For readers (like me) who are more used to thinking about power in terms of GDP numbers and defence budgets, this is revelatory. Underground Empire will make you reassess your views about the global balance of power. The “pipes and plumbing of globalisation” – internet cables, server farms, dollarised financial flows, the SWIFT payment system – is all mediated by the United States, which “has slowly but surely turned thriving economic networks into tools of domination”.
The book acknowledges the risks the United States is taking. It may get short-term advantage from manipulating this network but, taking a longer view, it is better off behaving like an umpire overseeing it than a player trying to win the game. Adversaries now have an incentive to seek alternatives. The book points out that Iran, in response to being ruthlessly sanctioned and locked out of the SWIFT payment system, has used proxies, cutouts and cash payments to circumvent US sanctions. At this point the book might have offered a deeper examination of the limits to America’s new dominion. What has American dominance of this realm achieved? Iran and Russia have not bent to Washington’s will, and China is not likely to either. Instead, they will seek to circumvent the system the United States has created.
Underground Empire makes a rather stark judgment about Chinese power: “Unlike the United States, it didn’t control any of the key choke points in the subterranean machineries of the world economy … Judged by the size of its economy, China was a global power. Judged by its influence over global economic networks, it was at best an also-ran.” That may be, but China now has every reason to build alternatives, and even without them, it is the biggest industrial power in the world. The book implies that this means little against America’s control of the “subterranean machinery”, but never quite tells us why.
Underground Empire decisively punctures the naïveté of techno-optimism, but the book might be guilty of some naïveté of its own. Having vividly described Washington’s ruthless use of its new empire to advance its interests, the authors conclude by calling for the United States to reform itself and practise a form of noblesse oblige (“Now, perhaps, the United States could deploy its empire to build a commonwealth …”). But that’s asking a lot of the United States, and understates the agency and determination of its adversaries, particularly China.