Ukraine: A year after Putin’s invasion

Nearly one year since the Russian invasion, no end is in sight to the war in Ukraine. It’s become a conflict of grinding, static attrition, largely due to the constraints on fighting imposed by winter. But both sides are clearly gearing up for renewed offensives over coming months. 

While last autumn’s successful Ukrainian offensives, first in Kharkiv then in Kherson, threw Russia on the backfoot militarily, Moscow is now reconstituting its forces and absorbing newly-mobilised conscripts amid claims that a further call-up is in prospect. Russia’s defence industry is working overtime to replenish the sizeable losses of equipment, augmented with missiles and drones from Iran.

While it too has suffered huge losses of troops and equipment, Ukraine is likewise building up its military reserves. Kyiv continues to receive large quantities of Western military assistance. The decision by Germany and the United States to provide main battle tanks (with their superior armour, weaponry and control systems) is a potential game-changer – although deployment of the tanks will take time.

Ukraine will seek to build on last autumn’s battlefield successes, recovering further territory from Russian occupation. Kyiv is sensibly not showing its hand regarding likely vectors of any offensive, but breaking the “land bridge” between Russia and occupied Crimea through Zaporizhzhia is a logical objective.

Meanwhile, Russia will press to gain more territory in the Donbas to consolidate its position in eastern Ukraine and support its claims that these annexed territories are now part of Russia. It may still harbour more ambitious military objectives across Ukraine.

At this stage, then, there’s little prospect of a negotiated end to hostilities. Neither side is ready or willing to compromise: indeed, positions have hardened and become more entrenched. Yet even if negotiations were in prospect, it’s hard to envisage an outcome that would satisfy both Ukraine and Russia, and thus translate into a lasting settlement – given their mutual visceral antipathies and irreconcilable objectives. 

Any negotiated outcome seems more likely to produce merely an uneasy truce, leaving unresolved elements on all sides aggrieved and dissatisfied with the compromises involved. The result would be continuing insecurity and instability for the region.

This unhappy prospect reflects the wider motivations underlying Russia’s actions. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine represents a defiant effort by Moscow to resist further erosion of its sway over its “near abroad”, asserting Russia’s entitlement to a protective sphere of influence around its borders. This is motivated by both imperial nostalgia and realpolitik calculations about Russia’s security needs. Yet Putin has over-reached in invading Ukraine – a miscalculation not unknown among former imperial powers.

Viewed from this perspective, the Ukraine war is part of the slow-motion process of disintegration of the Soviet Union. And it’s not the only example.

The unrest that has erupted around Russia’s vast periphery over recent times similarly reflects this messy denouement of the Soviet empire. To Russia’s west, longtime Belarus autocrat Alexander Lukashenko is clinging tenaciously to power, having thwarted (only with Moscow’s backing) a popular groundswell of democratic opposition after the flawed presidential election of August 2020. The Kremlin sees Belarus, no less than Ukraine, as part of the Russian patrimony, and crucial to Russia’s security.

Meanwhile, in the South Caucasus, tensions remain high between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the long-disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, an intractable conflict dating from Soviet times, and earlier.

In Soviet times, Nagorno-Karabakh was part of Azerbaijan (and remains internationally recognised as such), although mainly populated by ethnic Armenians. After intense fighting as the Soviet Union disintegrated, Armenia controlled the territory for 30 years. But in a short yet decisive war in late 2020, Azerbaijan (backed by Turkey) wrestled back control. 

Since brokering an uneasy truce, Russia (the traditional regional gendarme) has policed the dividing lines in Nagorno-Karabakh. But when tensions escalated again in late 2022, Russian mediation efforts were less effective, apparently reflecting Moscow’s diminished influence and its distraction with the war in Ukraine. Nagorno-Karabakh remains unfinished business for both Armenia and Azerbaijan, for whom it is a visceral issue.

Last year also saw a short but nasty conflict between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan over a longstanding border dispute, unresolved since Soviet times. Here too, the relative lack of effective Russian intervention to calm tensions was revealing, leaving the impression of a security vacuum. Similar unsettled Soviet-era border demarcation issues have led to conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in recent years.

And in Kazakhstan, suspicions abound of possible Russian irredentist ambitions over the majority ethnic Russian territories in the country’s north. Threats from Russian nationalists prompted by Astana’s refusal to support Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine have sharpened these fears. It was striking, though, that visiting Chinese President Xi Jinping explicitly restated last October Beijing’s strong support for Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity.

