengthening existing ones in the context of the rise of China, suggests a need for deeper Franco-Australian defence cooperation beyond the existing elements. Whereas we are used to working with the US and the UK, perhaps we need to work harder to collaborate with the French. 

Photo: HMAS Darwin with the French Carrier Strike Group FNS Charles de Gaulle, Australian Defence Image Library

In 1999, rapper Mos Def released a b-side single called 'Mathematics' in which he cleverly weaves numerical references into his rhymes to highlight socio-economic disparities between whites and blacks in the US. His message is simple: look at both sides of the equation and you get a fuller picture.

In the case of Australia's 2016 Defence White Paper, it's one half of an equation about Australia's strategic future with Indonesia. Naturally we'll need input from the Indonesian side if we're really going to understand how our defence ties will evolve over the next two decades. 

Let's start with the Australian side. Here are some Indonesia highlights from the White Paper: 

2.81 As our near neighbour, Australia's relationship with Indonesia is vital. By 2035, Indonesia should be a major world economy…

2.82 With continued economic growth Indonesia has the potential to increase its regional and global influence…

2.83 The modernisation of the Indonesian armed forces and Indonesia's growing influence are positive developments that will add to Indonesia's security, and that of the region. A secure Indonesia is in Australia's interests and its growing military capabilities will offer Australia and Indonesia opportunities for more effective cooperation to respond to regional challenges…

It builds ever so slightly on the 2009 and 2013 versions, subtly dropping references to Indonesia's democratic credentials and expanding on the country's potential. Chapter Five also touches on Indonesia and paints a constructive picture of future bilateral defence ties, emphasising the potential of maritime security cooperation (riffing on the maritime theme found throughout the 2016 edition). The White Paper passed through the Indonesian media without strong reaction, with a military spokesperson affirming there was no reason for concern.

There was no Kanye-style show stealing from Indonesian politicians the way Marty Natalegawa made a meal of our Darwin basing plans for US Marines. Times have changed and Defence has been cleverly keeping regional friends in the loop. [fold]

So far, it's a good start. But as I alluded to earlier, the future of defence ties with our nearest neighbour has got to take into account Indonesian conditions. As Rod Lyon deftly highlights on The Strategist, a 'dominant motif' emerging from the paper is that of uncertainty – and indeed that applies to Indonesia. Despite President Joko Widodo's proclamations about Indonesia becoming a global maritime fulcrum, there's been little meat on the bones to explain what that means for the country's strategic outlook or the Indonesian armed forces. 

We're still waiting on Indonesia's white paper (rumoured to be released later this year) but even then, like all white papers, whether it sticks is another question. Jokowi has affirmed that Indonesia's military modernisation will continue to deliver much-needed upgrades, particularly for the Air Force and Navy. But so far there's been patchy progress. In terms of defence budget, our White Paper is hopeful that Indonesia's economic growth will fund that military modernisation, but growth in recent quarters remains modest and well below the required 7% of GDP. 

What we do know is that Indonesia is focused on consolidating and modernising its military force to face specific contingencies such as conflict in the South China Sea, disaster relief, and illegal fishing. But even those tasks herald more uncertainty. Take illegal fishing: Jokowi has given a boost to civilian maritime forces with the establishment of a Maritime Security Body (BAKAMLA, which is effectively a coast guard) but its official status remains unclear and, in practice, its area of responsibility is muddied by overlaps with agencies like the Navy. There's also the issue of whether it has been able to beg, steal and borrow enough ships from the Navy to get the job done (Prashanth Parameswaran has a solid rundown of its 99 problems here). With 3.5 years left of Jokowi's tenure, fingers crossed these wrinkles are ironed out.

There's another factor as well, and that's the attitude of the Indonesian armed forces. Over the course of almost two decades, our militaries have grown closer since coming close to conflict over Timor-Leste. The question now is, to what extent can a more vocal Indonesian Chief of Defence Force (step forward, General Nurmantyo) encourage or inhibit future cooperation with Australia? Will we find an Indonesia that is receptive in 10, 15 or 20 years from now, if conservatism is a trend?

Civil–military relations in Indonesia is an area in need of further study and while the military is ostensibly out of politics, let's get real and acknowledge that it still wields influence in Indonesian politics and business today. Indonesia's Chief of Defence force has basically authored the book 'The Art of (Proxy) War'. The man is (not unjustifiably, looking at Indonesia's history with foreign interference) fixated with this concept, most recently signing agreements with national media outlets to fight against creeping proxyism in the country's TV and newspapers. Of course, shifts towards a more unstable strategic environment, in which our interests converge,  could override domestic factors. Nevertheless, until such a time, it's worth considering the prevailing attitudes towards Western militaries in Indonesia among some defence players and how they might shape things to come. 

Those of us watching Indonesia might also consider how Australia's future ISR acquisitions, particularly maritime-based platforms like P-8As and MQ-4C Tritons, will have an impact on relations. Will they increase our ability to work with Indonesia on asylum seekers or illegal fishing, or will they give conservatives in the Jokowi Government reason to be suspicious about our intelligence gathering activities?

