India’s election and foreign policy choices

Voting in India’s national elections opens today and the domestic electorate shows an increasing interest in foreign policies. The election manifestos of three national political parties – the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Indian National Congress, and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) or CPI(M) – tell a story of distinct ideological positions – right, centre, and left respectively. Each set out contending visions for voters to decide.

The BJP, seeking a third consecutive term, has been in-charge of India’s foreign policy for the last 10 years, so its manifesto contains the most comprehensive section on foreign policy and national security agenda. There is consequently more detail to unpack. Congress, which has previously ruled for more than 50 years, has a rich legacy of framing and articulating the major tenets of India’s foreign policy since independence and represents the principal opposition voice. The CPI(M), on the other hand, despite a striking decline in its electoral fortunes, occupies a critical intellectual position and has historically offered a leftist ideological critique of India’s foreign policy, most prominently during the nuclear deal struck with the United States in the 2000s.

The BJP portrays India as a “consensus builder, first responder and a voice of the Global South”. India’s G20 leadership last year is expectedly hailed as a success. Yet the rhetoric of  India as a “Vishwaguru” (teacher of the world), the talk of the town in Delhi leading up to the G20 summit, seems to have given way to a more toned down rhetoric of “Vishwabandhu” (friend of the world). Notably, the name “Bharat” seems to have replaced “India” in the official discourse, and the BJP manifesto promises to follow a Bharat First foreign policy, but without the isolationist tendencies exhibited in the “America First” policy of Donald Trump.

The BJP manifesto also contains the staples of Indian foreign policy, such as a claim to permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council, an emphasis on the neighbourhood, freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean, fighting terrorism, and expanding India’s diplomatic reach worldwide. The commitment to establishing the India Middle-East Economic Corridor (IMEC) suggests that its announcement wasn’t just a photo-op at the G20 summit.

But surprisingly, unlike its 2019 manifesto, there is no mention of BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Also missing is a direct reference to Pakistan or China as India’s major security threats, with a focus instead on non-state security threats such as terrorism and left-wing extremism. Despite recognising the need to shore up infrastructure along the borders, there is no direct reference to China’s territorial incursions.

The most interesting part of the BJP’s manifesto is an unmistakable emphasis on India’s soft power diplomacy, with a separate sub-section dedicated to this. The present government’s achievements related to its soft power are highlighted one by one: its vaccine diplomacy during the Covid pandemic; Chandrayaan-III, which became the first lander to touch down on the lunar south pole; India’s role in establishing an international day of yoga, and 2023 as the international year of millets; the global acceptance of India’s digital payment solution through the UPI; and commitments such as the International Solar Alliance and the Biofuel Alliance. The manifesto credits these achievements with instilling a sense of pride not only among citizens but also the diaspora.

Moreover, the manifesto commits to establishing Thiruvalluvar Cultural Centres across the world to promote India’s cultural heritage and democratic traditions. Without naming specific target countries, the BJP has also committed to bringing back Indian artefacts illegally taken away. This civilisational angle is further highlighted through its proposal to collaborate with other countries for the restoration and renovation of sites representing India’s heritage. Building upon the Ram Mandir inauguration in Ayodhya in January 2024, the BJP promises to launch a global outreach program to celebrate the legacy of Lord Rama.

It is typical for the incumbent ruling party to highlight the successes and overlook any alleged failures. That’s where the opposition parties take their cue.

Congress points to failures of the government, most notably, the Chinese intrusions in Ladakh and the Galwan clash in 2020, which represent the “biggest setbacks to Indian national security in decades”. It blames the lack of a comprehensive national security strategy and a government tendency for “chest thumping and exaggerated claims”. Congress promises to restore the status-quo ante along the Indo-China border, while also pledging to “repair” India’s image which it sees as damaged due to the present government’s record on human rights and social intolerance. It seeks a return to Nehruvian principles in Indian foreign policy, assuring that it will repair ties with Nepal, Bhutan, and especially Maldives, which have been strained in recent years.

Both Congress and CPI(M) accuse the government of undermining India’s commitment to following an independent, non-aligned foreign policy in the Gaza conflict by siding with Israel. The critique by the CPI(M) is stronger in tone and is reflected in its unmistakable anti-US and anti-Israel stance, which calls for scrapping all security and military ties with Israel and withdrawing from the US partnerships, including the Quad, which also involves Australia and Japan, and the I2U2, with Israel and the United Arab Emirates.

