It's unclear how Prigozhin's Wagner mutiny will affect operations in Ukraine. But it will corrode the fighting power of Russia's military

The ripples from the Wagner mutiny in Russia over the weekend continue to propagate across the Russian systems.

The leader of the mutiny, Yevgeny Prigozhin, has been transported into exile in Belarus. Reportedly staying in the only hotel in the capital of Belarus without opening windows, it is unlikely he will remain quiet or inactive for long.

Having led his own private army, which has both enriched him and made him infamous among his countrymen, Prigozhin is sure to be planning his next move. Whether this is in Belarus, Africa or elsewhere will likely be revealed in the coming weeks. Providing he survives that long.

While it is too early to make a full assessment of how the Wagner mutiny will impact battlefield operations in Ukraine, there is potential for three key repercussions on Russian military fighting power.

Fighting power — a term used by Martin Crevald in his 1982 book that examined the performance of US and German military institutions in World War II — generally encompasses the intellectual, physical and moral aspects of military organisations.

The physical

The physical aspects of war — the material, the fighting forces — provide the mass of people and equipment employed in conflicts. In the physical dimension, the Wagner mutiny will deny the Russian army some of its best shock troops in the eastern part of Ukraine.

The 2023 Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine, overseen by General Gerasimov, squandered lives and materiel with little gain. The only bright spot from a Russian perspective was the capture of Bakhmut. While this was not entirely a Wagner operation, it is hard to see how the Russians would have captured the city without the Wagner group's cunning use of human waves and elite ground forces.

Because Wagner had different rules from the Russian army, and a looser command and control framework, their forces showed more initiative on the battlefield than Russian forces. However, this leadership model also resulted in a culture that saw the murder of Wagner soldiers with sledgehammers.

But Wagner was just one of many private military companies operating under the Russian military in Ukraine. Many Russian companies, including GazProm, had developed and paid for their own private military forces that were employed in Ukraine. A key benefit of these organisations, at least for Putin, is that their casualties are not recorded as official casualties in the war.

Even dictators are worried about vengeful families of fallen soldiers, and the political implications of a combination of large casualties and minimal battlefield gains.

However, with the recent directive from Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu that all private military companies must sign contracts with the Ministry of Defence, private military companies are in essence being absorbed into the Russian military.

Many of these mercenaries, like Wagner troops, are sure to walk away rather than sign contracts. This will deprive the Russians of forces on the ground and probably see more of these well-armed thugs proliferate in vulnerable regions in Africa and beyond.

The intellectual

There will also be implications for the intellectual dimension of Russian fighting power. The rationale for the war was fatally undermined by Prigozhin. He "crossed the Rubicon" in his mutiny when he issued a video last week which challenged the purpose of Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

In the video, Prigozhin described an alternate reason for Putin's special military operations, blaming the invasion on Russian elite. In war, purpose matters.

It provides the inspiration that soldiers risk their lives for. Openly undermining the strategic rationale for the war will be a form of intellectual corrosion for Russian fighting power.

The moral

This leads to a final part of Russia's fighting power that has been impacted by the events of last weekend: the moral elements.

The moral aspects of fighting power include things like espirit de corps, the values and ethical stance of military organisations, how the various levels of an institution interact and trust each other, and their general morale. This is likely to be an increasing focus of those who study the Russian military.

That many military and other security services simply "stayed home" during this mutiny, with some units joining Wagner, shows that Russia has become a fragile nation and that there is a deep unhappiness with Putin's rule.

Within the Russian military, there will be deep discomfort among many leaders in Ukraine and beyond about the loyalty of different units. There will be a continuing unease among senior leaders about who they can trust in their chain of command — above and below them.

There are already reports that the former overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, General Surovikin, knew of Prigozhin's plans in advance. This will prove corrosive in the Russian systems and the lack of trust is likely to pervade all the way to the office of the president.

This deficit in trust, by members of the military and security forces as well as the general public, will also degrade the morale of leaders and soldiers in the field. And while this is yet to manifest in battlefield outcomes, it will increase the pressure that Russian forces are exposed to under the current Ukrainian onslaught.

Much is still to be revealed about the Prigozhin mutiny, and there will certainly be elements that may never be revealed to the public. But scenes of Russian air force aircraft being shot down by their fellow countrymen will be a shock to the Russian military.

It will irrevocably change the status of private military companies in Russia. And the mutiny will slowly, over time, corrode the fighting power of the Russian military.

The Ukrainians, who know the Russian military better than anyone on the planet, will be sure to exploit this.