Published daily by the Lowy Institute


Personality in foreign policy

The G20 Special Committee in 2018, Hamburg, Germany (Christian Charisius via Getty Images)
The G20 Special Committee in 2018, Hamburg, Germany (Christian Charisius via Getty Images)
Published 7 Jul 2021 06:00    0 Comments

Readers with long memories might recall the fleeting controversy about the time that a then freshly elected Prime Minister Kevin Rudd stopped, propped and saluted a deeply unpopular US President George W. Bush during a grand global summit.

It was a NATO meeting, April 2008, one of the early trips that earned Rudd the media moniker “Kevin 747” for his busy shuttle-style diplomacy. Bush, at the time, ranked as a factor causing 69 per cent of Australians “to have an unfavourable opinion of the United States”, according to the Lowy Institute Poll – a figure that even Donald Trump failed to top on becoming president in 2017.

The storm over the salute likely stemmed from a public expectation that the “deputy sheriff” days had passed with the Howard years. Rudd had promised to get Australian troops out of Iraq (the NATO meeting in Bucharest was to talk about Afghanistan) and the Australian public mood was decisively in favour of the statement, again asked in the Lowy Institute Poll, that “the US is playing the role of world policeman more than it should be”.

But the awkward salute across the crowd was all a hammy joke, said Rudd – an example of the kind of dorky humour that would become increasingly familiar to Australians in the years to follow.

Besides, the two leaders were apparently mates no more barely a few months later, amid claimed leaks of Rudd disparaging the US president for asking “what’s the G20?” as the world grappled with the growing global financial crisis.

Why recall this little remembered history? Partly because escaping the present to an episode now in the rear-view mirror helps to underscore a point, that the personality traits of leaders matter in the presentation of a country’s foreign policy, often as much as the great strategic contours and power politics that can shape decisions. The regard held for a leader can matter to the perception from other nations, too.

It’s not just Donald Trump versus Joe Biden, or even whether Australians evidently place more confidence in New Zealand’s Jacinda Ardern than they do in Scott Morrison (Lowy Institute Poll, again). The intangibles that each leader brings – and how leaders interact with one another – are a crucial consideration to determine the direction a country adopts.  

Recognising this influence of leaders seems to be a missing element in the fascinating debate in The Interpreter over what might be described as a “values” versus “interests” approach to foreign policy. Labels such as this can be overly simplistic, so better to read for yourself the exchange kicked off by Susannah Patton and Ashley Townshend warning Australia to steer clear of any Biden administration drive to frame its Asia strategy as a contest for democracy, while Michael Green and Ben Scott have separately argued for a strategy in support of democracy and rules upholding freedom.

The influence of leaders is often overlooked, in analysis but also by the public.

My point to add to this mix is that the person in charge matters. Would China pose the same challenge today had Xi Jinping not taken control? Perhaps China’s rising power made contest inevitable, but would the moment be now? It’s unknowable, of course, but as American diplomats privately wondered back in 2009, having been told “Xi was not very well cultivated”, it was far from certain he would become the leader.

Yet the influence of leaders is often overlooked, in analysis but also by the public. In 2015, around two-thirds of Australians either didn’t know or didn’t have a view when asked if they admired Xi, India’s Narendra Modi, Papua New Guinea’s Peter O’Neill or Japan’s Shinzo Abe, while Indonesia’s Joko Widodo and Germany’s Angela Merkel fared little better.

Think, too, on Trump’s interactions with Malcolm Turnbull and how this influenced Australian perceptions of America, not only the infamous phone call, but the moment Turnbull describes of the two tucked in an air-tight secured container to protect from prying ears, talking steel tariffs. Or Trump himself, as the manifestation of US attitudes, and the shift in priorities his presidency came to represent.

Or even remember Bob Carr, as Australia’s foreign minister filling in for Rudd at the G20 Summit in Russia in 2013, sitting at an assembled table of presidents and plenipotentiaries, including America’s Barack Obama, Indonesia’s Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and other great influencers of the time.

