There is scope, however, under the BURMA Act passed by Congress last year, for Washington to provide assistance to the opposition movement, “to establish an inclusive and representative democracy in Burma”. The Act cites “pro-democracy organisations”, including the PDF and ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), as possible recipients of “technical and non-lethal support”.
Despite the specific reference to “non-lethal” aid, the wording of the Act is broad enough to cover a range of military assistance short of arms and ammunition, possibly including the provision of body armour, uniforms, radars, medical equipment, and other supplies. It could also include training and intelligence.
Arguably, the provision of any support of this kind could be described as “fuelling an armed rebellion”.
There is always the possibility that lethal aid is already being provided secretly by one or more Western governments, either directly or through proxies. After all, that is what secret agencies do, and some are well practised in funnelling arms and other forms of clandestine assistance to groups such as the PDF and EAOs. Of course, this begs the question of why any government would want to do so, given assessments of the war’s uncertain outcome.
At present, however, there is no evidence of that happening. Experienced observers who have been monitoring the arms inventories of the PDF and EAOs have identified three main sources of their arms, and none of them include foreign governments. Instead, they identify the EAOs themselves, the Thai black market and the PDF’s own arms factories. There has also been a trickle of weapons from private groups of supporters overseas.
Another factor to consider is that, given the hydra-headed nature of the opposition movement in Myanmar, and its many loosely allied components, it is highly unlikely that a foreign intelligence agency could provide substantial practical aid to the PDF and other armed groups without it becoming widely known. There are simply too many ways for such information to leak and become public knowledge.
It is also relevant that the junta has made an effort to infiltrate the opposition movement. The generals are unlikely to remain ignorant for long of any secret channels of assistance, particularly if they included lethal aid, which is one of their greatest fears. Should the junta, or its partners such as China or Russia, hear of any clandestine support to the opposition movement, they would make it known very quickly. That too has not happened.
Whatever the real situation – and we remain ignorant of critical aspects of the civil war in Myanmar – it would seem prudent to await firm evidence before leaping to any conclusions, let alone making bold and unsubstantiated claims of shadowy intelligence relationships. Other pundits observing Myanmar have already fallen into this trap, to their cost.