Rivalry for influence between Russia and China in Central Asia is longstanding. In general, while Beijing has enjoyed growing economic preponderance, Moscow retained stronger political influence and security ties, reflecting the Soviet, and earlier Tsarist, imperial legacy. 

But Moscow’s standing has diminished over the past year, conspicuously evident in regional summits where Putin has sometimes cut a lonely figure and leaders of former Soviet republics have not shied from criticising Moscow and distancing themselves from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Yet geographical proximity, coupled with political and economic realities, keep smaller ex-Soviet republics dependent on Moscow. 

Seen from an historical perspective, none of this should be surprising. While the USSR was formally dissolved in 1991, the process of disentanglement has inevitably proved gradual and haphazard.

This underlines that empires end messily, not tidily.

One year into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the war is heading for another critical moment. 

Russia is expected to launch a major new offensive in the Donbas. Ukraine wants to hit back with a counter-offensive to retake occupied territories. Faith in the Ukrainian army among Western backers is high. But there is a big problem: Ukraine is using up ammunition much faster than North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) members can manufacture it.

“Things are happening quickly. But we need to continue, we need to step up even more because there’s a big need out there to provide Ukraine with ammunition,” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said last week. “This is now becoming a grinding war of attrition, and a war of attrition is a war of logistics.”

While NATO members are under pressure to increase their peacetime military production, Ukraine is also under pressure from the United States to quickly swing the war in its favour while foreign military aid continues to flow.

This time a year ago, things looked different.

Before the invasion, many didn’t believe in the possibility of a state-on-state war in Europe. As Russia gathered troops on the border with Ukraine, the move was so bold it seemed a bluff. Then, many didn’t believe Ukraine could withstand a much bigger enemy.

But Ukrainians defied the odds. And Russian President Vladimir Putin has lost in many ways.

Not only has Ukraine withstood Putin’s assault, it has managed to rally massive international support and keep military aid coming throughout the year. A recent survey by Ipsos revealed that public support for Ukraine globally has not changed, and interest in news about it remained high by the end of 2022. 

Ukrainians have emerged as a more united and widely admired nation under the leadership of their charismatic President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. They took up arms, raised funds for the army, and tirelessly advocated for their cause on every available platform at home and abroad. Russia’s propaganda machine faltered, and Ukraine has completely dominated and controlled the narrative.

Many Russian-speaking Ukrainians have abandoned the language they now view as belonging to the enemy. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the same trend is happening in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, where the war has also sparked reflections on national identity and history, and politicians have shifted their attention towards China. Among Russia’s ethnic minorities and the world at large, people are having long-overdue conversations about Russia’s colonial legacy and imperial ambitions.

NATO has been revitalised. Sweden and Finland – previously neutral states – are on the path to joining the alliance. The European Union has cut oil and gas imports from Russia. An unprecedented barrage of sanctions has turned Russia into an international pariah. Isolation has forced the Kremlin to desperately ramp up diplomatic efforts in Asia and Africa. The country saw a massive exodus of both foreign businesses and its own people; at least 500,000 Russians are estimated to have fled since the start of the war. The number of Russian soldiers killed and wounded in Ukraine is approaching 200,000 according to The New York Times, citing US and other Western officials.

Russian war crimes have been meticulously documented by local and international investigators. The International Criminal Court has launched a probe, and more than 40 countries and the European Union have supported Ukraine’s proceedings against Russia in the International Court of Justice. The mounting body of evidence collected early means it will be preserved before it is lost or destroyed, and witnesses’ memories fade. 

But while Putin has had many setbacks, he is not yet losing the war. The Russian economy is hurting but it is still paying for the war machine. And time is not on Ukraine’s side. The Ukrainian army is much more prepared than at the war’s outset, benefiting from both Western weapons and training. Yet it is still outnumbered. With little regard for his people and human life in general, Putin is ready to throw as many bodies onto the battlefield as needed.

Military analysts speculate about the outcomes of the war. The truth is nobody knows. And that’s why we’re entering another year of uncertainly and fear. What is clear is that we can have no illusions about Putin’s true motives and his lack of desire for peace. There is little hope of change coming from Russian’s liberal opposition, and the prospects of protest have been dimmed as dissenters have been imprisoned, intimidated or pushed into exile.

Ukrainians will have to defy the odds once again and attempt to finally defeat the Russian army. This too will come at a price. Russia has responded to past Ukrainian advances and Western aid by indiscriminately targeting civilians and bombing energy infrastructure. In the coming year, we are likely to see more of the same.

As Russia’s war on Ukraine approaches its first anniversary, two conclusions are apparent.

