[1] See, for example, Ashley Tellis, “No Escape: Managing the Enduring Reality of Nuclear Weapons,” in Strategic Asia 2013–14: Asia in the Second Nuclear Age, eds. Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark and Travis Tanner (Washington DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2013).
[2] The workshop, held in Singapore in May 2014, and blog debate served to test ideas in this Report, as did the authors’ consultations with a range of distinguished experts on nuclear strategy in the United States and elsewhere, notably former chief arms control negotiator and naval officer Ambassador Linton Brooks. The conclusions remain the authors’ alone. For the workshop, see http://www.lowyinstitute.org/events/ssbns-and-indo-pacific-strategic-stability?noredirect=1. For the blog debate, see http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/?d=D%20-%20Sea-based%20nuclear%20weapons%20and%20strategic%20stability.
[3] For a comprehensive recent assessment of Pakistan’s seaborne nuclear aspirations, and how these could dangerously interact with India’s, see Iskandar Rehman, “Murky Waters: Naval Nuclear Dynamics in the Indian Ocean,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/03/09/murky-waters-naval-nuclear-dynamics-in-indian-ocean/i7dn. See also Andrew Winner, “The Future of India’s Undersea Deterrent,” in Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition and the Ultimate Weapon, eds. Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012).
[4] Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress Washington DC, 22 October 2013, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA590260; Hans Kristensen, “Russian SSBN Fleet: Modernizing, But Not Sailing Much,” Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, 3 May 2013, http://fas.org/blogs/security/2013/05/russianssbns/.
[5] Toshi Yosihihara and James R. Holmes, Red Star Over the Pacific (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 125. The authors contend that “sea-based nuclear deterrence and the naval contest for access are likely to intersect in unexpected ways that could bode ill for Asian maritime stability.”
[6] Gregory Koblentz, Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age, Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 71 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2014), 19.
[7] See also George Perkovich on nuclear weapons geostrategic effects: “Statement of George Perkovich, Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,” in Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, US Congress (Washington: Armed Services Committee, 2015).
[8] Owen R. Cote, Jr, The Third Battle: Innovation in the US Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines (Security Studies Program: MIT, 2000).
[9] Ibid., 65.
[10] Donald C. Daniel, Antisubmarine Warfare and Superpower Strategic Stability (London: Macmillan, 1986), 191.
[11] Tim Hare, “Nuclear Policy at Sea: A Part-time Deterrent Will Not Do!” RUSI Journal 154, no. 6 (2009), 54.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Comments from Sir Mark Stanhope made during consultations at the workshop in Singapore.
[14] Daniel, Anti-Submarine Warfare and Superpower Strategic Stability, 203.
[15] This idea is explored in Wu Riqiang, “Survivability of China’s Sea-based Nuclear Forces,” Science and Global Security 19, no. 2 (2011), 109–110.
[16] See, for instance, Christian Conroy, “China’s Ballistic-Missile Submarines: How Dangerous?” The Diplomat, 18 November 2013, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/chinas-ballistic-missile-submarines-how-dangerous-9414.
[17] US Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015 (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2015), 9, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Felix K. Chang, “Chinese Submarines and Indian ASW in the Indian Ocean,” Geopoliticus: The FPRI Blog, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2014, http://www.fpri.org/geopoliticus/2014/11/chinese-submarines-and-indian-asw-indian-ocean.
[21] Kris Osborn, “Admiral Says China Now Outnumbers US in Attack Submarines,” DoD Buzz, 26 February 2015, http://www.dodbuzz.com/2015/02/26/admiral-says-china-outnumbers-u-s-in-attack-submarines.
[22] Office of Naval Intelligence, The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics (2009), 22, http://fas.org/irp/agency/oni/pla-navy.pdf.
[23] U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2014 Annual Report to Congress, Chapter 2, Section 2 “China’s Military Modernization” (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2014), 320, http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Annual_Report/Chapters/Chapter%202%3B%20Section%202%20China%E2%80%99s%20Military%20Modernization.pdf.
[24] Ajay Banerjee, “A First: Nuke Sub Arihant to Test-fire N-capable Missile”, The Tribune, 9 July 2015, http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/a-first-nuke-sub-arihant-to-test-fire-n-capable-missile/104772.html.
[25] “PM Launches INS Arihant in Visakhapatnam,” The Times of India, 26 July 2009, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/hyderabad/PM-launches-INS-Arihant-in-Visakhapatnam/articleshow/4820660.cms.
[26] Rajat Pandit, “Move to Fast-Track Two Submarine Project Gathers Steam,” The Times of India, 14 July 2014, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Move-to-fast-track-two-submarine-projects-gathers-steam/articleshow/38342676.cms.
[27] Pravin Sawhney and Vijay Shankar, “Is the Navy’s Newest Sub Worth the Price?” The Hindu, 5 April 2012, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/is-the-navys-newest-sub-worth-the-price/article2829121.ece.
[28] Sandeep Unnithan, “‘INS Arihant’ to Sail on Deterrent Patrol After Commissioning,” India Today, 2 December 2010, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/ins-arihant-to-sail-on-deterrent-patrol-after-commissioning/1/121885.html.