“It’s not that hard to get here, to this table,” Carr wrote in his memoir of that St Petersburg meeting. “A bit of application, a bit of luck, some patience. Every election that’s ever been held, someone loses. But someone wins. There’s always a vacancy and it’s got to be filled. With competence you can keep on rising. None of this warrants deference.”

Perhaps not. But it does benefit to know the personalities involved. Because what a leader chooses to do, or not to do, can have a lasting influence on a country’s international relations.


Building stronger Australia-Indonesia ties

How concerned should we be about Australian attitudes to Indonesia? (dirkb86/Flickr)
How concerned should we be about Australian attitudes to Indonesia? (dirkb86/Flickr)
Published 28 Jun 2021 10:00    0 Comments

When then Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono addressed the Australian parliament in 2010, he argued that the bilateral relationship faced four major challenges: improving mutual public understanding, managing diplomatic differences, boosting economic ties and adapting to emerging regional problems.

More than a decade later, both countries have made steady progress on the last three challenges. However, the 2021 Lowy Institute Poll of Australian attitudes to the world shows that there is still much work to do on the first.

Analysing the Indonesia data in the annual Lowy Poll is usually a dispiriting exercise. Whether asked about their warmth toward Indonesia, confidence in its leaders, or even their level of basic knowledge about their biggest neighbour, Australians tend to show a combination of disinterest and distrust.

We cannot afford just to tell each other how important Indonesia is. We need to convince politicians and broader swathes of the public to learn more and care more.

This year’s responses are broadly in line with these trends, despite some inevitable year-to-year turbulence in the data.

That’s worrying, of course. But it should also be a call to action for officials, researchers, businesspeople and others who care about Australia’s relationship with Indonesia.

We cannot afford just to tell each other how important Indonesia is. We need to convince politicians and broader swathes of the public to learn more and care more about Indonesia if we are to develop a positive feedback loop that brings more attention, resources, knowledge and trust to bear in the bilateral relationship.

Cuts in the funding for teaching the Indonesian language and culture have made this task harder. But, in addition to lobbying government for more resources, we need to find other ways to improve Indonesia literacy in Australia.

So how concerned should we be about Australian attitudes to Indonesia? There are some small positive signs this year, although it’s not clear if they represent a meaningful shift or simply year-to-year volatility.

On the poll’s “feelings thermometer” (measured from 0°, very cold, to 100°, very warm), Australian warmth toward Indonesia rose by four degrees since last year to 55°. That’s significantly ahead of the nations at the bottom of the fridge, China, Russia, Iran and Myanmar. But it’s behind regional neighbours such as the Philippines, Thailand, Papua New Guinea and South Korea and, of course, Australian besties in New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

When it comes to trust in Indonesia to act responsibly in the world, there was a 12 point jump this year to 48%. But that’s still below the 52% of Australian who trusted Indonesia back in 2017, and little changed from previous polls in 2009 and 2011. Yet again, Australians place Indonesia ahead of revisionist actors such as Russia and China but well behind India and close allies such as Japan and the UK.

These results are mirrored when it comes to attitudes toward national leaders. Only around a quarter of Australians (26%) have some or a lot of confidence in Indonesian President Joko Widodo to do the right thing in world affairs. That puts Jokowi, as Indonesia’s leader is known, well ahead of Russia’s Vladimir Putin, China’s Xi Jinping and North Korea’s Kim Jong-un but well behind India’s Narendra Modi, Japan’s Yoshihide Suga and Germany’s Angela Merkel.

While the gap between trust in Indonesia and confidence in Jokowi looks large (22 points), there is a similar-sized deficit toward the prime ministers of the UK, Japan and India, suggesting that Australians are more confident in the long-term partnerships with these nations than in their current leaders. US President Joe Biden is the only leader to inspire more confidence than his country, likely reflecting relief at the ouster of Donald Trump but fear of the lingering impact of his time in office.

