Indeed, if anybody thinks that Qin being out of the picture will help Washington and Beijing come to a mutually acceptable set of terms for their relationship, they are bound to be disappointed. The disputes between the United States and China are too numerous and comprehensive. The superpowers are operating on different wavelengths, more prone to preaching to each other about their respective shortfalls than doing the hard, necessary work of finding compromise on issues of mutual interest (climate change to name but one). In public, senior US and Chinese officials have a habit of painting one another as the sole impediment to a new, improved and more effective bilateral partnership – a never-ending game of one-upping that reinforces hardline elements on both sides.
Overall, the problem with US-China relations isn’t any one person – it’s the fact that the two countries have many national interests that are essentially incompatible. Combine this with mutually antagonistic perceptions and it becomes clear why the frosty ties are so difficult to thaw. Examples are numerous. Washington and its allies, including Australia, Japan and South Korea, remain disturbed by the People’s Liberation Army's (PLA) tendency to stake out territorial claims that are, at best, contrary to the so-called rules-based international order. Beijing is equally disturbed about Washington’s military posturing in the region. Every conceivable US action, whether it's the rotational deployment of B-52 bombers to northern Australia or the AUKUS pact, is depicted by Beijing as a US-led attempt to contain Chinese power or prepare for a regional confrontation over Taiwan. Biden administration officials frequently wave off China’s complaints as unjustified, emphasising that confrontation is neither inevitable nor desirable. But Xi, the one who really matters, doesn’t buy the US explanations and likely never will.
The problem with US-China relations isn’t any one person – it’s the fact that the two countries have many national interests that are essentially incompatible.
This isn’t to say that US-China relations are doomed. The two sides have engaged in a number of diplomatic encounters over the last three months, geared less towards solving problems and more on establishing communication channels that can endure after setbacks. CIA Director William Burns made a visit to Beijing in May to meet with Chinese intelligence officials. Antony Blinken followed up with a visit in June, becoming the first US secretary of state to land on Chinese soil in five years. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen did the same in July, as did former secretary of state and US climate envoy John Kerry. None of the sessions produced deliverables other than a pledge to keep talking, but even this low bar is a good sign that the relationship still holds some promise however faint it appears to be right now.
With or without Qin Gang in the picture, US-China relations will proceed as they currently are. America and China’s foreign policies appear immovable, drama over personnel notwithstanding.