The CPI(M) also opposes the presence of any foreign military bases in the Indian Ocean as well as allowing access to Indian naval, air and military facilities for refuelling and stationing purposes to other countries. It takes a more balanced approach towards India’s neighbours, calling for a negotiated settlement with China, being open to resuming talks with Pakistan, and persuading Sri Lanka to devolve more powers to its Tamil-speaking regions.

Surprisingly, none of the three manifestos mentions Russia, perhaps as an acknowledgement of the awkwardness arising out of Russia’s tricky position in the contemporary global order.

It is generally believed that foreign policy stands out as a rare area of bipartisan agreement, unlike economic or social issues that are much more contentious and that dominate electoral debates. But reflective of the prominence of international affairs in modern life, this election reveals India’s major political parties are emphasising the differences in approach.

With India going to the polls in April, the buzz is that Prime Minister Narendra Modi is set to win a third term. The question that remains is how decisive the victory will be. Modi’s unfettered popularity among the electorate, a hugely fragmented and uninspired opposition, and citizens’ desire for continuity are some reasons why a Modi win is highly likely.

Foreign policy-wise, a Modi win would ensure that future approaches build on existing momentum and stay on its current trajectory. There will be continued focus on the Indo-Pacific, targeted action to mobilise the Global South for greater inclusion in international cooperation mechanisms, a more assertive push for United Nations reform and even greater participation in the region through existing policies (Act East Policy, Neighbourhood First Policy), Indian-led mechanisms (International Solar Alliance, Biofuel Alliance), and minilateral mechanisms that India is part of (Quad, I2U2).

For Malaysia, a country with almost seven decades of bilateral ties with India, a Modi win would mean continuity. After the brief impasse in 2019, the last few years since 2020 saw a pandemic-induced reset in ties with visible effort on both sides to enhance cooperation and elevate relations.

With the enhanced strategic partnership guiding relations since 2015, the year Modi visited Malaysia, the time is ripe to contextualise ties and ensure that they are functional in the emerging regional order – and indeed, there are existing enablers for this.

The recent flurry of diplomatic visits by Indian ministers to Malaysia and a visit by the Malaysian foreign minister to India at the end of last year provide much-needed optics to the significance of ties. Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s visit to Malaysia this week just before elections could be interpreted as a reaffirmation of how important Putrajaya is to New Delhi, and vice versa. The visit also suggests imminent continuity and consolidation in India’s approach to Southeast Asia – which is useful messaging for Malaysia, the 2025 ASEAN chair.

Also important is how Malaysia fits into India’s deeply entrenched “personality and personal relationship-driven foreign policy mechanism” – an aspect of foreign policy that is incidentally based on Jaishankar’s diplomatic prowess on the international stage and Modi’s projection of close friendships with his international counterparts. In that sense, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s warm camaraderie with Modi is and will be an important factor for deeper bilateral ties.

The resumption of regular defence exercises post-2019 is an important enabler for deeper strategic ties. Recently, Malaysia participated in the Milan exercises as one of the 50 navies in the Indian Navy’s largest-ever multilateral naval exercise. Despite the symbolic nature of Malaysia-India defence cooperation, this aspect of relations reinforces the active and conscious trust-building process.

This forms the bedrock of new-era ties and in many ways deters future diplomatic rows. The defence exercises with India also underscore Putrajaya’s efforts to address perceived parochialism in its strategic relations in the region.

Lastly, the “proliferation” of bilateral mechanisms and initiatives in recent years demonstrates two-way commitment to ensuring cooperation is aimed at addressing contemporary challenges, thereby reiterating the importance of ties. Some examples are the Malaysia-India start-up bridge and the provision extended to Malaysia to trade in Indian rupee.

These Modi-era enablers also serve to stabilise and preserve amicable, functional relations in the face of many points of contention. The basis for the Putrajaya-New Delhi relationship, hence, has been quite clearly, a strategic and calculated silence on issues that could upend this working dynamic. A third term for Modi, however, could encourage a maturing of bilateral ties beyond this selective inattention. This should involve open, targeted and honest interventions restricted to matters unique to the bilateral relationship – mindful that this is not interpreted as interference in internal matters.