It is hard to imagine much improvement in Australian perceptions of Indonesia until the end of the pandemic, which is currently rampaging through Indonesia, and travel and other people-to-people links can be resumed.

The good news from the poll on this front is that 60% of Australians support providing financial assistance to Southeast Asian countries to boost their access to Covid-19 vaccines. Younger Australians are keener to help Indonesia and its neighbours, with 70% saying that Australia should fund vaccines for the region, compared to 56% of Australians over 30. The problem, as Australia itself has found, is that acquiring and distributing the right vaccines to the right people at the right time is not just a question of money.

Greater knowledge of another country is no guarantee of closer ties, as demonstrated by the souring of Australian perceptions toward China. Australia and Indonesia do not see eye to eye on many issues and never will. But having been travelling to and studying Indonesia since the early 2000s, I am convinced that the more outsiders can explore and learn about the country, the more they will understand and admire it.

The first task, for now, is helping Indonesia get through the pandemic in the best shape possible and working out how Australia can open up to the world. Then we must revisit the “bottom line” of former president Yudhoyono’s speech in 2010:

We still have a lot of work to do when it comes to people-to-people contact and when it comes to appreciating the facts of each other’s national life.


Main image via Flickr user dirkb86, thanks to a Creative Commons licence


Putin has his generation of fans – even in Australia

Russian President Vladimir Putin leaves after a speech at the 20th Congress of the United Russia Party in Moscow, 19 June 2021 (Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images)
Russian President Vladimir Putin leaves after a speech at the 20th Congress of the United Russia Party in Moscow, 19 June 2021 (Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images)
Published 25 Jun 2021 11:00    0 Comments

The international cult-like fascination with Russian President Vladimir Putin, evident at various times among US Republicans during the Trump era, appears to have a foothold in Australia. The 2021 Lowy Institute Poll finds that Australia’s version of the “Putinistas” are more likely to be men. Of male respondents, 19% say they have confidence in Putin “to do the right thing regarding world affairs”, whereas only 12% of Australian women reported “a lot” or “some” faith in him. This echoes a favourable view of Putin reported by a recent Pew Poll, which found more Australians have confidence in Putin’s approach than the median across the 14 countries surveyed.

Maybe it’s the extreme strongman (often topless) Putin propaganda imagery that resonates. But gender aside, divergent age groups of Australians also judge the Russian leader quite differently.

Of people aged 18–29 years, 22% have “a lot or some confidence” in Putin as a political leader. This compares to only 11% of those aged 60 and above. At the other end of the spectrum, 34% of people aged 18–29 have “no confidence at all” in Putin. But people aged 60 and above are more invested in this negative sentiment, with 56% reporting no faith in the Russian leader.

If such distrust reflects a generational hangover from the experience of the Cold War, it appears not to be an attitude that is inherited. Asked how much trust Australians have in Russia to “act responsibly in the world”, close to 34% of those aged 60 and above report “not at all”, compared to 16% of people 18–29 years old. Flipped around, the tiny minority of Australians that trust Russia “a great deal” (3%) are more likely to be in the younger cohort, whereas none of those aged over 60 had such faith in Russia. Overall, the number of Australians who trust Russia “a great deal” or “somewhat” to act responsibly appears to have flatlined, having been 24% in 2020 and 26% this year.

Perceptions of Russia are also “cool” when judged on the “thermometer”, a scale where 0° is very cold and 100° is very warm. Australians put Russia at 42° in 2020 – the latest result is 41°. This contrasts with the United States, steady on 62°.

Again, this lukewarm attitude to Russia appears to have a generational component. While the tragedy of the downing of flight MH17, the prime ministerial threat to “shirtfront” the Russian leader, and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine have been a collective lens through which Australians view Russia, sentiment among the younger generation is still remarkably different to those with memories of the Cold War.

