Deep-sea mining for critical minerals appears imminent but without an agreed international rulebook

The commercial extraction of critical minerals from the Pacific’s seafloor could begin as early as 2027. But a new Lowy Institute Analysis argues diverging strategies and a lack of international governance expose Pacific countries to exploitation by the United States and China.

The paper by Dr Connor Graham, entitled Fault lines beneath the Blue Pacific: Deep-sea mining and the future of Pacific unity, shows that the scramble to mine the ocean floor is being driven by competition between the United States and China.

Both great powers are eager to access the critical minerals needed to make batteries, weapons systems and clean energy infrastructure — resources that are abundant on the Pacific Ocean’s seafloor.

Some Pacific Island governments view seabed minerals as a potentially transformative source of revenue, while a growing coalition is calling for a moratorium or precautionary pause because of the risk of irreversible damage to ocean ecosystems, fisheries, food security, livelihoods and culture.

Dr Graham argues that the absence of an international governance framework for commercial deep-sea mining leaves Pacific states negotiating without internationally agreed protections. It also renders them dependent on individual agreements drafted by companies seeking to mine their ocean floor.

“For the Pacific Island nations caught in the middle of this great power battle for critical mineral supremacy, the economic proposition is difficult to refuse,” writes Dr Graham. “In return for sponsoring mining companies … Pacific nations are being promised significant revenue.”

“The problem is not that Pacific nations disagree; it is that they are being forced to negotiate individually against parties with vastly more resources, information, and legal capacity — and that the international framework designed to protect them has stalled.”

Meanwhile, Australia is yet to take a clear policy position on deep-sea mining in the Pacific.

“The environmental regulations Australia says must precede deep-sea mining do not exist, and the International Seabed Authority’s mining code remains unfinished, yet commercial operations appear imminent,” says Dr Graham.

“A commitment to standards that have not been written as a condition for activity that is about to begin is less of a policy, and more of an abstention. But Australia cannot afford to abstain from this debate.”

“Australia has the standing, the relationships, and the institutional presence to change those conditions,” he writes.

KEY FINDINGS

• Commercial deep-sea mining (DSM) could begin as early as 2027, driven by US–China competition over critical minerals. The Pacific Ocean will be the focus of these activities, with its seafloor holding vast quantities of the prized polymetallic nodules. But Pacific Island nations are divided: some see DSM as an economic necessity, while a growing coalition warns of irreversible damage to the ocean that sustains them.
• No global rulebook for DSM yet exists. The International Seabed Authority has spent more than a decade drafting one, still with no agreed standards, liability framework, or guaranteed benefit-sharing protections. This leaves the Pacific vulnerable to exploitation, with the United States’ decision to pursue commercial licensing outside the international system deepening the governance gap.
• Australia should take a clear position on DSM in the Pacific. That position should include investing in Pacific nations’ capacity to regulate seabed mining, championing a Pacific-led governance framework via the Pacific Islands Forum, and reaffirming its obligations to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea by calling for a completed mining code before commercial operations begin.

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