In the past, African nations have helped China repeatedly break its diplomatic isolation. In the early 1960s, the newly independent African countries established diplomatic links with the young People’s Republic of China. In 1971, those nations voted in support of China’s permanent seat at the UN Security Council. And after 1989, they continued to welcome Chinese leaders with open arms despite post-Tiananmen sanctions imposed by Western countries. More recently, African nations have been part of a “like-minded group” of 50 countries that has supported Beijing’s Xinjiang policies within the United Nations. If the coalition of Western democracies that Biden wishes to create gets serious about constricting China’s international room for manoeuvre, the nations of the global South may yet again play a helpful role for Beijing.
Previously, China had not been very successful with the other piece of its strategy, which aimed at consolidating its position as the leader of the “emerging forces” of the world as part of a global strategic competition against its archrivals. Despite generous economic assistance, liberal use of bribery, proactive propaganda campaigns and the provision of weapons and guerilla warfare advisers, the CCP’s success in establishing regimes led by pro-Chinese communist parties in African countries was ultimately limited in the 1960s. Today, Beijing uses a more sophisticated version of several of these tactics to induce countries of the global South to join its “circle of friends”, albeit seemingly without any ideological intent or “strings attached”.
Things may already be changing, though.
As I explain in my latest report, Chinese planners have since at least 2015 been defining a new Africa strategy, which includes reflections on why the Chinese model of political and economic governance can and should be transferred to African countries. For the African continent to properly fit into China’s vision for a new world order, and play an appropriate role within the subsystem that Beijing aspires to create and dominate, it will need to go through a series of transformations, both economic and political, that China aims to assist.
This emerging proactive effort grows out of Beijing’s need for its “partners” to be “stable”, i.e., ruled by amenable governments that will favour China’s interests and will not be disrupted by elections or democratic transitions. China’s strategists likely view the African continent as a testing ground for perfecting techniques that can be applied across the developing world, with the aim of building a bloc of populous and increasingly prosperous nations that will support Beijing, follow its lead and eventually help to upend the global balance of power.
Nadège Rolland