China’s Military Display and Its Indo-Pacific Message

In his speech to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting this week, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that “we should contribute to safeguarding world peace and stability. . . . We should set an example in championing the common values of humanity.” Two days later, Xi had played host to a crowd of foreign leaders at a military parade in Beijing, which, according to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), was to commemorate “the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War.”

The reality is that the parade had three more vital objectives for Xi. The first was to reshape narratives about the role of Russia and China in winning World War II, and to downplay to very significant role played by allied fighting forces and industry. The second was to act as a mega–arms bazaar, demonstrating China’s latest advanced weaponry to potential buyers, particularly those who no longer wish to rely on Russian equipment or want cut-price versions of the latest generation U.S. weapons. Finally, and most importantly, the parade sought to project China’s strength and its inevitable and unstoppable rise through a demonstration of large-scale and high-technology military power.

The parade, along with the recent three-way handshake between the leaders of China, India, and Russia, was a rebuke with Chinese characteristics to current U.S. economic and security policy objectives in the Indo-Pacific, and potentially heralds a very different political, economic, and security environment for all of us who live and work in this dynamic region of the world.

This commentary aims to assess the implications for Australian politics and national security affairs in the wake of the events of the past 48 hours in China. But first, what was unveiled during the parade, and what might it mean for military affairs in the Pacific theatre?

The Parade: Five Key Themes

The spotlessly curated Tiananmen Square was the background for the Beijing Victory Day Parade. With a thousand-person band, augmented by a massive choir, the parade was well set to be a significant spectacle for the easily impressed. But analysts don’t watch these events for the music. It was the military equipment that rolled past the reviewing stand that was of most interest.

Overall, there were no major surprises, such as a new Chinese stealth bomber, but there were some new weapons and platforms unveiled. The structure and content of the parade were pretty standard. Five key themes stood out, however.

Most of the weapons and platforms were not brand new, but generally, every land, air, and sea platform was more of a recent design and more modern than many in the inventories of Western military organisations. Newer does not always mean better, however. While most Western military equipment has been tested in Iraq, Ukraine, and elsewhere, none of China’s new equipment has.

1. The new weapons and platforms were interesting and demonstrate the advanced military research and development ecosystem that China now has. Large underwater uncrewed vessels, the uncrewed rotary wing aircraft, and the HQ-16C missile, DF-61 and DF-31BJ missiles, as well as the laser defence systems, were newly revealed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The unmanned aerial vehicle mounted on the rear deck of the Type-100 Infantry Fighting Vehicle was also interesting as it demonstrated learning and adaptation based on the drone operations of Ukraine and Russia over the past three years.
   
2. The key message from all of these systems is that long gone are the days when China was reliant on Russia or other foreign suppliers of its most sophisticated weapons and platforms. The current level of indigenous capacity in China for military production implies high levels of sustainability in any future conflict.
   
3. Parades are not indicators of warfighting effectiveness. Notwithstanding the impressive orchestration of the parade and highly synchronised music and marching, these have almost zero impact on the measurement of military effectiveness. While there have been large PLA reforms over the past decade, particularly in the creation of joint theatre commands and strategic support institutions, analysts watch exercises and activities such as the PLA’s Joint Sword-2024 exercise and Strait Thunder-2025A around Taiwan to gain insights into real PLA warfighting capability. But even then, Western observers won’t really know until there is a real fight.
   
4. This parade was designed to influence the calculus of regional governments. However, while the demonstration of military power was impressive, it is unlikely to shift the perspectives of regional leaders drastically. For those who have already decided to accommodate China, the parade might reinforce why they have decided to do so. For others who have decided to resist Chinese aggression, it may provide additional purpose. But perhaps the most interesting question related to the perceptions of foreign leaders is this: What was Putin thinking watching the parade, and what are his generals thinking? Surely, they must be concerned.
   
5. Xi’s narrative remains steady and consistent. In his speech, President Xi reinforced his long-standing narrative about the inevitable rise of China. He described how “the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is unstoppable” and that “humanity is again faced with a choice of peace or war, dialogue or confrontation, and win-win outcomes or zero-sum games.” It also gave Xi another chance to reinforce loyalty to the CCP among the PLA.