How might this happen? For starters, a summit between Anwar and Modi must come to fruition. This is perhaps the most visible missing piece in efforts to reinvigorate bilateral ties. Should Modi take office again, Putrajaya and New Delhi must ensure this meeting takes place – necessary optics for the region but more importantly, key messaging for Malaysians and Indians alike. This is because misperceptions about both countries and the Malaysia-India relationship are particularly known to percolate to societal and individual levels, which then affect bilateral ties.

A meeting between both leaders would reaffirm that there is indeed a shared strategic future with scope for tangible cooperation despite existing ideological divergences and contentions. This summit would also, for Malaysia, be taking place in a fairly stable political environment without “subtext”, compared to last time, between former prime minister Najib Razak and Modi. The summit must also be complemented with enhanced two-way engagement through track 1.5 and track 2 dialogues, coupled with movement of media delegations, which are crucial to address sentiment-related misinformation.

Sophisticated ties would also mean that Putrajaya is open to “buying what New Delhi is selling” on the multilateralism front. Collaborating within newer India-led initiatives such as the International Solar Alliance, Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure, and Global Biofuels Alliance, which are aimed at tackling global challenges, should be high on Malaysia’s list if headway is to be made to enhance bilateral relations.

For Putrajaya and New Delhi, a Modi win presents an opportunity to find new homeostasis in relations. It allows for a conscious understanding of what conditions are deterring a potential “perpetually stable” relationship. Malaysia must hence plan its long-term approach to a post-election India. Passive symbolism and “pseudo-strategic” ties will no longer do.

As elections loom, India is in free trade agreement mode. Hot on the heels of announcing the signing of a “landmark” deal with a group of non-EU European countries, India has also been deep in negotiations with the United Kingdom. Those talks concluded last week, failing to clinch a long-awaited deal – a sad outcome for UK trade negotiators who have now conducted 14 rounds of trade talks with New Delhi, but something that has Canberra trade officials breathing a sigh of relief, seeing reprieve and more opportunity for Australia to gain a strong market foothold.

This is a turnaround for India from its previous position of protectionism, particularly when it walked away from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in 2019. After signing trade deals with the United Arab Emirates and Australia, this one is the first for Europe. India’s government now wants to hit US$1 trillion in annual exports by 2030, so recognises it needs to open up its own market for that to happen. 

Next month marks two years since Australia signed its long-sought free trade agreement with India. Known as ECTA (Australia–India Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement), it allowed for tariff reduction on a wide range of Australian goods exports, including wool, oats, produce, wine, minerals and resources, cosmetics and railway equipment. Services under the agreement include higher education, various business services and construction.

Since then, moves to enter the Indian market by Australian companies have been cautious, stymied by factors such as a general lack of India literacy and the ability to scale fast.

Major organisations including ANZ, Wesfarmers and Telstra are in India, as well as technology firms Acusensus, Rubicon Water and Atlassian.

Indian companies operating in Australia include online marketplace Cars24, rideshare app Ola, and a number of IT companies such as Infosys and Wipro. 

Last fortnight’s deal with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which includes Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway and Switzerland, involves US$100 billion worth of investments across a range of sectors in India, including manufacturing. It also offers more room for Indian services firms to enter their markets, such as in the audit and accounting, legal, IT and healthcare sectors. 

The deal also includes a commitment by the EFTA to generate a million jobs in India over 15 years, which would go some way towards easing the persistent challenge of unemployment there. And importantly, it also allows for more relaxed visa requirements for Indians working in Europe.

When it comes to negotiations over the UK free trade agreement, visas for Indian workers in Britain have also been a key condition. This is something that more than likely has put UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak in an unenviable bind in which he is forced to tread a path between the desire to gain agreement with New Delhi and accede to domestic concerns around migration, particularly strident in conservative quarters.

In fact, the atmosphere around migration is a tinder box, and is not expected to ease ahead of general elections later this year. But India–UK migration is apparently a sticking point that will not go away. Access to visas for highly skilled Indian professionals and for social security payments to be returned are, it is said, the most politically sensitive elements of the proposed deal.

However, the calling of India’s own general elections, which will take place between April and June, has put the trade talks on hold. It has also been said that India is holding out to be able to negotiate with a UK Labour government, which may be more amenable on the visa conditions.