Will Moscow seek to capitalise on the warmer sentiment towards Russia among some young Australians?

One in ten of those aged over 60 consigns Russia to the deep freeze, at 0°, yet only 4% of people aged 18–29 rank their view of Russia as “very cold”. It may be that those with somewhat warmer feelings towards Russia are influenced by a sense of distance – the presentation of Russia in the popular press as a “European” problem far distant from Australian concerns. And it could be that there is a general coolness about the present state of the world. Feelings towards the United States have dropped 6° in the last four years.

The results pose a fascinating series of questions, including whether Moscow will seek to capitalise on the warmer sentiment towards Russia among some young Australians; whether there might be more support for post-pandemic educational exchanges, for instance; or the possibility of a hearts and minds campaign for the next generation?

Perhaps, for now, all we can be assured of is an uptick in Putin calendar sales for the Australian market.


The dangers in Australia’s blissful ignorance about India

Australian confidence has fallen in India’s Narendra Modi to “do the right thing regarding world affairs” (Biju Boro/AFP via Getty Images)
Australian confidence has fallen in India’s Narendra Modi to “do the right thing regarding world affairs” (Biju Boro/AFP via Getty Images)
Published 24 Jun 2021 05:00    0 Comments

A major headline from the 2021 Lowy Institute Poll is the dramatic decline in the Australian public’s assessment of China, continuing the trend already observed in previous years. While 52% of respondents said they trusted China to “act responsibly in the world” either “a great deal” or “somewhat” in 2018, in 2021 only 16% did so. Similarly, for the first time in 2021 almost two-thirds of the respondents (63%) view China as more of a security threat than an economic partner. Australia-China relations have certainly reached a nadir.

But what of the Australian public’s attitude to that other Asian great power, India?

Australia-India relations have never been better. The elevation of the bilateral relationship at the virtual leader’s summit in June 2020 to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” reflected the obvious chemistry on display between Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Scott Morrison.

The two countries made meaningful progress to advance defence cooperation including the signing of a mutual logistics support arrangement, and an agreement to support collaboration between defence science and technology research organisations in both countries. This was followed by Australia’s long-awaited inclusion in the November 2020 Malabar naval exercises. Also significant was the commitment to boost broader science, technology and research to support responses to Covid-19 and to work together to reduce supply chain vulnerabilities exposed by the pandemic for critical health, technology and other goods and services. Finally, the “joint declaration on a shared vision for maritime cooperation in the Indo-Pacific” commits both countries to work together bilaterally to the promote a free, open, inclusive and “rules-based maritime order”.

Given these bilateral developments, one would expect greater public awareness of India’s importance and relevance to Australia, more so given the deteriorating relationship with Beijing. The latest Lowy Poll shows some indication of that.

In 2020, 61% of Australians said they trusted India “a great deal” or “somewhat” to act responsibly in the world, up from 45% in the previous year and on par with their views of the United States. Australians continued to display “warm feelings” toward India, too (measured on a 100 degree scale), which at 56 degrees represented a 4 degree increase from the previous year.

Less encouraging, however, were public perceptions of Modi, with only 38% of respondents saying that they had “some” or “a lot” of confidence in him to “do the right thing regarding world affairs”, representing a 4% fall from 2020. However, this must be interpreted alongside the striking finding that of all national leaders included in the survey, Modi was least known by the Australian public, with 30% of respondents either unsure or having “no view” of his political integrity.

Another noteworthy finding is that 81% of respondents viewed India as doing “too little” to combat climate change, only one point less than China, and 10 points worse than the United States. Given that respondents ranked climate change as the second highest “critical threat” to Australia’s vital interests in the next 10 years in 2021, the poor view of India in this regard could lead to current “warm feelings” dissipating.

