Myanmar, explained.
Thaksin Shinawatra, Thailand's former prime minister, at the Pheu Thai party headquarters in Bangkok, Thailand, in March (Andre Malerba/Bloomberg via Getty Images)
This is not the first time the former Thai PM has showcased his supposed statesman qualities.
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Thaksin Shinawatra’s Myanmar talks likely driven by politics and moneyThaksin Shinawatra’s Myanmar talks likely driven by politics and money
Former Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra has presented himself as a possible mediator of Myanmar’s civil war. But Thaksin is likely motivated by his own political and financial interests. His past personal ties to Myanmar’s military leader could hamstring any claims to be an honest broker.
On 6 May, a Myanmar media outlet – Salween Press – said Thaksin met representatives of some Myanmar ethnic armed groups and the National Unity Government (NUG). Thaksin had only returned to Thailand in August last year from a long self-imposed exile, and had been held in a police hospital until February.
Some of his meetings were confirmed by Thailand’s new foreign minister, Maris Sangiampongsa. The government said that it is not involved. But nor will it intervene.
Thaksin is widely held to the real leader of the ruling Pheu Thai Party, headed by his daughter Paetongtarn. She is but the latest family member to lead a Thaksin party, following in the footsteps of her aunt Yingluck, uncle Somchai, and Thaksin himself. Moreover, the Foreign Minister is close to Thaksin, and would not upset his patron.
Thaksin’s gambit in Myanmar is not a surprise. He has form for similar interventions, possibly to raise his domestic profile in Thailand by showcasing his supposed statesman qualities.
But these actions produced little for the other parties. In 2010, Phnom Penh announced Thaksin had resigned as its economic advisor “because of personal difficulties in fulfilling his role completely”. Thaksin’s meetings with insurgent representatives represented nothing new: peace talks had been held intermittently for years. And they did not reduce violence, as data from the non-government organisation Deep South Watch shows: it only trended downward after the 2014 coup against Yingluck’s government.
Thai guards along the border with Myanmar (Valeria Mongelli/Anadolu via Getty Images)
Thaksin’s past actions also hamstring his ability to be seen as an honest broker.
Thaksin's intervention could detract – or at least distract – from official Thai efforts to resolve the civil war in Myanmar.
It’s not always possible to know where Thaksin’s political goals end and his financial goals start. In a 2009 interview with the French newspaper Figaro, after Thaksin’s supporters protested following a legal move to seize US$2 billion of his wealth, he said his aims were, “Democracy, symbol of liberty, equality and fraternity, like you, the French!”, before adding, “It is also necessary that I recover my frozen assets.”
This may also be the case in Myanmar, where Thaksin reportedly has had business interests. According to The Irrawaddy – an online news site founded by exiled Myanmar journalists – Thaksin also had property in the cities of Dawei and Myanmo, as well as oil- and gas- interests in the country.
It is unlikely Thaksin’s latest gambit will pay peace dividends for Myanmar. Indeed, given his personal ties to Myanmar’s coup leaders and likely financial interests, his intervention could detract – or at least distract – from official Thai efforts to resolve the civil war there.
Moreover, it could lead to increased focus on Thai economic ties with the powers-that-be in Myanmar. This, in turn, could provoke some potentially awkward questions, particularly by those progressive Thais keen to see a more rights-based international outlook in the country’s foreign policy.
About the author
Craig Keating
Craig Keating is a former analyst, ex-diplomat, and long-time Thailand watcher.
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