Noting the challenges outlined above, let's explore some of the positive opportunities that arise in the White Paper with Indonesia.

First, in the chapter on international engagement, the White Paper says we'll increase the number of liaison personnel from other countries in areas like strategic policy development (5.10). It would be constructive to encourage Indonesian civilians and military personnel to have short stints in these kinds of areas. In addition to a skills exchange, there's much to learn about each other's bureaucratic cultures, and if there was a way of institutionalising that knowledge transfer, even better. Second, the paper also expresses a desire to increase military exercises, especially maritime ones (5.9). Provided Indonesian forces are in a position to accommodate this, it's a good time to work with Indonesia on all things nautical-by-nature. 

Overall, this White Paper is a refreshingly mature take on relations with our nearest Southeast Asian neighbour as well as a clear-eyed look at its place in the world. Taking into account Indonesia's domestic constraints, as well as its ambitions, will help us work out whether things add up the way we might want them to.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user CARAT.

Among defence and security wonks the release of a new Defence White Paper always prompts Talmudic parsing of the text. Three such papers in the last seven years has proven especially rich pickings for those with such a disposition. Unsurprisingly, thus far the bulk of the reflection on the latest paper has been about the big ticket items: the large capital outlays on high-end kit, the strategic disposition of the country and the country's capacity to match strategic ends and means.

Although domestic politics has been part of the conversation (principally focused on the impact of the leadership change from Abbott to Turnbull), the broad ranging bipartisanship about the direction of strategic policy and the importance of a militarily capable Australia has clouded from view the fact that this Paper marks a significant step in domestic electoral messaging for the Liberal-National Coalition, one the Coalition itself may not have noticed.

At the risk of over-simplifying, since at least 2001, the Coalition's electoral success has rested on two pillars: economic probity and a robust approach to national security. The ALP is driven to distraction by the Coalition's ability to convince electors that it is a better economic manager than its opponent. That conservatives are almost hard-wired to fiscal rectitude and economic prudence has become an article of faith among their core supporters and indeed appears to be a widely held belief, according to pollsters. Equally, whether in relation to illegal boat arrivals, terrorism or more conventional defence and security matters, the Coalition has been remarkably effective at converting a complex security environment into popular support.

The Labor government elected in 2007 was acutely aware of its perceived weakness in both these key policy areas and did its utmost to reverse this perception. This was an important part of the 2009 Defence White Paper's commitment to a much more muscular posture and the big financial commitments to support 'Force 2030'.  Labor's misfortune was to be at the helm when the greatest crisis to have hit the global economy broke in 2008. [fold]

As a result of the GFC, and the decision to adopt large scale Keynesianism to see off recession, Labor had to walk away, economically speaking, from its 2009 ambitions. This opened the door that allowed Tony Abbott's Opposition to argue that Labor 'always cuts defence' and to pursue the same core electoral message of the successful Howard years.

Upon coming to office, the Abbott Government set about making good on its claims by embarking on a new White Paper which would right the purported wrongs of ALP stewardship of defence. The centrepiece was an almost blind faith in the need to ramp spending up to 2% of GDP, a figure noted by many as magical in its qualities and not in any substantive way tied to strategic policy. It was of course a strong symbolic commitment and, notwithstanding the change in leader from Abbott to Turnbull, has been retained in the latest Paper.

Sensibly the Paper attempts to decouple spending from GDP, but nonetheless their remains a substantial financial commitment at the centre of the Paper. It's a commitment that sits uneasily with the Coalition's core electoral message. To put it bluntly, the Turnbull Government will find it difficult to argue that it is both fiscally prudent and tough on defence. Much of the new Paper frames the spending in terms of its ability to foster local industry, contribute to innovation and revive Australian shipbuilding. One cannot escape the conclusion that the Coalition has tried to put the most positive economic spin on a policy approach that does not resonate with its economic policy ambitions.

The White Paper goes to great lengths to say that the costs of the projected program have been independently verified, and we have no reason to doubt this. But it is entirely silent on how all this spending will be paid for. Given ever-growing demands on social services and health costs, the eroding tax base and projections of a long period of slow global economic growth, this absence is  striking.

The problem that seems to have eluded Coalition strategists is that the Howard era formulation of a strong national security posture and fiscal prudence was only possible because of unique circumstances in Australian economic history. The GFC and the end of the commodity super cycle will impose difficult choices for the Coalition. How will the government be able to sell the requisite tax increases or expenditure savings necessary to pay for this Paper? It will either have to take the ALP's position and squib on its ambitions, make extraordinarily difficult political decisions or borrow like crazy and hope the military Keynesians are right.

Photo by Flickr user Images Money.

Whether Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull intended it or not, his new Defence White Paper has been widely interpreted as sending a clear message that Australia is willing to join our allies in using armed force if necessary to defend the 'rules based global order' from China's strategic ambitions in Asia. Moreover, most people apparently think that's a good message to send.