While the questions asked in the Lowy Poll are directed toward unearthing the nuances of public opinion on the Australia-US and Australia-China relationships, the poll suggests the Australian public is not as aware or convinced about the strategic and economic significance of India as is the Australian government. Perhaps the best that can be said is that India and its leaders are neither seen by the Australian public as a significant problem for our national interests (apart from climate change.) The point is that the public do not consider India as a significant part of the solution to our deteriorating relationship with China.

This shallow public interest and understanding of India is unsurprising given the cursory and sporadic coverage that Indian politics is given in the Australian media. Most of what is reported is viewed through the prism of India-China border clashes, the intractable conflicts between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, or focused on crises of governance such as the Modi government’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic.

The poor view of India to combat climate change could lead to current “warm feelings” dissipating.

Little is written in the Australian media or academic/policy circles about India’s foreign policy, or its growing role as part of Australia’s free and open Indo-Pacific strategy. This includes the part it might play in the stated objectives of Australia’s 2020 Strategic Update to “shape Australia’s strategic environment”, “deter actions against Australia’s interests’ or “respond with credible military force”.

If correct, this situation presents short-term opportunities and longer-term dangers for government policy if the public’s blissful ignorance about and relative disinterest in India persists. On the upside, the government and policy elites will have a free hand to continue efforts to develop the Australia-India relationship with little need to manage or respond to public pushback. There is currently little evidence of any anti-India sentiment among the Australian public.

However, as Canberra reacts to ongoing Chinese coercion by putting more efforts into deepening the strategic and economic relationship with India, the public will need a better understanding of why the partnership with India is in our long-term interests even if there are short-term obstacles. This is especially important if China seeks to increase pressure on Australia as Canberra puts more emphasis on the bilateral relationship with India or on groupings such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or “Quad”.

Public ignorance is rarely a sound basis for enduring and ambitious government policy. The Lowy Poll suggests the public conversation about India has only just started.


By the numbers: Charting the Australia-China relationship in decline

Only one in ten Australians have confidence in China’s Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs (Jason Redmond/AFP via Getty Images)
Only one in ten Australians have confidence in China’s Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs (Jason Redmond/AFP via Getty Images)
Published 23 Jun 2021 14:00    0 Comments

“China is angry. If you make China the enemy, China will be the enemy.” Or so said a Chinese government official speaking to an Australian reporter in November 2020. This comment came with the now infamous “14 grievances”, a list of what the official said were the obstacles to improvement in Australia-China relations.

But Australians too are unimpressed with China’s behaviour. The 2021 Lowy Institute Poll, released today, shows that trust and warmth towards China have fallen to yet another record low. On almost every question that has been asked about China in the 17 years of the poll, views have soured. The one exception is Covid-19 handling, where the number of Australians that say in 2021 that China has handled the pandemic “very” or “fairly well” increased by 14 points to 45%.

From month to month, the Australia-China relationship has gone from bad to worse.

From month to month, the Australia-China relationship has gone from bad to worse. The downward spiral, which dates from 2017, was accelerated by China’s furious response to Australia calling for an inquiry into the origins of Covid-19 in April 2020.

Australians are paying attention. Trust in China has plummeted – only 16% of Australians say that they trust China a great deal or somewhat to act responsibly in the world, a seven-point decline from 2020. This figure has plummeted in three years, halving since 2019 and now at a third of the level in 2018 when a majority of Australians (52%) said they trusted China.

It seems like a lifetime ago, but in 2014, China’s President Xi Jinping was delivering an address to Australia’s parliament about friendship and goodwill. Then, half the country (53%) didn’t know who Xi was. Fast forward to 2021 and only one in ten Australians have confidence in Xi to do the right thing regarding world affairs.

It was on that same visit in 2014 that Australia and China inked a free trade agreement, ten years in the making. But today, even views of China’s economic growth — historically a positive for Australians — have now shifted into negative territory.

For the past decade, Australian governments, businesses and publics alike placed China at the centre of our economic prosperity. Today, less than half the population (47%) say China’s economic growth has a positive influence on their view of China, a steep 28-point fall since 2016.