For its part, Britain wants India to reduce or remove tariffs on alcohol – particularly Scotch whisky (a vital part of the Indian post-midday diet), dairy, automobiles, confectionery, produce and more. The United Kingdom also wants to be able to bid on projects in Indian states. 

There is, admittedly, something rather poignant about this situation, though. A few hundred years after the East India Company tapped the subcontinent for its goods and cheap labour, the UK government is now coming, cap in hand, to India seeking market access for its goods. And two Indian men, both leaders of their respective countries, discussing how to get the best deal for Indians in Britain. Now that’s a reversal of colonialism if there ever was one. 

The failure to reach a deal, though, is a boon for Australia, as it now has more time to gain a solid foothold into India. What Australia is best placed to deliver are high-value products, whether cosmetics or wine, clean energy or even, say, helicopters. What holds Australia back is a lack of skills, work force and India literacy. When more Australians start to understand India as a place beyond the headlines and cliches, the rewards will flow.

India has, time and again, been questioned by Europe on its commitment to buying Russian oil despite the sanctions on Moscow, against the backdrop of the ongoing armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine. This question came up again at last month’s Munich Security Conference. India’s External Affairs Minister rightfully said that in the contemporary world, having a unidimensional approach to building relationships is not as sensible as having multiple options, reaffirming New Delhi’s multi-alignment approach.

India continuously pushes for a multilateral world order across international forums, which is essential given the historic divide between the Global North and Global South. This is something that the Indian government has been trying to establish within the UN Security Council as well as through its reformed multilateralism agenda. While there is merit in India’s multi-alignment approach, it is also counterintuitive to securing and carrying out the responsibilities of permanent membership of the Council.

To a certain extent, UN Security Council permanent membership defines the power structure of the global order. India’s efforts to bring about a systematic transition to multipolarity at the United Nations will aim to change the balance of power dynamics and how power is measured in contemporary global politics. However, such a change in the status quo of power structures can only be brought about by system-determining states.

Building upon the systems theory of international relations, Robert Keohane in 1969 described system-determining states as those that play a critical role in shaping the system, such as the two great powers in a bipolar system. A paper published in 2022 by Edström and Westberg contextualised the system-determining concept in contemporary times, highlighting the UN’s P5 or “the big five” – the United States, China, France, Russia and the United Kingdom – as the system-determining states of today.

In this respect, India fits well with the description of a system-influencing state. Keohane describes these as states that cannot expect individually to dominate a system but that may nevertheless be able to significantly influence its nature through unilateral as well as multilateral actions. New Delhi’s influence in making the Global South relevant and becoming the voice of the Global South are key examples here. Under its G20 presidency, being able to add the African Union as a full-time member was one of New Delhi’s most influential recent acts.

Thus, India, due to its multi-alignment approach, has been able to garner an influential status in the current global system. However, this might not be enough to fulfil the characteristics of a permanent representative at the UN Security Council. India’s position on the two major armed conflicts that the globe has witnessed in a post-Covid world order raises concerns that New Delhi’s multi-alignment approach hinders its system-determining decision making.

On many occasions, when a permanent member of the UN Security Council exercises its veto, that instance could be frustrating for global peace. This has been witnessed during the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and also recently between Israel and Hamas. However, a non-abstention voting approach confirms that a permanent member of the UN Security Council is taking a step towards determining the rules of the global system.

India went on to abstain from all resolutions relating to the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine at the UN General Assembly Emergency Special Session (UNGA ESS), despite all its resolutions requesting the aggressor to withdraw its forces from Ukraine. This voting behaviour continued when the UNGA ESS voted on a resolution on the Israel–Hamas situation on 27 October last year. Such abstention-oriented voting is rooted in a multi-alignment policy, which aims to keep all the stakeholders content for India’s strategic interests.

India’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Ruchira Kamboj, while delivering the explanation of New Delhi’s vote on UNGA ESS resolution ES-11/6 asked, “Has the UN system, and particularly its principal organ, the UN Security Council, based on a 1945-world construct, not been rendered ineffective to address contemporary challenges to global peace and security?” Kamboj’s remark indicated the need for reforms within the UN Security Council, given the Council has several times reached a deadlock on crucial matters of international security and peace. However, India’s abstention route wouldn’t change the outcomes in the Council, given an abstention will not play a determining factor.