So it seems wise to ask whether this message is really true. Would we go to war with China over any of the issues which now loom as tests of the future order in Asia — in the Spratlys, or the Senkakus, or even Taiwan? 

Most people who approve of the White Paper's message probably do so with complete confidence that the issue will never arise. They assume war won't happen because they are sure the Chinese would always back down rather than risk a clash. Maybe they are right. Confronted with US and allied resolve, Beijing might decide that even Taiwan was simply not worth the immense costs of conflict.

But we shouldn't bet on that, because the Chinese probably think the same about America and its allies. They think a war would be just as costly to us as to them, and they believe the issues at stake matter more to them than to us. So they are likely to assume that, whatever we say now, on the brink we would back off rather than fight. And the more confident they are of that, the less likely they are to back down. It has happened before: in an escalating crisis, both sides assume the other will step back, and so neither does before it's too late. This is exactly what happened in July 1914.

Remember, the stakes are high for both sides. This is a contest over the future of the Asian order, and we should not for a moment assume that China is any less committed to building a new order than we are to preserving the old one. Unless one side or the other abandons its core objective, the chances of a crisis in the Western Pacific escalating to the point that we face a decision about going to war is already quite high, and is growing steadily.

So we ought to think seriously about what war with China over one of these issues would actually look like. [fold]

It is easy to start a war expecting a quick fight and an easy win. But America and its allies do not have overwhelming military superiority, and nor does China. That means neither side would be likely to win decisively after a short, contained conflict.

Both sides would therefore soon face a new choice: to escalate and accept the much higher costs of a big and protected war, or give up. Again, it is easy to assume that China would back off first, but we can't bet on that. China has an immense capacity to both inflict and absorb damage, and we cannot expect it to be any less committed to victory than we would be.

So would we back off and accept defeat to avoid escalation, if China didn't? This choice carries grave consequences, because both sides have nuclear forces, and there is a real risk of an escalating conflict crossing the nuclear threshold. Of course no one can imagine it coming to that, but it could unless one side backed down. And how can we be sure the Chinese would back down if we wouldn't? Alternatively, if we were capable of backing down, wouldn't it be better never to have started the war in the first place?

Even without a nuclear exchange, this would soon become the biggest and most costly war since 1945, and the end of all we envisage for the Asian Century, even if we won. And what would 'winning' even mean? Neither side has any chance of a decisive victory, so it is hard to imagine how a war with China ends. That alone should give pause to those who think it might be a good idea to start one.

In fact, I think it is unlikely Australia would go to war with China in any situation short of the outright invasion of the undisputed territory of another sovereign state. I think it is quite unlikely America would either, once a president was brought face to face with the military realities. So we are just bluffing, and our bluff is being steadily and systematically called by China.

None of this is to deny that Australia, like others, has a huge stake in the way Asia's regional order evolves, and that we need to do whatever we can to prevent changes in the order that affect our truly vital interests. Moreover, it is not to deny that some principles of regional order would be worth going to war with China to defend.

But we do have to ask whether the costs and risks of such a war are justified to defend every element of the so-called 'rules based global order' in places like the South China Sea. More realistically, we will have to accept some changes in the regional order to accommodate China. We all find the idea of making such an accommodation uncomfortable, even scary. But is it scarier than war with China? It is time to think carefully about that. And it is time to stop talking tough when we don't mean it. It is undignified as well as dangerous.

Photo courtesy of Australian Defence Image Library.

• The launch of the Defence White Paper was a hot mess of hashtags: Prime Minister Turnbull (#DWP2016), Defence Minister Payne (#2016DWP), the Department of Defence (#defencewhitepaper) and Chief of Defence Force (#WhitePaper) all used different ones.
• As a result, defence commentators also fractured. Defence, which commissioned a 360-page social media review in 2011, would have benefited from one coordinated hashtag to avoid social media splinter and help measure impact.
• More online coordination is evident in the government's response to Cyclone Winston in Fiji, with Defence and DFAT giving the public timely updates including good cross-promotion of each other's roles. 
• The top ten best military apps for the battlefield.
• India's Army, which has a 3.7 million Facebook friends, monitors and attempts to counter negative messaging on WhatsApp (interesting to note India's Army Chief reads a daily social media report).
• 19 incredible photos from the Australian Navy (and more on their Instagram account).
• A debate on why US military officers don't write. This response argues a problem of time and top cover.
• Government blogs often fall into the trap of hosting little more than puff pieces, but the Australian Army's Land Power Forum blog, designed to generate new ideas, is different. Last month, Captain Rob Morris used the blog to argue the ADF should embrace collaboration app Slack. 
• Major Mick Cook hosts a new podcast about war and warfare.
• Grounded Curiosity, founded by Major Clare O'Neill, aims to engage junior commanders about the future of warfare. It also hosts a blog to which military professionals can submit posts.
• The NZ Army admits to making a slow start on social media and learning some tough lessons. Lesson 1? Those who 'like' you on social media don't necessarily like you.
• A warning for India's military personnel: if you're receiving unusual attention from female admirers online, you may be the target of a social media honeytrap.   
• Brigadier Mick Ryan on why military leaders should fully exploit the potential of social media.
• The People's Liberation Army newspaper, the PLA Daily, is the most popular Weibo account run by China's military, with 9 million followers. So it's unsurprising President Xi Jinping recently chose the PLA Daily to publish his first Weibo post, captured here: 

Three years ago, China's state media celebrated the fact that the Gillard Government's 2013 Defence White Paper did not consider China a military threat. Xinhua News Agency heralded it as a success of China's peaceful development strategy and evidence that the region was warming to China's growing influence.