[29] Hans M. Kristensen, “China’s Noisy Nuclear Submarines,” FAS Strategic Security (blog), Federation of American Scientists, 21 November 2009, http://fas.org/blogs/security/2009/11/subnoise/; “SSBN Arihant Class Submarine, India,” Naval-Technology.com, http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/arihant-class/.
[30] Rehman, “Murky Waters,” 12–13; “Indian Navy’s K-15 SLBM Successfully Completes Development Trials,” Naval-Technology.com, 29 January 2013, http://www.naval-technology.com/news/newsindian-navys-k-15-slbm-successfully-completes-development-trials.
[31] Rehman, “Murky Waters,” 12.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Kyle Denning, “Outrunning an Arms Race: Naval Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia,” Project on Nuclear Issues (blog), Center for Strategic and International Studies, http://poniforum.csis.org/blog/naval-nuclear-deterrence-in-south-asia.
[34] Rehman, “Murky Waters,” 17–23.
[35] “Pakistan PM Approves Deal to Buy Eight Chinese Submarines: Official,” Reuters, 2 April 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/02/us-china-pakistan-idUSKBN0MT05M20150402.
[36] Jeyup S. Kwaak, “North Korea Developing Ballistic-Missile Submarine, Seoul Says,” The Wall Street Journal, 11 May 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/north-korea-developing-nuclear-missile-submarine-seoul-says-1431322781.
[37] “North Korea Submarine Missile Launch Photos May Be Fake, Say Experts,” The Guardian, 20 May 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/20/north-korea-submarine-missile-launch-photos-may-be-fake-say-experts.
[38] James Hardy, “North Korean SLBM Test Leaves More Questions than Answers,” IHS Jane's Defence Weekly, 12 May 2015, http://www.janes.com/article/51356/north-korean-slbm-test-leaves-more-questions-than-answers.
[39] There was broad agreement on this point by experts and former senior naval officers during the Singapore consultative workshop for this project.
[40] Stephen M. Meyer, “Soviet Nuclear Operations,” in Managing Nuclear Operations, eds. Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner and Charles A. Zraket (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1987), 487–491.
[41] Owen R. Cote, Jr, The Third Battle, 2.
[42] Frank O’Donnell and Yogesh Joshi, “Lost at Sea: The Arihant in India’s Quest for a Grand Strategy,” Comparative Strategy 33, no. 5 (2014), 472.
[43] This seems to be confirmed by Iskander Rehman in his conversations with Indian naval officers who said that civilians would not be permitted on SSBNs during patrol; Rehman, “Murky Waters,” 27; O’Donnell and Joshi, “Lost at Sea,” 471.
[44] Jeffrey Lewis, Paper Tigers: China’s Nuclear Posture (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014), 114.
[45] Sir Mark Stanhope, comments during Singapore workshop with authors; eds. Carter et al., Managing Nuclear Operations; Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, “Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 1–2 (2015), 40.
[46] Ashton B. Carter, “Communications Technologies,” in Managing Nuclear Operations, eds. Carter et al., 222.
[47] Ibid., 223.
[48] Lyle J. Goldstein and Andrew S. Erikson, eds., China’s Nuclear Force Modernisation (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 2005), https://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College-Press/-Newport-Papers/Documents/22-pdf.aspx; “Command and Control Facilities,” Federation of American Scientists, 4 March 2000, http://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/facility/c3i.htm.
[49] Wei Cheng-hao and Ma Zhi-min, “Requirements and Countermeasures for Submarine Communications in Information Naval Battle,” Ordnance Industry Automation 3 (2008), http://en.cnki.com.cn/Article_en/CJFDTOTAL-BGZD200803025.htm; Zhang Xiao-chen, Wen Dong, Fan Zhi-ming and Sun Xiao-lei, “Research on the Reliability of Shore-to-Submarine VLF Reserving Communication,” Ship, Science and Technology 1 (2011), http://en.cnki.com.cn/Article_en/CJFDTOTAL-JCKX201101022.htm.
[50] For detailed analysis of Indian nuclear command and control systems, see Ashley J. Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Washington DC: Rand Corporation, 2001).
[51] Rajat Pandit, “Navy Gets New Facility to Communicate with Nuclear Submarines Prowling Underwater,” The Times of India, 31 July 2014, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Navy-gets-new-facility-to-communicate-with-nuclear-submarines-prowling-underwater/articleshow/39371121.cms.
[52] Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, “China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force,” Naval War College Review 60, no. 1 (2007), 70.
[53] Jan Joel Andersson, “The Race to the Bottom,” Naval War College Review 68, no. 1 (Winter 2014), https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9c43a160-2281-4bd9-9ad4-787f4c24fedf/The-Race-to-the-Bottom.aspx; Kow Swee Lean Collin, “Submarines in Southeast Asia: Proliferation, Not a Race,” The Diplomat, 30 January 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/submarines-in-southeast-asia-proliferation-not-a-race/.