A year of economic coercion from China, directed at Australian businesses, has not gone unnoticed. As recently as three years ago, 82% of Australians saw China as “more of an economic partner to Australia”. Today, that number sits at 34%. By contrast, the majority of Australians (63%) see China as “more of a security threat to Australia” in 2021.

Australians are also concerned about China’s military. Almost all Australians (93%) see China’s military activities in our region as having a negative influence on their views of China, a 14-point increase from 2016. This comes at a time where the potential for a war over Taiwan is in the news: the majority of Australians (52%) say a military conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan poses a critical threat to Australia’s vital interests, a large bump of 17 points from 2020.

Nevertheless, the majority of Australians (57%) would prefer to stay neutral in conflict between the superpowers. This is consistent with past Lowy Institute polling that shows increasingly wariness of military engagement in hypothetical scenarios involving China. Four in ten (41%) say Australia should support the United States.

Positive views of China are few and far between in the Australian public. However most remain positive about Chinese people they have met, with 76% saying they had positively influenced their view of China. Similarly, seven in ten Australians (68%) say China’s culture and history have a positive influence on their view of China.

Still, the majority of Australians (56%) say that China is more to blame for the tensions that have plagued the bilateral relationship. A sizeable minority (38%) say that Australia and China are equally to blame. And Australians do have reservations about how the relationship has been handled, marking the Coalition government 5.1 out of 10.

Few incentives are obvious that will lead to a change of course. With public opinion towards China at rock bottom, and Prime Minister Scott Morrison tabling the “14 grievances” at the G7, the decline in the Australia-China relationship seems set only to deepen.


US-Australia alliance a friendship, not a love affair

President Joe Biden talks by phone with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison from the White House Situation Room on 3 February 2021 (Adam Schultz/White House/Flickr)
President Joe Biden talks by phone with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison from the White House Situation Room on 3 February 2021 (Adam Schultz/White House/Flickr)
Published 23 Jun 2021 10:00    0 Comments

At first glance, the 2021 Lowy Institute Poll, released today, tells a positive story about how Australians view a post-Donald Trump America: trust in the United States to behave responsibly in the world has rebounded to 61% (an increase of 10 points from last year), and nearly 70% of Australians trust President Joe Biden to behave responsibly in the world – a dramatic shift from the 30% who trusted President Trump.

However, a consideration of trust levels in the United States since 2006 suggests that along with relief over the election of Joe Biden, there is a pronounced wariness among the Australian public about an ally that has also brought a lot of heartache.

For example, consider that the current percentage of Australians who trust the United States to behave responsibly in the world is approximately the same as the percentage of Australians who trusted the United States during two distinctly troubling periods in the recent past:

  • In 2006, when the situation in Iraq had deteriorated to the point that the outbreak of an Iraqi civil war appeared likely and President George W Bush remained committed to his existing policy;
  • In 2017, following America’s election of an isolationist president who planned to withdraw the United States from international treaties and multilateral obligations (trust declined further over the three years of Donald Trump’s presidency and registered a low of 51% in 2020, explaining the 10-point jump in 2021).

It seems unlikely that Joe Biden, a well-known and well-liked moderate Democrat, would preside over an America that induced the level of disillusionment among Australians that we would associate with these two earlier periods. More likely, the 61% of those who trust Biden in the 2021 Poll reflects the cumulative effect of Australians feeling over-exposed and vulnerable to America’s wars and exhausting domestic politics over the past 20 years.

Australia experienced a relatively low number of casualties in America’s post-9/11 wars. But the Australian public has experienced war differently than the American public. Despite committing military forces to every major US-led intervention (and making its own deployments to East Timor and Solomon Islands), Australia had not lost a soldier in combat since the end of the Vietnam War until 2002 in Afghanistan.