It should come as little surprise, then, that the 2016 Defence White paper released last Thursday was less well-received. Nevertheless, the Chinese response was measured and rather low-key. Official channels have stopped short of directly denouncing the expansion of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) outlined in the White Paper.

During a press conference last Thursday, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed 'serious concern and strong dissatisfaction' with the White Paper's negative statements concerning the South China Sea and the development of China's military strength. Canberra was instructed to 'take a correct and positive view of China's strategic intentions'.

The Ministry of National Defence responded in a similar manner by firmly opposing any accusations concerning China's construction islands and reefs in the South China Sea. The Ministry maintained that 'the South China Sea matter is not an issue between China and Australia' and urged the military alliance between Canberra and Washington to 'abandon its Cold-War era mentality'.

Indeed, Australia's potential involvement in the South China Sea continues to be the most sensitive issue surrounding the 2016 White Paper. Foreign Minister Julie Bishop was reprimanded by the state-aligned tabloid Global Times for her remarks in Tokyo last month, and her comments that China should respect international law concerning the South China Sea were dismissed as 'irresponsible' and 'hypocritical'. [fold]

Along with the US and Japan, Beijing considers Australia a 'country outside the region' which should not interfere in issues pertaining to the South China Sea. Beijing is insistent that the disputes must be resolved between claimant states alone. Freedom of navigation operations by the US Navy and attempts by Tokyo to insert itself into the matter are branded as provocative and detrimental to regional stability.

Recently, there has been a ramp up in rhetoric concerning how Beijing should respond to this foreign 'provocation'. The establishment of a Chinese Air Defence Identification Zone over the disputed islands and reefs has even been suggested. Though Beijing's rhetoric is primarily aimed at the US and Japan, Australia has not been entirely exempt. An editorial published in Global Times last December warned in a less-than-subtle way that 'it would be terrible shame if an aircraft crashed while on patrol over the South China Sea, and it happened to be Australian'. 

Concerning the expansion of the ADF, state media tended to focus on the decision to increase the Royal Australian Navy's submarine force from 6 to 12 submarines.

State-owned news outlets have previously weighed in on the Australian submarine debate. An article published by Xinhua last November argued that Australia should choose France or Germany as a design partner over Japan and condemned Tokyo's move to push into the international weapons market. In resisting Japanese pressure, Canberra was even praised for its professional 'politics is politics, and business is business' attitude.

It would appear that China does not take issue with Australia's acquisition of submarines per se. Instead, Beijing is primarily concerned with what it perceives as Tokyo's growing military ambitions in the region. The selling of military technology and defence equipment is reported as evidence of Japanese remilitarisation and an ultimate attempt to contain China.

The delay in announcing a submarine design partner has thus tempered the Chinese response to the 2106 White Paper. In the event that Japan wins the bid for design partner, however, Beijing's rhetoric would likely remain centred on denouncing Tokyo's ambitions rather than opposing the submarines themselves.

All other aspects of the ADF's expansion and increased funding over the next decade received little attention. This suggests that Beijing is less interested in the specific capabilities that Australia is developing, and more concerned with the direction of Australia's strategic posture.

One researcher from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, quoted in People's Daily, argued that 'the Australian government has stepped up its efforts to follow through with the Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy of the United States'. Other reports were similarly alarmed that Australian defence policy was aligning itself closely with the rebalancing strategy, which is interpreted as an attempt to contain China's rise.

But an article in The People's Liberation Army Daily also noted the success of Canberra's hedging strategy thus far. Both the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence supported the White Paper's statement that 'Australia welcomes China's rapid development and its important role in upholding regional and global stability'. 

For Beijing' narrative of a peaceful rise, it will be important to demonstrate that states in the region can successfully balance security partnership with the US and economic cooperation with China. Australia is an important example of this, but it is a narrative that will be further challenged as many of China's neighbours continue to enhance military coordination with the US.

Photo courtesy of Australian Defence Image Library.

The new Defence White Paper opens with the bold assertion that it 'represents the Government's firm commitment to the Australian people that we will keep our nation safe and protect our way of life for future generations'. If only it was that simple. No government can secure a nation's future through defence alone.

Widely praised by knowledgeable commentators, the White Paper is undoubtedly a thoughtful piece of work. However its release, and its strategic analysis of our environment in particular, has highlighted the lack of strategic thinking in foreign policy more broadly.