First, the war has a long way to run. Its ultimate outcome remains in the balance. Russia’s military objective is unchanged. It is to extinguish Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence, annex territory, install a client regime in Kyiv, and establish a veto over Ukraine’s decision-making. It seeks to create a replica of Belarus, a neutered and dependent nation on its southern flank, with no prospect of joining NATO or falling into the West’s orbit.

Ukraine’s objective is national survival: to expel Russian forces from its territory, including Crimea and the Donbas, and ensure its ability to determine its own form of government and chart its own course as an independent nation.

These two objectives are irreconcilable, meaning a negotiated settlement is not in prospect. The outcome of the war will determine the political outcome.

Second, the stakes have never been higher.

For both Ukraine and Russia, the war is now existential in nature. Defeat for Ukraine would mean its extinguishment as an independent nation. Defeat for Russia would mean the end of Vladimir Putin’s rule and the overthrow of Moscow’s ruling class.

But the war’s outcome will also determine the trajectory of the global political order.

If Ukraine prevails, the foundational principles that underpin the modern world, including the sovereign equality and political independence of nation states, and the prohibition on acquiring territory through aggression, will have been preserved.

If Russia prevails, we will revert to a Hobbesian world order where “might makes right”, where larger nations bend smaller ones to their will, and where the use of armed force and even the threat of nuclear weapons become normalised as tools of statecraft. For Australia, such a scenario would be dire.

Despite early setbacks in its strategy, the war is now settling into a pattern familiar and favourable to Moscow. It is becoming a drawn-out conflict of attrition in which Russia can bring its superior resources to bear, including more soldiers and weaponry, and which drains Ukraine of its resources and weakens the resolve of its Western backers.

Russia’s mobilisation of 300,000 additional soldiers is having an impact on the battlefield. Further mobilisations may follow. Though achieved at great expense, Russia has seized the town of Soledad and is pressing on to Bakhmut, in eastern Ukraine. All the signs are that Russia is preparing for a renewed offensive in the northern hemisphere spring.

With the stakes so high, and the war in the balance, further Western support to Ukraine is critical. This is why Western allies, including a very reluctant Germany, have agreed to send battle tanks to Ukraine.

The United States is sending 31 M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine. Germany will send its own Leopard 2 tanks, and has agreed to allow other nations to re-export the Leopard 2 to Ukraine, including Canada and Poland. The United Kingdom is sending 12 of its Challenger 2 tanks. France, Portugal, Spain, Finland, the Netherlands and Denmark will all follow suit.

All up, Western nations have committed some 105 tanks to Ukraine.

While it will take time to deploy the tanks and for Ukraine to train crews and integrate the tanks into battle plans, these new tanks will be a step-change for Ukraine’s capability, marking a big improvement on their aged fleet of Soviet-era and other tanks, which are increasingly running short of parts and ammunition. They will improve Ukrainian firepower and manoeuvrability and strengthen their ability to withstand Russian assaults.

Australia should be joining this effort and sending a contribution of our own tanks to Ukraine.

Australia has the tanks to spare. The current fleet of 59 M1A1 Abrams tanks, none of which are presently deployed, is due to be replaced with a new variant (the M1A2) beginning from 2024.

A contribution of 12 Australian M1 Abrams tanks would make a material difference to Ukraine’s fighting ability. Ukrainians are already preparing to receive the US contribution of 31 M1 Abrams tanks, so a further Australian contribution would be readily integrated.

Australia’s support to Ukraine to date, including the provision of Bushmasters and a slow-to-start ADF training mission, has been respectable. But the war is entering a new phase, and our support needs to keep pace with developments on the ground. It cannot be “set and forget”.

When Prime Minister Anthony Albanese met Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in July, he promised that Australia would “stand side-by-side with the Ukrainian people in their time of need”.

That time of need is now. Supporting Ukraine to resist Russia’s aggression is not only the right thing to do. It is also firmly in Australia’s national interest.

Australia talks a big game about protecting the rules-based global order. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the most naked and aggressive challenge to this order. If we are serious about rolling back this threat, then the most material impact we can have is to ensure Ukraine’s soldiers – who are bearing the human cost of this war – are provided with the tanks and other weaponry they need to prevail.

On 26 February last year, a few days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations issued a statement expressing “concern’’ over the “evolving situation” – a stance that caused great dismay among the many countries hoping for a stronger international condemnation of Russia’s actions.

Almost one year later, even after Ukraine’s foreign minister himself lobbied ASEAN countries to do so, the grouping is yet to collectively denounce Russia’s move. Outside of ASEAN, countries such as South Korea and Japan were more open in their denunciation of the Kremlin.