Further, the then-Prime Minister John Howard’s decision to commit Australian military forces to the war in Iraq in 2003 led to a meaningful divide on defence policy between the Labor and Liberal parties, and among the public, that was an unusual and generally unwelcome development in Australian politics. Lowy polls from the past decade highlight that only a small percentage of Australians believe that involvement in either the Afghanistan or the Iraq wars was worth the costs.

Turning to America’s exhausting domestic politics, the past 20 years have tested the patience of America’s closest friends. Intense partisan polarisation became evident during the George W Bush administration, was operationalised into legislative dysfunction during the Obama years, and then directly undermined American democracy during the Trump years.

But it is important to acknowledge that inside this post-9/11 period, Australians also witnessed an America that voted twice for a liberal black man named Barack Hussein Obama, and expectations of America surged. Lowy Polls show that Australians’ confidence in the United States to behave responsibly in the world reached 83% during the Obama years.

75% of Australians believe the United States would come to Australia’s defence if Australia were under threat.

So, what does Australians’ wariness and disillusionment mean for the alliance with America? Maybe not much, for now. Responses to questions on the alliance in the 2021 Lowy Poll are consistent with past years: 78% view the ANZUS alliance as important to Australia’s security and 76% agree that Australians and Americans share many common values and ideals. Similarly, 75% of Australians believe the United States would come to Australia’s defence if Australia were under threat.

As a harbinger of things to come, this year’s Poll did find a significant generational divide on certain questions, with Australians under 30 being less likely to trust the United States and more likely to believe the alliance is less important because the United States is in decline.

Also, a majority of Australians – 58%, down from 66% in 2019 – agree with the statement, “Donald Trump has weakened the alliance with the United States”. But it is not clear how he weakened the alliance since overall support levels for the alliance have remained high.

Perhaps a level of trust in the United States that sits around 61% is appropriate. It is better than it was, but it is not as good as it has been because Australians have gained, though disappointment, a more pragmatic view of America. And you can still be good mates with someone you see clearly.

Under President Barack Obama (pictured at Bagram Air Field in Afghanistan in 2012), Australians’ trust of America to act responsibly in the world was at its peak, registering 83% in the Lowy Institute Poll (Pete Souza/White House/Flickr)

How Australians look in the mirror, and out a window to the world

A healthy self-image offers surprising insights into the mood of the nation (Saeed Khan/AFP via Getty Images
A healthy self-image offers surprising insights into the mood of the nation (Saeed Khan/AFP via Getty Images
Published 23 Jun 2021 06:00    0 Comments

Australians generally hold a healthy self-image of the nation’s place on the global stage. The 2021 Lowy Institute Poll, released today, reveals that view to be sustained. In fact, it’s stronger than ever.

The results speak largely to what many Australians see as competence in the face of crisis – increasingly seen as the new marker of soft power in the post-Covid-19 era. In large part, this is a fair call. Australia deserves credit for having managed the pandemic relatively successfully; it’s a particularly positive reflection on effective testing and tracing mechanisms and Australian compliance with pandemic restrictions.

And it’s a matter of reputational pride. Australians are overwhelmingly of the view (97%) that the nation’s response to Covid-19 will have a “very positive” or “positive” influence on Australia’s reputation in the world.

Yet there are some inconsistencies to be teased out on this measure of self-image, particularly when viewed against rankings of others’ handling of Covid-19. For example, Taiwan, the United Kingdom and the United States are ranked surprisingly poorly on their handling of the crisis. This is despite the fact that Taiwan to date has recorded fewer cases than Australia, while the UK and US have demonstrated remarkable turnarounds in delivering national vaccination programs in the 2021 year to date.

It’s curious that persistent issues with Australia’s quarantining processes, systemic delays in the national vaccination rollout and ongoing closure to the wider world have not been cause for deeper reflection by Australians. Of course, the suggestion that there may be a “halo effect” at play when Australians consider the achievements of their own nation is not necessarily a striking revelation.