While there have been a regular stream of Defence White Papers, there have been just two White Papers on Foreign Affairs and Trade, in 1997 and 2003. The Asian Century White Paper, commissioned by the Gillard Government from outside the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and released in 2012, seems to have sunk without trace. A capability review of DFAT, made public in June 2014, noted 'suspicion of prioritisation, strategic planning' and that the Department was 'less good at policy development'. 

In the Boyer Lectures at the end of 2015, Lowy Institute executive director Dr Michael Fullilove called for a three dimensional foreign policy. Given the Asia Pacific region is central to the emerging world order, Dr Fullilove argued, we should seek to shape our circumstances through 'three dimensions'; active engagement with major powers, with multilateral institutions, and with countries in this region. But successive Australian governments have starved our diplomatic service of funds and shrunk our network of foreign missions to the smallest footprint of all G20 nations except Saudi Arabia. 

Australia's robust culture embraces the idea of sending our diggers overseas to fight for their country and its allies. Yet we seem almost embarrassed by those who fight for our interests through the intellectual pursuits of diplomacy. A lot is expected of our diplomats when an Australian gets into trouble overseas, but we don't want to fund the patient relationship building that is necessary to ensure both effective help for individuals in time of need and broader efforts to secure our interests are successful. As Dr Fullilove said 'history is not made by vast impersonal forces. It is made by individuals in hugely consequential meetings'. Australia needs to invest in capable diplomats to secure Australian interests overseas.

The Coalition government has given more resources to DFAT and started opening embassies. It is unlikely this will be sufficient to compensate for years of under-resourcing, or turn around the issues identified in the capability review. At the same time, the government has also undermined Australia's foreign policy by abolishing AusAID and making massive cuts to Australia's aid program. [fold]

Long-term security in our region and beyond depends in part on genuine development opportunities for those living in poverty and insecurity. Australia and New Zealand are the only developed countries largely surrounded by emerging economies and 'fragile states'. We therefore have more to gain than others from an effective aid program. For decades, Australian aid has supported ideas, policies and programs that accelerated growth, development and poverty reduction. It placed Australian experts in positions of extraordinary trust and influence inside ministries across the region. Through long and deep engagement, unique networks of support and friendship were created. The aid program helps to provide breadth and depth to Australia's foreign policy, but the wholesale departure of many of our aid experts, and the largest budget cuts ever, have reduced the influence and utility of our aid. Under the direction outlined in the Defence White Paper, this imbalance will only grow. Recently the ratio of aid to defence spending was one to six. Now it is one to eight. Under the defence spending projected in the White Paper, it will shift to about one to twelve over the next decade.

When discussions of national security are dominated by military security, decisions involving vast amounts of money seem to be made without adequate consideration of the soft-power options — the current situations in Afghanistan and Iraq attest to this. The Australian Government and people would be better served by ensuring development, diplomacy and defence have equal weight in Cabinet and national security discussions. But to do this effectively, the Australian Government needs to produce a White Paper on Diplomacy and Development, and then invest in increasing our competencies across both these dimensions.

Australia's foreign policy has become unbalanced. A bold Defence White Paper cannot, on its own, secure our future.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Alex de Sousa

Hugh White's piece in The Age today makes many good points about the limitations of the latest Defence White Paper on strategic outlook and policy. As White says:

The more likely outcomes are escalating US-China strategic confrontation and growing risk of war between them, or gradual US withdrawal. Either would mean a truly fundamental deterioration in Australia's strategic circumstances, confronting us with an entirely new set of strategic and defence choices. These are the choices that the new White Paper completely fails to address.

I broadly agree. The White Paper fails to consider a future where the fundamental make-up of power in our region has shifted dramatically. It rests on many assumptions, including that the 'rules-based order' will manage the power transition taking place in the region. But I think White oversteps when he says 'the White Paper fails to consider what we might want of our forces in the very different Asia now emerging', and when he argues that 'Some of its biggest-ticket commitments — like nine new frigates costing more than $30 billion — have no robust strategic rationale.'

I believe the White Paper does an able job in addressing one critical issue facing Australia: military modernisation in Asia. This was cited as a significant concern for Australia's strategic outlook in the 2009 and 2013 Defence White Papers. But in the 2016 version, it is arguably the main strategic issue. In the 'Why Now?' section, the White Paper observes that 'Some matters that previous Defence White Papers have described as longer-term issues, such as the impact of military modernisation in our region, now fall to this White Paper to respond to.'

The array of regional military modernisation trends is daunting. Advanced air-superiority fighters, long-range precision weapons, cyber, hypersonics, anti-satellite weapons, and amphibious capabilities are but a few of the areas in which our region has seen serious strides in the last decade.

The White Paper attempts to cover many of these. It calls for a boost in cyber security and space personnel, the relocation of a US 'optical space surveillance telescope to Australia', acquisition of a total of six E-7A Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft and a limited air-defence capability for the Army.

But military modernisation combines not only technological advancement but also the number and sophistication of platforms and capabilities. In this respect, submarines are one of the fastest growing areas of military modernisation in the Indo-Pacific. [fold]

By some estimates, by 2030 there will be 288 submarines in East and South East Asia, up from 200 in 2010. This is a critical development. Submarines are highly capable platforms that can provide asymmetric deterrence against a superior foe. They can also collect intelligence and reconnaissance, escort amphibious forces and insert Special Forces.