At the United Nations, many Asian countries have also been cautious when it comes to resolutions put forward on the invasion. While a number of Western-aligned countries have voted in favour of and even co-sponsored resolutions denouncing Russia, many others have opted to consistently abstain, including on votes reaffirming Ukraine’s sovereignty.

The region’s biggest player, China, continues to balance its rise at the UN with its proximity to the Kremlin, while the conflict has brought North Korea even closer to Russia.

China’s balancing act

While nobody knows exactly what was said during the Xi Jinping-Vladimir Putin meeting in Beijing in the weeks before Russia’s invasion, its tone set the stage for subsequent events. The two leaders’ statement declaring “no limits to their strategic partnership” furthered tensions between the East and the West.

China’s subsequent support of Russia in its invasion did however show some limits. Western diplomats sensed China was put in a difficult position. China has continued to keep a deliberately ambiguous stance on the war, reminding rivals of the importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity while using abstention votes on the matter in the UN Security Council and the General Assembly. China also tried to present itself as a potential mediator between the parties involved in the war, but that idea was quickly dismissed. 

China abstained on a majority of votes in the Security Council and the General Assembly, but it did vote against an April resolution suspending Russia from the Human Rights Council, saying the vote “set[s] a dangerous precedent”.

All in all, China’s voting patterns show the war in Ukraine has undoubtedly widened the gap between China, Russia and the West, but China’s support, especially its military support, has not been as limitless as initially expressed before the war.

DPRK: closer together

In October 2022, the General Assembly passed a resolution asking Russia to reverse course following its annexation of the Ukrainian territories of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia. A total of 143 countries voted in favour of the resolution, and only four countries voted alongside Russia against the resolution. The only Asian country to do so was the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Not long after the vote, the DPRK also recognised the territories as Russian. 

The DPRK’s unconditional support of Russia in its voting patterns could have a direct effect on votes about issues affecting North Korea in the Security Council, bringing Moscow closer to Pyongyang. The arms trade between the two countries also speaks to the close partnership.

The last time the Security Council issued a presidential statement on the DPRK was in 2017, and the inability of the Council to do or say anything in a united manner in 2022, despite the country’s record-breaking number of missile launches, did not go unnoticed. As such, while China has shown some restraint in its partnership with Russia, the DPRK continues to openly support the Kremlin at the UN.

A cautious and tactful approach

While Pyongyang stands out as the only Asian country to offer unconditional support of Russia’s war, many Asian countries were reluctant to fully denounce Russia’s actions and opted somewhere in the middle.

Countries such as Vietnam, Laos and Thailand have continually abstained on Ukraine-related resolutions at the UN, as has Sri Lanka. 

Indonesia, as the host of the G20 Summit last July, tirelessly sought to present itself as a potential mediator in Ukraine, and President Joko Widodo attempted some shuttle diplomacy, unsuccessfully. At the UN, however, Indonesia did not opt for neutral votes and voted in favour of resolutions denouncing Russia’s actions.

Myanmar, as well as Afghanistan, denounced the invasion but both still have representatives from previous, elected governments as the UN has not recognised the Taliban in Afghanistan nor the junta in Myanmar. As such, the lack of support at the UN may not represent the de facto authorities’ stance at home.

India’s many friends

India was put in the hot seat as an elected member of the Security Council in 2022. The country sought to show the world it is a geopolitical leader and deserves a permanent seat on the Council while also formulating a coherent policy on Ukraine.

On the Security Council, India kept a position of abstention on any Ukraine vote – except on an obscure procedural vote requested by Russia to prevent Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy from taking part in a meeting virtually. India voted to allow Zelenskyy to speak. 

If India wanted to flex its diplomatic muscle on the Security Council to show it deserves a permanent seat, the country’s speeches and voting patterns at the UN have shown restraint rather than a tour de force. India’s balancing act was a tough one to maintain. India has to tightly manage its proximity to the West through the security ties in the Quad, and with Russia through the BRICS emerging economies group. India’s economic interests also undoubtedly influence its stance – the country continues to purchase Russian crude oil at discount despite sanctions imposed by other countries. India’s abstentions are also not a surprise considering its longstanding refusal to criticise Russia at the UN.

One year later

Asian countries have, so far, shown consistency when it comes to voting at the General Assembly. Both the General Assembly and the Security Council will hold meetings to mark the one-year anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine. With no end in sight to the conflict, it seems likely based on this pattern that Asian countries will continue to opt for caution and neutrality rather than push for a more resolute stance.