But like most subsidies, these policies don’t help the Chinese economy overall. Pro-MPA governments could produce economic analyses that make this clear. Beijing could be influenced by these arguments, as several krill vessels and processing centres have recently been delayed or cancelled on economic grounds.
Stronger moves in the World Trade Organisation against fisheries subsidies would also help, even against so-called “good” subsidies that cover the costs of meeting fisheries agency rules. Because CCAMLR has high requirements, China’s subsidies for krill-taking in southern waters are particularly generous.
And helping China establish alternative industries could limit interest in krill-taking, which drives Beijing’s opposition to the newly proposed MPAs. One example is developing fish food from algae or waste products for domestic use or sale internationally. Australian science could also investigate whether it is possible – and for China, potentially cheaper – to breed krill on land, particularly for nutraceutical krill oil.
Another idea is some form of climate change credits for leaving krill in the Southern Ocean, as krill sequester carbon through their waste and their bodies when they die. China has a poor record when it comes to blue carbon – think of all the greenhouse gases released when South China Sea islands were enlarged by dredging. But if such credits were confined to the Southern Ocean, it could be worth exploring.
Moreover, Chinese businesses are interested in Antarctic tourism. Selected concessions on tourism access and infrastructure could be offered to let China’s tourists directly see the environmental benefits of MPAs. Chinese public interest in Antarctic conservation, though small, is growing.
ATS members could also do more to help developing countries resist the Chinese fishing industry’s illegal practices, mistreatment of contract fishermen and unequal agreements, beyond the Southern Ocean. The industry does respond to international criticism, albeit grudgingly.
The aim in all these areas would be to appeal to interests beyond China’s fishing industry, which currently has a rigid grip on China’s polar policies, and to reduce the fishing industry’s power through international scrutiny.
The more pressure there is on China’s fishing industry, the more likely it is that Beijing might realise that MPAs are not in fact a barrier to an already overextended, expensive fishing industry, but a good – and easy – way to be seen to cooperate on the world stage.