Many of the new submarines entering the region are quiet, European-designed, diesel-electric models. For instance, in 2011 Indonesia signed a deal with South Korea for three Chang Bogo-class diesel-electric submarines, which are based on the German-designed Type 209. The first is slated to be delivered in December. Jakarta is also considering buying two Kilo-class submarines from Russia by 2019. Malaysia acquired two Scorpène-class subs from France in 2009 and 2010, with the boats becoming fully operational after development delays in 2012. Singapore ordered two Type 218SB advanced air-independent propulsion boats from Germany in 2013 which will supplement its four existing submarines.

Further afield, Vietnam's six brand new Kilo-class submarines have all been delivered and are already reportedly being used as significant asymmetric deterrents against a numerically superior force in the South China Sea. South Korea is nearing the end of a successful rolling build program that has been underway since the early 1990s. It currently fields nine Chang Bogo-class boats and is half-way through building three batches of Son Wonil-class subs, based on the Type 214, another German design. North Korea is estimated to possess 70 submarines of various types. The country's slow but steady progress in this area became clear last year with its failed testing of a ballistic missile from a submerged platform. India, Pakistan, Taiwan, Thailand and Bangladesh also are all pursuing modern submarine programs.

But then there is China. One of the most telling lines in the White Paper is when it addresses China's military modernisation: 'China's Navy is now the largest in Asia. By 2020 China's submarine force is likely to grow to more than 70 submarines.' The focus on China's rapidly growing underwater warfare capability is central to understanding the maritime build-up the White Paper lays out for Australia's naval forces.

China's future submarine force, already fairly dynamic, will be a mix of advanced conventional-powered boats and improved nuclear-powered vessels. According the US Department of Defense, China currently possesses 53 diesel attack submarines, five nuclear attack submarines, and four nuclear ballistic missile submarines. In the next decade, China is expected to continue to grow the number and capability of its nuclear attack submarines, introduce a new class of guided-missile attack submarines and commission up to 20 Yuan-class air-independent propulsion subs. All up, this represents a formidable mix of conventional and nuclear capability, one that will continue to be the largest submarine force in Asia, and a force that will increasingly become more capable of long-range operations, both in the Indian Ocean and our own region.

Reading the 2016 White Paper within this context makes it clear that Defence has shifted its strategy and tone on the importance of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability.

In terms of spending, the proposed breakdown of investments in capabilities to FY2025-26 allots 25% to 'maritime and anti-submarine warfare'. This is massive considering that it excludes amphibious warfare spending (money going toward getting the Canberra-class LHDs and related amphibious equipment and capabilities), which is included in the 18% going towards land combat, as can be seen in the figure below:

As part of the 25% figure, the RAN will get a raft of new ASW platforms and capabilities. The best ASW weapon in any navy is another submarine, and the White Paper makes clear the intention to acquire 12, with the first arriving in the early 2030s. Interestingly, the most important platform in the Navy's future ASW force will likely be the last to be commissioned into service, according to the Defence White Paper.

Australia's submarine force will be supported by nine new frigates, which the White Paper says will be 'optimised for anti-submarine warfare'. Details on the desired capabilities of the new frigates have yet to be released, but in 2014 rumours circulated that Defence wanted a hull that could support two helicopters, with one option potentially being a redesign of the new Air Warfare Destroyer hull specifically for ASW. The new ships are also very likely to be equipped with towed-array sonars (something the ANZAC-class was fitted for, but it was never installed). Towed-array sonars, in conjunction with ASW helicopters, improve the ship's ability to track and triangulate underwater targets through multiple sources of information. This is an area where the RAN has been weak in the past — four of the Adelaide-class were belatedly upgraded with the systems in the 2000s. The new Air Warfare Destroyers are equipped with an integrated sonar system, including a towed-array and a ASW helicopter, meaning all the RANs future combat vessels will be capable of ASW.

That brings us to Australia's new MH-60 'Romeo' maritime helicopters, reportedly one of the most 'advanced naval helicopters available.' The RAN will have a total inventory of 24 Romeos and plans to be able to operate eight with the fleet at one time. As mentioned above, a surface vessel equipped with an ASW helicopter exponentially increases the ability of that vessel to triangulate and prosecute an underwater target. This is due in part to the speed of the MH-60, its ability to remain on station for protracted periods and its reusable 'dipping sonar'.