Back in 2011–12, during its seventh term as a non-permanent member, it was argued that “India did not succeed in acting as a bridge between the concerns of the western powers and the developing world or between east and the west.” This implies that a decade ago, India did not even have system-influencing power. Since then, New Delhi has positioned itself as the voice of the Global South and taken its reformed multilateralism agenda forward. But this can only take India so far. This influencing orientation might help New Delhi in positioning its cause for reformed multilateralism across the UN General Assembly, but finding a seat at the UN’s most powerful body is not assured.

Following a multi-alignment approach makes India an influential voice in the contemporary global order, but that same approach also inhibits it from being a determining power, which is essential for becoming a great power. India’s foreign policy and its global position have indeed benefited from the multi-alignment approach. However, it might not be the key to unlocking New Delhi’s ambitions at the UN Security Council.

Democracy in South Asia is experiencing a troubling decline. Indicators point towards a consistent backsliding. Recent unfair elections held in Bangladesh, Pakistan and Maldives as well as the upcoming election in India against a backdrop of polarisation, highlight the ongoing erosion of democratic values in the region.

In Bangladesh, the 7 January election this year resulted in Sheikh Hasina, the leader of the Awami League, securing her fourth consecutive five-year term as prime minister. The campaign was marred by controversy and a boycott (again) by the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party – a decision that stemmed from the Awami League’s refusal to establish a caretaker government to oversee the election process. Described widely as a “sham” election, the campaign unfolded against a backdrop of violent protests and government crackdowns, contributing to a notably low voter turnout. These circumstances have heightened concerns about Bangladesh’s trajectory towards authoritarianism, casting doubts on the integrity and inclusivity of the electoral process.

In Pakistan, the election held on 8 February was marred by allegations of irregularities and a lack of fairness, particularly with regard to the treatment of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) political party. The military’s influence remained significant, effectively orchestrating various aspects of the political process. During the election, the military appeared to favour former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, who had recently returned from a four-year exile in London. The military made concerted efforts to stop another former prime minister, Imran Khan and his PTI party, from returning to power after Khan's removal through a vote of no confidence in April 2022.

Imran Khan himself was sentenced to decades in prison in three separate cases in the week preceding the election. The charges against him ranged from leaking state secrets to engaging in unlawful marriage. The PTI faced significant crackdowns, which included stripping the party of its political symbol, the cricket bat, by the Supreme Court. Many PTI leaders were either arrested or coerced into leaving the party.

Even in the face of such formidable challenges, candidates backed by the PTI successfully secured a plurality of parliamentary seats, winning 93 out of 266, largely attributed to their adept use of social media platforms to mobilise their voter base. However, Nawaz Sharif’s party formed a government through coalition arrangements with other parties, with Sharif’s brother Shehbaz Sharif assuming the position of prime minister for the second time on 3 March. It is evident that Imran Khan’s party will persist in challenging the newly formed government, alleging that it has usurped their mandate. This situation could exacerbate Pakistan's political instability and compound its economic challenges. The classification last year by the Economist Intelligence Unit of Pakistan as an authoritarian regime underscores the persistent concerns about the violations of democratic norms observed in this election.

Maldives hasn’t suffered nearly the same political strife and in September last year held its fourth multi-party presidential election, resulting in the triumph of opposition leader Mohamed Muizzu. The previous president, Ibrahim Solih, lost following a split in his party close to the election with a resulting division of votes. Although the election was relatively competitive and peaceful, independent observers accused the government of using state resources to sway the electoral outcome and of incentivising the media with financial rewards in exchange for favourable coverage. Allegations of widespread vote-buying were also prevalent during this period, undermining the equity and fairness of the election.

Finally, India is gearing up for one of the world’s largest democratic exercises as it prepares to elect a new parliament in April and May. India’s fervent political environment is characterised by growing polarisation, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi a focal point for criticism over accusations that he adopts strongman tactics and advocates divisive policies. The government has launched an unprecedented attack on civil liberties, free media and minority rights, while also introducing discriminatory laws. Under this administration, India has been downgraded in the annual Freedom House index from a “free democracy” to a “partially free democracy”.

