American troop numbers in Afghanistan will drop below 5000 by November this year. Simultaneously, the Taliban will likely push for US pressure to dissolve the current Afghan government and put in its place an interim administration under the guise of a power-sharing agreement in exchange for a ceasefire. Dispatching the current establishment would precipitate a strategic vacuum that would elevate the Taliban to the status of the most powerful actor in the country.
Such a position would likely induce other strongmen to join their ranks, not because those powerholders like the Taliban, but because they want to survive. Again, it is vital to bear in mind that the Taliban have a fundamentally different idea of peace – namely peace on their terms – and that very definition translates to compelling others to submit to their rule.
The US-Taliban peace deal has built a bridge that will help the Taliban lay siege to the Afghan government, with the aim of precipitating its collapse. This sense of siege is already being felt in Kabul and also came through in a statement by Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan when he said in an interview last year that the Afghan government “was a hurdle in [the] peace process that was insisting the Taliban should talk to it”.
Commenting on Pakistan’s approach to Afghanistan, a European diplomat with whom I spoke in Kabul noted, “The Taliban will not agree to disband, because that is their guarantee to military and political survival. Pakistan has no reason to pressure the Taliban on changing its goals, because it benefits from them.”
This observation underscores Pakistan’s consistent aim with regard to Afghanistan – a weak and pliant government of its choice that it can control. Pakistan’s continued effort to seek a regime of its choice in Kabul demonstrates that it is pursuing goals that have less to do with security and more to with being a revisionist actor.
There are no easy options on the table for Afghanistan. The entry of the Taliban into the Afghan political system poses an existential challenge for the Afghan government, in that it would fundamentally and irreversibly alter the nature of the state, entrench the Taliban in Afghanistan, and cement Pakistan’s influence over its neighbour, a sovereign state.
The current peace process is skewed in favour of the Taliban, and it is in their interest to remain engaged until April 2021 to ensure the US meets the withdrawal obligations outlined in the Doha agreement. President Ghani’s negotiating team would want the Taliban to recognise the administration, accept the 2004 constitution, uphold the social, political and economic gains of the past two decades, protect women's rights, declare a ceasefire, and participate in government through national elections – all of which is wishful thinking.
In the end, the intra-Afghan talks will become less relevant as events on the ground overtake the negotiating positions of either party. By that time, it will be too late to rescue an overwhelmed partner.
So what can allies do as a “Plan B” to safeguard Afghanistan?
Contingency planning needs to focus on reassuring Kabul that it is worth protecting, which should involve certain steps. First, freeze the implementation of the US-Taliban peace deal, because the Taliban have proved unwilling to meet their sole obligation – namely, to sever ties with terrorist organisations.