Lastly, Australian aerial maritime surveillance and ASW is set to continue to improve. Defence announced in February 2014 that Australia would acquire eight P-8A maritime patrol and ASW aircraft with an option for an additional four. The 2016 White Paper further increased this to a total of 15 by the late 2020s. The P-8 is a generational improvement on Australia P-3 Orions and has proven to be far more capable that expected. For instance, during the search for MH370, the aircraft consumed less fuel than computer modelling had predicted, even at lower altitudes, made 2000 -2200 km transits from bases in Western Australia to the Southern Indian Ocean and was reportedly capable of remaining on station for up to 12 hours. Australia's 15 P-8s will be supplemented by seven MQ-4C Triton unmanned drones that will provide maritime surveillance and reconnaissance, allowing the P-8s to focus on the ASW mission if need be. And if, as suggested in the White Paper, the planned upgrade of the Cocos Island and Darwin airfields goes ahead, Australia will have significant capability to conduct extended maritime surveillance and forward ASW operations deep into the Indian Ocean and across its northern reaches.

I agree that there are areas in which the White Paper is lacking and is not particularly forward thinking. But in the area of maritime military modernisation, particularly the fast growing world of undersea warfare, the Paper does an able job in addressing strategic risks. If all the procurement programs are delivered (a big 'if'), Australia will likely have one of the best ASW capabilities in the region.

Photo courtesy of Wikipedia.

1. The 'rules-based' euphemism

The term 'rules-based' is repeated 56 times throughout the 2016 Defence White Paper. Short-form for 'Australia prefers the status quo', the term 'rules-based' is an expression of fear and uncertainty, given that the status quo is being challenged.

At the time of the 1976 Defence White Paper, for instance, Australia's strategic environment could not have been more different. Back then our major strategic and trade partners were the same, the Soviet Union and China were implacable foes, while the economic and technological gap separating the West and Asia was widening. Today, in every respect, the opposite is true.

The repeated exhortation to preserve the 'rules-based' order is therefore an admission of this epochal strategic shift. The US-led order that has underpinned strategic stability in Asia over the past 40 years is fast disintegrating. We are entering a new era of strategic uncertainty characterised by intense great-power rivalry and challenges to international norms with which Australia is long accustomed.

2. The American sunset

For the first time the 2016 Defence White Paper leaves open the prospect of an end to US primacy in the Western Pacific.

Paragraph 2.8 states that 'the US will remain the pre-eminent global military power for the next two decades'. In geo-strategic terms, 20 years is the blink of an eye, and previous Defence White Papers have prophesised US military preponderance for 'the foreseeable future'.

One might argue that the 2016 Defence White Paper is merely providing a strategic outlook on a twenty-year timescale, and that it should not be inferred by this statement that the Australian government believes US primacy in the Western Pacific may end. However, paragraph 2.35 offers a startling projection of regional military expenditures to 2035, when China has clearly eclipsed the US. Its inclusion in the Defence White Paper is significant.

Moreover, it must be recognised that the US has global security interests (I would say distractions), while China concentrates its force modernisation on a comparatively narrow range of strategic objectives. China does so at a fraction of the cost of the US, and without the handicap of having to project power across 10,000km of Pacific Ocean. [fold]

In other words, the 2016 Defence White Paper is clear: the 'rules-based order' is being challenged, and perpetual American primacy cannot be guaranteed.

3. The commitment to spending 2% of GDP on defence

On seven occasions throughout the new Defence White Paper, the commitment to spending 2% of GDP on defence is categorically affirmed. I've debated here on The Interpreter why the 2% target is essential for alliance management, and how this is quite unrelated to force planning.

Some longstanding opponents are writing contorted obituaries for the 2% target based on paragraph 8.10, which says the 'Government's 10 year funding model will not be subject to any further adjustments as a result of changes in Australia's GDP growth estimates'.

But all that's being asserted here is that the funding certainty provided in the Defence White Paper obviates any need to adjust force structure plans. The bottom line is the commitment to reaching the 2% target as a proportion of GDP is consistently and explicitly repeated throughout the document, including in the paragraphs that surround this quote. There is no prospect of the 2% of GDP target being jettisoned by any either major political party any time soon, and this is entirely consistent with Australia's national interests.

4. Australian defence policy is entering a pro-nuclear era

Defence white papers in recent history have affirmed Australia's longstanding commitment to nuclear disarmament and a nuclear-weapons-free world. References to Australia's reliance on US extended nuclear deterrence were couched in terms of 'so long as these weapons exist'.

That's now over. Paragraph 5.20 reads 'only the nuclear and conventional military capabilities of the US can offer effective deterrence against the possibility of nuclear threats against Australia.' Further, Paragraph 2.104 notes that Australia has 'historically' been a prominent supporter of the Non-Proliferation Treaty — a telling use of tense.

In light of deepening tensions in the Western Pacific and the proliferation of ballistic missiles among several countries listed in the Defence White Paper, it's clear that the Australian government's approach to nuclear weapons is fast evolving. Greater Australian reliance on nuclear deterrence capability is being foreshadowed.

5. The fall of Jakarta

When it comes to Indonesia, the 2016 Defence White Paper adopts a small-target approach. Granted, paragraph 5.34 labels a strong and productive relationship with Indonesia as 'critical to our national security'. Yet this reads more as a factual statement than an ambition for deepening our defence partnership.