But add to this the overwhelmingly positive perceptions about the impact of Australia’s diplomacy service, foreign aid, defence force, and even the nation’s economic outlook on global reputation, and the picture Australians appear to have of the nation becomes uncharacteristically rosy.

There’s no clear explanation for this outlook. Is it simply short-term optimism at work in the aftermath of the pandemic? Or is it symptomatic of deeper, enduring anxieties about the outside world, which amplified by Covid-19, have reinforced the sense of safety and security of “Fortress Australia”? Either way, these perceptions offer surprising insights into the mood of the nation.

To be fair, the outlook is not entirely rosy. Poll data points to important elements of self-critique when it comes to Australia’s international standing. Cue Australia’s climate policy.

It’s clear that issues surrounding the nation’s climate policy continue to have a polarising effect on Australian communities; a fact not only borne out by the poll data, but ironically repeated this week in the Australian government. Yet, many Australians are concerned that lagging leadership on climate policy will have reputational impacts. Six out of ten Australians think that the government is doing too little to combat climate change, while most support Australia’s engagement in international climate negotiations to address the issues.

These numbers bode well for Prime Minister Scott Morrison, who will face increasing international pressure to explicitly commit to climate action targets in the lead up to the UK-hosted COP 26 later this year. Though it’s not yet clear if the government’s position will stretch that far by November.

Lyndhurst, South Australia, October 2020 (denisbin/Flickr) 

And beyond the insights into self-image, the poll reveals interesting dynamics in Australian views of others in the world.

It’s no surprise that the most striking of these shifts relate to China. Quite simply, China’s reputation among Australians has plummeted with 2021 marking the lowest point yet on the temperature gauge. The response reflects a rising sense of national indignation at having been the target of China’s targeted economic sanctions and wolf warrior diplomacy over the past year. And Australians lay much of the blame for the current state of affairs with China.

An underlying concern emerges that Australians’ perceptions of others in the near neighbourhood hasn’t shifted all that much.

While less favourable views of China’s system of government and military strength and investment are to be expected, it is interesting to note the overall decline in Australian positivity about China’s economic growth. Other critical distinctions are evident. Despite the bilateral tensions and cooling perceptions towards the Chinese government, Australians remain largely positive in their views on Chinese culture, history and people. There are important positives to be found here, at least for the moment.

In reflecting on the soft power assets of others, it is clear that some leaders cut through with Australian audiences. New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern continues to top the rankings with 91% of Australians expressing confidence in her leadership. US President Joe Biden, operating within his first year of office, also ranked impressively, making a turnaround from Donald Trump, and underscoring Australia’s steady commitment to the US alliance. Consistent with other markers of the relationship, Australian confidence in China’s Xi Jinping is low, with only one in ten Australians expressing confidence that he would “to do the right thing in world affairs”. The 2021 poll reflects a fall of 33 points since 2018.

While New Zealand stands well ahead of the rest and the United Kingdom remains predictably high on the Lowy Poll’s “feelings thermometer” there is a steady sense of positivity and warmth reflected in Australian perceptions of others in the Indo-Pacific region. For example, Japan, India, Indonesia, Taiwan and South Korea continue to rate reasonably well, as do Papua New Guinea and the Pacific Islands Forum.

Yet when viewed over time, and through prism of Australian foreign policy aspirations, an underlying concern emerges that Australians’ perceptions of others in the near neighbourhood hasn’t shifted all that much. Four points here, two points there – but overall inconsequential in terms of the deeper relationships. The key signal coming through in 2021 – consistent with the past decade of polling – is that Australians remain somewhat ambivalent about their connection to the region, and indeed the wider world.

Beauty is, as they say, in the eye of the beholder. As Australians turn their gaze towards addressing the significant long-term challenges of the decade ahead, we should take care that the rosy view we hold of ourselves is at least balanced by better understanding of how others also might see us, alongside deeper engagement with the region. If not, our rosy view might well turn into complacency about the outside world and ultimately act as a constraint on our larger ambitions.