A second lesson is that despite the need for long-range strike, this is not a substitute for engaging in close combat. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian strikes have by themselves been decisive. Close combat is required to hold or seize terrain. In Australia’s region, seizing and holding terrain will be vital for deterrence and defending forward bases. The recent disestablishment of 20% of the Army’s close combat battalions augurs poorly for the ADF. Having a mix of capable long- and short-range combat systems, with crewed and uncrewed platforms, places potential adversaries in a dilemma and influences their strategic calculus. Ukraine has used the meshing of civilian and military sensors and advanced AI-supported digitised command and control to orchestrate both forms of combat.
A third lesson pertains to the integration of defences against aircraft, missiles and drones. Ukraine has adapted since the start of the war, absorbing Western systems and merging them with Soviet-era systems and commercial technologies to build the world’s best air defence network. This is a capability sorely lacking in Australia. Australia has several indigenous companies which build these capabilities for Ukraine; they should be building them for Australia as well, and in large quantities. Concurrently, Defence needs to invest in low-cost interceptors to flip the economics of destroying low-cost uncrewed aerial vehicles.
A fourth lesson is the centrality of humans in war. It is humans who make the decision to go to war and set the conditions under which war is terminated. And it is humans who fight and learn throughout a conflict. The Russo-Ukraine War has seen a human adaptation battle between the two sides, with each seeking to learn, adapt and improve their military effectiveness. Two important elements stand out: tactical adaptation, which is the art of learning and innovating to win battles; and, strategic adaptation, which is the art of learning and adapting to win wars. Key Russian strategic adaptations have included the use of personnel and the mobilisation of defence industry. Australia needs a faster adaptation cycle in procurement, defence production, military doctrine, and force development if it is to keep up with threats.
Finally, this war has demonstrated the centrality of good leadership. Good national leadership and competent battlefield leadership makes a significant difference in military and national security affairs. Both sides have demonstrated that leadership accountability matters. Ukraine in particular has held its military leaders accountable for battlefield failures. It has removed non-performing ministers and military leaders, up to and including military commanders-in-chief. As a department that is chronically failing in personnel recruitment and retention, procurement, and transparent communication with media and citizens, no lesson could be more relevant to the Australian Department of Defence than leadership accountability.
The Russo-Ukraine War offers a panoply of lessons which might inform strategy, defence industrial priorities, military force structures and battlefield tactics. Learning from the experiences of other nations is what a clever country does. And for Australia, that begins with learning the lessons for which the Ukrainians have paid such a high price.