Ideas such as a voluntary national service scheme would more directly draw upon underutilised human resources, but any expansion of the Australian Defence Force or DFAT would function as a fiscal stimulus to the economy as well. Diverting part of the workforce into the military, for instance, effectively creates more vacancies in the job market for others to fill. Growth in defence manufacturing and supporting services would have similar effects.
Because Australia still needs equipment from overseas, consideration must be given to its trade balance. Even then, Australia still has the capacity to pay for what it needs.
Since 2013, Australia’s arms imports have averaged about US$1.5 billion (A$2.1–2.4 billion) annually. In comparison, Australia’s total annual import in 2019 was over A$400 billion. Even in a shrunken post-pandemic trade environment, spending A$4 billion annually for arms imports on top of the recent plan (many items in which are not entirely new), nearly tripling the previous level, would be unlikely to upset the trade balance. That amount of purchase, sustained through just a decade, would be more than enough to double the planned acquisition for the Royal Australian Air Force.
Similarly, doubling Australia’s foreign aid would cost just another A$4–4.5 billion. The meaningful question, then, is not “how much commercial imports should Australia sacrifice to pay for its foreign and defence policy”, but “how much of a minor risk on balance-of-payment is Australia willing to take?”
Australia has the human and material resources to expand both prosperity and defence and diplomatic capabilities. In the early 1950s, Australia’s defence expenditure rose to 5% of GDP before falling to 2.5% in the 1960s. But with a national commitment towards full employment and a sustained immigration program, Australia’s economy grew at an average annual rate of 4.2% in the 1950s, and 5.3% in the following decade. This experience was shared in many other Western countries at the time. And Australia did not “pay for” this by sacrificing foreign aid either: in the 1960s, Australia’s aid-to-GNI (gross national income) ratio was 0.4-0.5%, double the level of today.
An expanded foreign and defence policy would, and should, invite public scrutiny and questioning. An expansion does pose an opportunity cost, lowering the ceiling of available resources for domestic consumption, although this effect would remain mostly hypothetical until the country approached full employment. The government would still need to demonstrate why it is necessary to direct significant resources to those fronts, why the standard of living need not be sacrificed as such, and that the various projects and items are worthwhile and cost-effective.
In the long run, the opportunity cost does matter, since national development is still fundamental to strategic heft and security. If Australia can grow by 40% in the next two decades, for instance, the relative weight of a defence program, even as ambitious as that recommended by White, would shrink from 3.5% to 2.5% of GDP, while DFAT’s budget could double in real terms and still occupy less than 0.4% of GDP.
But Australia can only secure its strategic standing by discarding the distorted perceptions about its fiscal constraints, and by asking the right questions about the cost of defence and foreign policy.
Frank Yuan