When Ukraine initially sought to leave the Russian orbit in 2004, its first pro-EU president, Viktor Yushchenko, was poisoned with a dioxin found in the defoliant Agent Orange. Now, as Ukraine battles full-scale invasion, suspected and confirmed poisonings of Kremlin opponents have continued. In late 2022, a tenacious Russian journalist began to lose her hair at the age of 32 after being poisoned with potassium dichromate. Several members of the Russian opposition hoping to plan for a post-Putin Russia fell ill with symptoms “consistent with exposure to a nerve agent” while meeting in Berlin. Russia’s Deputy Minister of Science and Higher Education, who had recently complained of Russian policy in Ukraine, died suddenly while on a plane over Cuba. And recently, friends of Alexei Navalny claimed he had been poisoned for a second time while held in prison.
In 2023, as Russian forces face a determined Ukrainian counter-offensive, the possibility of chemical weapons being deployed against soldiers or civilians confronts us yet again. As Zelenskyy was speaking in Riyadh, footage was circulating online of phosphorus being used against soldiers holding out in the devastated city of Bakhmut. Local residents also saw thermite munitions – which international law prohibits as an anti-personnel weapon – raining down on Kherson. And following the destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam, Ukrainian intelligence warned that Russian troops had rigged a massive ammonia plant in Crimea with explosives.
Recently, signatories to the Chemical Weapons Convention met in Geneva for their Fifth Review Conference. The summit was reportedly a frustrating affair, with Moscow and its usual coterie blocking any attempts to account for events in Syria and elsewhere. But there was one promising avenue: the work of the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), established by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The IIT was set up to identify the perpetrators of specific instances of chemical weapons use in Syria. It is not, however, empowered to determine the criminal responsibility of individuals.
Some commendable work by the investigative outfit Bellingcat could prove a useful addition to the IIT, and similar mechanisms, in future. Using open-source intelligence, Bellingcat’s investigators recently managed to identify the individuals responsible for targeting civilian areas with long-range cruise missiles in Ukraine. Similar work has been done by intelligence agencies, academics and human rights groups to account for much of the “chemical weapons kill chain” employed by the Assad regime.
The cruise missile operators were an unremarkable group of people, with social media profiles and mundane routines. Obviously, neither Bellingcat nor the OPCW are prosecutorial bodies armed with the right to arrest these individuals. But having been publicly identified, perhaps they will be less inclined to take a foreign holiday any time soon.
In the case of chemical weapons, obtaining the identities of persons responsible could have a similar deterrent effect. They may be in a jurisdiction that presently sees them out of reach. But perhaps they have a property in London, a second family overseas, or maybe a wife who enjoys the Paris shopping scene. Such vulnerabilities, it could be said, might present future opportunities.