But there are potential downsides for Russian leadership. The Kremlin may be concerned that some members of this network are articulating their political ambitions. For example, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of Wagner Group – a private military company with close links to Putin – or the former combatant Igor Strelkov. It may also worry Putin that Prigozhin’s open conflict with the Ministry of Defence, and some of his actions – such as executing mercenaries rescued from Ukrainian captivity and publishing videos of executions online – have gone too far, showing publicly that even the most loyal members of the president’s entourage can get out of hand. The Kremlin may also be anxious that the war party will “overheat” Russian society and the regime may lose support if Putin decides to compromise with Kyiv to end the war.
But new radicals have become Kremlin’s indispensable tool. Putin understands that he cannot sustain a war of attrition without a societal consensus to continue at all costs and without active grassroots supporters. So, paradoxically, the Kremlin grants ardent supporters of the war the freedom of speech that its opponents could never have.
Over the last year, the Kremlin had to make two decisions to adjust the Russian political system to a new reality of war.
First, the presidential administration decided to increase patriotic propaganda dramatically and introduced new media and activism formats – for example, Russia revived the Soviet-era young pioneers’ movement. Second, the Kremlin encouraged radical opinion leaders to promote grassroots patriotic consolidation and to create an impression that the country is ready for a long-term confrontation. The war party also got free rein in defining and discussing the goals and objectives of the war to unite all groups of revanchists, from nationalists and communists to imperialists and monarchists. The Kremlin wanted everybody to be involved. And as long as the Kremlin is interested in a prolonged military campaign, the war party will have access to media and other resources.
However, depending on how the regime manages the exit from the war, various options are possible.
In case of a compromise with Ukraine, and if the regime retains control, the Kremlin will likely try to restructure the narrative using moderate loyalists. In this scenario, the leaders of the war party will either be quickly removed from the public eye, or the authorities will use leverage against them to modify their position.
If the Kremlin is unable to end the war on the conditions it would see as favourable, Putin will likely seek to appropriate the ideology and rhetoric of the war party as a means to consolidate his regime. These would serve as a tool to confront any who might advocate for an end to the conflict. They could be used to promote the idea that “liberating” what the war party views as Russian land in Ukraine is an existential fight. In this scenario, Putin will continue to blame any battlefield failures on Western support for Ukraine, including from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and continue to present himself as the only leader strong enough to defend Russia and Russians against a West set upon bringing it and them down. For the Kremlin, battlefield setbacks are unlikely to lead to compromise and retrospection, but more likely a closer alignment with the radicals in the war party who would argue any such path would amount to a betrayal of Russians who have already died on the front.
Relations between the war party and the Kremlin would of course sour if the radicals start attacking Putin directly and there is an open split among the Russian elite, with the Kremlin losing control over public narratives. But this scenario is highly unlikely. The war party – apart from several indirect outbursts – has hardly criticised the president so far. Even the Kremlin’s most radical critics within the war partysay that Putin’s resignation would be catastrophic for Russia.