The 2013 Defence White Paper, by contrast, saw great opportunity in maturing the Australia–Indonesia defence relationship. It recognised that Indonesia was a major land power stranded on a massive archipelago, and that our asymmetric force posture is conducive to a comprehensive defence partnership that could multiply the strategic weight of both countries. Since then, circumstances have dramatically altered. Spying revelations, naval violations of Indonesian waters, bribing of people smugglers, and the execution of two reformed Australian prisoners have seen relations sink to their lowest ebb since the East Timor crisis of 1999.

The 2016 Defence White Paper provides a shopping list of ongoing bilateral defence activities and recognises the strategic implications of Indonesia's rise. Yet it presents no plan for getting ahead of this curve or realising the long term potential of Australia-Indonesia defence cooperation. Given the relationship's importance, the failure of the 2016 Defence White Paper to provide a credible and ambitious strategic blueprint for bilateral defence cooperation is a major weakness.

6. The curious equivalency of the Strategic Defence Objectives

The 2016 Defence White Paper lists three so-called 'Strategic Defence Objectives'. These are:

• Deter, deny and defeat attacks on or threats to Australia and its national interests, and northern approaches.
• Make effective military contributions to support the security of maritime South East Asia and support the governments of Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and of Pacific Island Countries to build and strengthen their security.
• Contribute military capabilities to coalition operations that support Australia's interests in a rules-based global order.

At first read, these objectives are long-standing and uncontroversial. What is profound, however, is that paragraph 3.10 stipulates that the Government agrees these should be 'equally weighted' – a remarkably ham-fisted assertion.

Imagine Australia is being invaded by a foreign power through its northern approaches. Meanwhile, an allied request is made for an Australian contingent to help stabilise a region in the Middle East. Which should be the higher priority for the Australian government? The 2016 Defence White Paper's failure to clarify the order of Australia's strategic priorities represents a clear flaw.

7.  The absence of the Anglosphere

In many ways the 2016 Defence White Paper released under Malcolm Turnbull and Marise Payne bears close resemblance to what might have been expected under their immediate predecessors. One imagines, however, that a Defence White Paper released under a prime minister who reintroduced knights and dames would have more to say about our colonial devotion to the mother country.

As it is, the Defence White Paper offers little more than a polite nod to Australia's historical ties with the UK, and presents a factual account of ongoing security and intelligence linkages in a couple paragraphs. The same is true for Canada. In other words, the Defence White Paper gives attention to the UK commensurate with its influence in our strategic affairs: marginal.

8. The 'newly powerful' folly

The most explicit paragraph on China is one that doesn't refer to it by name. Paragraph 2.24 reads:

While it is natural for newly powerful countries to seek greater influence, they also have a responsibility to act in a way that constructively contributes to global stability, security and prosperity. However, some countries and non-state actors have sought to challenge the rules that govern actions in the global commons such as the high seas, cyberspace and space in some unhelpful ways, leading to uncertainty and tension.

Of course this is a not-so-subtle reference to China's dredging and militarising of artificial islands in the South China Sea, industrial scale cyber theft, and weaponisation of space.

But to frame thinking about China as 'newly powerful' is to commit the very gravest error, one that could lead to catastrophic miscalculation when assessing China's resolve. For the Chinese, theirs is the greatest civilisation to have ever existed – the core of a Sino-centric world order lasting 1800 years. From Beijing's point of view, the dominance of Western powers is but a blip on the long annals of the Middle Kingdom, and China's rise is merely the natural correction to the rightful longstanding norm.

The implication of the 2016 Defence White Paper is that if China merely constrains its ambition and accepts the 'established rules-based order' as imposed by the more enlightened foreign powers, then peace and stability can prevail.

But herein lays the immutable truth about the great-power rivalry unfolding on Australia's doorstep: China views itself not as newly emerging, but as re-emerging. This means China's ambition is not based on grandiose fantasies but on reclaiming past glories and overcoming recent humiliations. That's a very different proposition to what the 'newly powerful' label so condescendingly implies.

Conclusion

I'll conclude this lengthy review by referencing the speech that Prime Minister Turnbull recently delivered to CSIS in Washington, where he noted President's Xi's expressed desire to avoid the 'Thucydides Trap'.

This is a reference to the tendency throughout history for conflict to erupt when an established power is faced with a rising power. In describing the cause of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides provides this timeless explanation: 'It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable.'

Turnbull told his American audience that he believed President Xi's sincerity with regard to avoiding the Thucydides Trap, and that China should therefore refrain from provocations that might lead to conflict.

But what the Prime Minister failed to mention was that the Peloponnesian War broke out when the established power (Sparta) declared war on the rising power (Athens), not the other way around. Therefore, when President Xi speaks of avoiding the Thucydides trap, he wants America to peaceably give ground.

It is beyond question that the American-led global order has been unambiguously good for Australia and the world. The US has been a more restrained, universalist, and inclusive hegemon than any historical comparator. It is no accident the American era coincides with unprecedented advancements in every metric of human progress. But we must be honest with ourselves. China's determination to expel the US from Asia is absolute, and the 'established rules-based order' is coming to an end.

Photo by Flickr user Peter Miller.