The parade highlighted that China is continuing towards its aspiration of becoming a “world class military” by 2049. This direction, provided by President Xi at the 19th Communist Party Congress in 2017, appears to be well on track. Indeed, the Chinese may well undershoot this target and achieve military supremacy in the Pacific and beyond much earlier. That could be a problem.

This is certainly what CCP propagandists want nations around the world to believe. Demonstrations of military power are not about extending the hand of peace, despite Xi’s words earlier this week. The military power on display at the parade, or at least the power that China wants the world to perceive, reinforces a narrative of a massive, advanced, and unbeatable PLA. For the many, smaller nations of the Pacific, the message is this: Don’t stand in the way of China’s rise, but work with us. As previously noted, Xi emphasized, “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is unstoppable.”

But despite the impressive drill and weapons on display, every military has weaknesses and seams that can be exploited. China is no different. Its military personnel and weapons are largely untested in combat. Its middle and senior ranking leaders are promoted mainly for loyalty rather than warfighting effectiveness. Corruption remains a significant challenge. And the will of the Chinese to fight a war—long or short—remains unknown. All these challenges should moderate any anguish or vexation felt by watching the display of military might in China.

Implications for Australia

The parade has several potential implications for Australian political and military affairs.

Recent narratives from the Albanese administration have focused on how the Australian government has stabilised the relationship with China. During his recent six-day trip to China, Albanese was given the red-carpet treatment. China is seeking to replace the United States as Australia’s most stable partner, even if it may not be its principal security partner. As Xi stated during Albanese’s visit, “With joint efforts from both sides, the China-Australia relationship has risen from the setback and turned around, bringing tangible benefits to the Chinese and Australian peoples. . . . No matter how the international landscape may evolve, we should uphold this overall direction unswervingly.” The parade is unlikely to shift the trajectory of Australia’s relations with China, at least under the current government.

However, the parade does highlight the lack of any engagement by the Australian government with the citizens of Australia about current and future security threats. An unanswered question from the parade in Beijing is whether it will change Australians’ perception of threat from the People’s Republic of China and build momentum for a national conversation about security.

In a nation where trust in the United States has nosedived from 65 percent (2022) of people surveyed to just 36 percent (2025) in the Lowy Poll series, China still has an even lower trust rating with the Australian people. The 2025 poll found just 20 percent of Australians trusted China. But the Albanese government has worked hard to avoid discussions about increased defence spending or a threat from China. Will the parade change the perceptions among Australians about China and force the public conversation the government is desperate to avoid? A sceptic would suggest that it will not, given the supine reaction from both the government and public to the recent circumnavigation of Australia by a PLA Navy task force.

Military implications. For the Australian Defence Force, the parade provided additional insights into the comprehensive array of modern technologies that the PLA has developed. While placing them on parade and deploying them in war are two very different things, the range of crewed and uncrewed systems, as well as sensors and missiles on display in Beijing, provides further evidence of the hyper-modern capacity of the Chinese military. This will inform training and education as well as strategic planning.

More importantly, the Chinese demonstration of military power on Wednesday again highlights the centrality of Australia’s alliance with America, and its security relationships with New Zealand, Japan, and others, to its national security. The mass of the PLA shows that no nation can confront China alone. Even the most spirited, professional, and innovative military organisation must band together with others to deter and confront Chinese military aggression, and this will remain a foundational element of Australia’s national security posture.

Conclusion

For most national leaders who watched the parade or who were briefed on its conduct, this was an event that was unlikely to change their established strategies for dealing with China. After all, the Chinese investment in military hardware is hardly a new phenomenon. Even Xi’s speech was a reinforcement of existing narratives. As he described during his parade speech, “humanity rises and falls together.”

Standing in stark contrast to this message, however, China today assembled a grouping of the world's most brutal dictators to help celebrate the end of World War II. For some, it was a demonstration that China’s time has come, and that it will now assume its rightful place at the head of nations and as a global military power. For others, it was an indication that more thinking and resourcing for national security and diplomacy is required from Pacific democracies, including Australia, if they are to retain a full measure of national agency in the decades ahead.