[54] Long and Rittenhouse Green, “Stalking the Secure Second Strike,” 48.
[55] Norman Polmar and Kenneth J. More, “Cold War Strategic ASW,” Undersea Warfare 7, no. 4 (2005), http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/usw/issue_27/asw2.html.
[56] Rachel Williams, Richard Norton-Taylor and agencies, “Nuclear Submarines Collide in Atlantic,” The Guardian, 16 February 2009, http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/feb/16/nuclear-submarines-collide.
[57] Jeremy Page, “Deep Threat: China’s Submarines Add Nuclear-Strike Capability, Altering Strategic Balance,” The Wall Street Journal, 25 October 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-submarine-fleet-adds-nuclear-strike-capability-altering-strategic-balance-undersea-1414164738.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Tatsuya Fukumoto, “China’s Nuclear Subs Aim to Probe South China Sea,” The Japan News, 13 June 2015.
[60] Lyle Goldstein and Shannon Knight, “Wired for Sound in the ‘Near Seas’,” Proceedings Magazine 140, no. 1334 (April 2014), http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2014-04/wired-sound-near-seas.
[61] This was the basis of the Reagan Administration’s Maritime Strategy in the late 1980s and aggressive ASW certainly compelled the Soviet Union to invest more treasure and conventional capabilities into protecting their SSBNs, resulting in the bastion strategy. There is also evidence that in the 1970s, the USSR shifted SSNs from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic in order to protect their forward deployed SSBNs off the US East Coast; Stefanick, Strategic Anti-submarine Warfare and Naval Strategy, 3.
[62] Page, “Deep Threat.”
[63] Kris Osborne, “US Navy Issues Warnings on Russia, China’s Submarine Fleets,” Military.com, 20 September 2014, http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/09/20/us-navy-issues-warnings-on-russia-chinas-submarine-fleets.html.
[64] Stefanick, Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare and Naval Strategy, 1–3.
[65] Rehman, “Murky Waters,” 45.
[66] Sujan Dutta, “Navy Rings China Nuclear Sub Alarm,” The Telegraph, 24 March 2015, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1150325/jsp/frontpage/story_10739.jsp#.VRJ5TPmG8UU.
[67] Air-Sea Battle Office, Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges (Washington DC: Department of Defense, May 2013), http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summary-May-2013.pdf; Aaron L. Friedberg, Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Debate Over U.S. Military Strategy in Asia (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014).
[68] Erik Slavin, “Analysts: Air-Sea Battle Concept Carries Risks in Possible Conflict with China,” Stars and Stripes, 28 September 2014, http://www.stripes.com/news/analysts-air-sea-battle-concept-carries-risks-in-possible-conflict-with-china-1.305505.
[69] Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi eds., The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2005), http://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/sms-2013.pdf.
[70] Koblentz, Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age, 26.
[71] Robert D. Critchlow, “Nuclear Command and Control: Current Programs and Issues,” Congressional Research Service Reports, 3 May 2006, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33408.pdf.
[72] Arun Prakash, “India’s Nuclear Deterrent: The More Things Change…,” RSIS Policy Report, 24 March 2014, 4; Rehman, “Murky Waters,” 16.
[73] John Mearsheimer, “A Strategic Misstep,” International Security 11, no. 2 (1986), 40–41.
[74] Koblentz, Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age, 19.
[75] Edward Wilson, “Thank you Vasili Arkhipov, the Man Who Stopped Nuclear War,” The Guardian, 27 October 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/oct/27/vasili-arkhipov-stopped-nuclear-war.
[76] Wu Riqiang, “Survivability of China’s Sea-based Nuclear Forces,” 105.
[77] Frank O’Donnell and Yogesh Joshi, ‘India’s Missile Defense: Is the Game Worth the Candle,’ The Diplomat, 2 August 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/indias-missile-defense-is-the-game-worth-the-candle/.
[78] Koblentz, Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age, 22.
[79] Wu Riqiang, “Survivability of China’s Sea-based Nuclear Forces,” 109–110.
[80] Ibid., 109.
[81] Bryan Clark, The Emerging Era in Undersea Warfare, CSBA Report (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2015), 10, http://csbaonline.org/publications/2015/01/undersea-warfare/. Some different methods that can in theory be used to detect submarines are through variations in the gravity gradient and turbulent wake. Research articles into these methods have appeared in Chinese and South Korean journals.
[82] Ibid., 8.
[83] Andrew Davies, “Trends in Submarine and Anti-Submarine Warfare,” Speech at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute Submarine Conference 2014, http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/ASPI-submarine-conference-2014-Davies.pdf; Scott C. Truver, “Taking Mines Seriously: Mine Warfare in China’s Near Seas,” Naval War College Review 65, no. 2 (Spring 2012), 30–66.
[84] See more on the Hider-Finder Competition from Bryan Clark and John Stillion, What it Takes to Win: Succeeding in 21st Century Battle Network Competitions (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2015).
[85] “Singapore Proposes Framework for Submarine Operations Safety,” Channel News Asia, 21 May 2015, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/singapore-proposes/1861632.html.