Such region-wide challenges to democratic principles pose obstacles to economic and social development. They exacerbate insecurity and impede collective state efforts to confront urgent problems including extreme poverty and climate change. South Asia represents almost a third of the global population living in extreme poverty, while environmental phenomena, from floods to droughts, have become more prevalent. Political instability resulting from democratic backsliding makes these challenges all the harder.

A well-meaning Canadian acquaintance once asked me, “Why does Toronto feel like Delhi these days?” I chuckled. I did not have a spontaneous answer and resorted to a helpless grin. After some reflection, I convinced myself that the remark was a tad dramatised. Canada is a flagbearer for many things liberal. Toronto’s diversity would certainly make Delhi run for cover. No matter recent exceptions. On the whole, thoughtful writers shower Ottawa with lavish praise – for its open borders.

Talking about diasporas, it is routine to note that Indian origin people make one-sixth of humanity. Some estimate the Indian origin population as upwards of 33 million – that is an entity as large as Saudi Arabia. From tech-utopians in Silicon Valley, and doctors and medical experts in the Anglophone world, to construction workers packed in the Gulf, and maternity nurses in Israel, “desis” are literally everywhere.

It is in this context that Delhi is reinvigorating its outreach to overseas Indians. Prime Minister Narendra Modi revels in diaspora jamborees on his visits abroad. Ask the Australian chief – Prime Minister Anthony Albanese himself was witness to one such spectacle in Sydney.

India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has also made a habit of addressing diaspora outreach programs on his trips. He routinely emphasises the “migration and mobility” agreements that India has signed with partners such as Italy, Germany, Austria, France and the United Kingdom. In a similar vein, President Emmanuel Macron too is exhorting Indian students to pick France as their preferred destination. He, like some of his European counterparts, has even loosened the tap of work visas for Indian talent.

To be sure, Indian governments across the aisle have courted the diaspora in the last three decades. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Atal Bihari Vajpayee championed the diaspora as bridges between the place of their birth and residence. Even the leaders of the Indian Freedom Movement relied on support from their overseas brethren.

Delhi’s courtship of its diaspora is a reminder of China’s Deng Xiapoing and his opening to the world. Deng encouraged Chinese citizens to travel overseas and absorb what the world had to offer. Along with the debonair Chou Enlai, Deng’s formative years were shaped in France. He loved his pamphlets and croissants one too many.

Deng believed that ethnic Chinese citizens across the world, especially in Southeast Asia, would be instrumental in China’s domestic transformation. Remittances, investments, best practices and technological skills were invaluable imports from overseas Chinese.

He also saw the Chinese diaspora as a tool for political mobilisation in Southeast Asian countries. That is to sway his counterparts in neighbouring capitals to take Beijing’s demands seriously. Some such as Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew feared that Deng’s attempts were aimed at coercion at best and internal strife at worst. Lee reminded Deng that despite having an ethnic Chinese majority, Singaporean diplomats spoke English with their counterparts. It was his way to reinforce Singapore’s multicultural and multiracial identity.

Coming back to India’s recent inclination to sign mobility agreements, such jolly arrangements paint a smooth landscape. Yet, there are some things that go unsaid. One such reality is that most countries seek skilled Indians. The crème de la crème is preferred over a flood of job-hungry aspirants.

To build the base of Industry 4.0, importing tech talent is no longer a desire, it is an urgent necessity.

Host countries also must grapple with the baggage of politics that their immigrant populations bring. Experts argue that the Indian diaspora is the fertile ground where homeland politics spills into the cocktail of the host countries’ internal politics. The diaspora is where “India’s domestic politics intersects with its foreign policy”.

There is another aspect to this story as well. Given India’s post-colonial roots, many Indians of all shades and hues seek a one-way international ticket. To migrate to the “Global North” is considered qualitatively better than loitering in domestic territory. Many Indians might frown at Britain’s past, yet if given a chance to live in edgy Camden – no points for guessing their choice.

Moreover, nationalism and abstract ideas are mere speed breakers in the quest for mobility and migration. People follow the mint. After all, the smell of dollars is infectious. In an unvarnished remark, a seasoned Indian academic editor once noted that if given a free hand (not bound by visa restrictions), around two-thirds of Indians would frantically migrate overseas.

Anecdotal evidence shows that the diaspora too is not too keen on returning. Many non-resident Indians may wave the flag vigorously in their respective countries and hoot when dignitaries show up, yet economic opportunity has rooted them to their new countries. As Vajpayee used to say, “If you care for India, come to India.” Despite many exceptions, he might now get many a helpless grin in return.

In India’s election this year, younger voters aged 18-35 will comprise the largest voting bloc, in what is expected to amount to the highest youth participation ever. Reaching this group has become critical for all political parties, and Indian foreign policy has emerged as a polling issue in the eyes of these voters.

The ruling BJP has shown the most interest in cultivating the youth demographic. That follows success in the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, where 40 per cent of voters aged 18-35 backed the party. Among these, first-time voters accounted for 68 per cent, making youth support a vital factor in the BJP election strategy. Similar campaigns are already evident this year in the run-up to the April and May poll.

The debate over Indian foreign policy has shifted during the Modi years, having once been the purview of elite circles to a subject of everyday primetime debate. This is not only through traditional news outlets debating India’s place in the world – the social media revolution has made content easily accessible to the youth even in the remotest parts of the country. This was visible when India chaired the G20 last year through the government’s G20 Jan Bhagidari movement (People’s participation) and the G20 University Connect initiative, reaching out to 50 million young people from schools and skills centres and 100,000 students from 101 universities across India.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi also shifted diplomatic meetings to venues outside the capital to cities across the country in a bid to connect with larger audiences and make foreign policy a dinner table conversation.

Institutions such as the Ministry of External Affairs have become more active offline and online, but political personalities represent the success of India’s foreign policy in the public imagination. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s Minister for External Affairs, has adopted a high profile and sought to reach different segments of youth demographic through podcasts, interviews, and seminars. His short clips explaining India’s position on global issues or responding to criticism are popular on Indian social media, resonating with India’s younger voters.

When chairing the G20 sessions, Modi chose to display “Bharat” as another name for India on the official placard before him, seeking to connect with a rural population moving beyond the urban elite. In a poll conducted by India Today, 50 per cent supported the adoption of the Bharat name. In a recent survey conducted by Lokniti on first time-voters in Delhi, 19 per cent attributed their liking for Modi to India’s image at the international level more so than the success of foreign policy institutions.

Many younger Indians feel a sense of pride in the success of Indian diplomacy. In a Pew survey last year, 68 per cent agreed that India’s influence is growing stronger in the world. The connection appears different for urban and rural populations: the former is attracted by the image of India rising along with its economic prospects, the latter by the assertion of culture.

India’s foreign policy under Modi appears to resonate with younger voters as having shared characteristics – risk-taking and aspirational. While enunciating change in Indian foreign policy, Jaishankar said that “We need to take risks; without taking risks, you can’t get ahead”, and called out “double standards” of Western partners. This shift can be seen in India sticking to its neutral position on Russia and continued relations with the Myanmar junta, approved of by 80 and 74 per cent of young respondents, respectively.

Indian foreign policy is presented under the slogan of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam (the world is one family). Modi has portrayed India as a Vishwamitra – peacemaker, trusted manufacturing alternative, and voice of the Global South. India’s efforts to develop good relations with the United States and Russia simultaneously has received a positive response from youthful voters with 81 and 77 per cent respectively supporting the efforts. Besides countries, engagement with diverse sub-regional and regional minilateral and multilateral institutions such as BRICS, the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal (BBIN) Initiative, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Quad, and G7 have also gained larger support among the youth.

The YouGov-Mint-CPR Millennial survey conducted in December 2023 shows high satisfaction with the government’s handling of diplomacy. Another foreign policy survey by ORF shows that 83 per cent of youth approve of the current government’s foreign policy, marking a six per cent and 11 per cent increase from 2022 and 2021.

Today, India’s youth acknowledge the country’s increasing foreign policy heft and deft. India’s bid for a UN Security Council permanent seat has 88 per cent support among young people. Foreign policy success is acknowledged – for example, the recent release by Qatar of eight former Indian navy personnel accused of spying was seen as a huge success for Indian diplomacy.

But with this support will come an expectation for the youth to have a greater say not only in responding to India’s foreign policy but to actively participate in and influence decision-making. The government needs to be ready for younger Indians, as they become more aware and vocal about India’s place in the world, to play a vital role in shaping foreign policy.