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Executive summaryExecutive summary
Australians are wary of the two superpowers, placing low levels of trust in both the United States and China. Australians’ trust in the United States to act responsibly in the world has fallen to 31%, the lowest level ever recorded in the Lowy Institute Poll. By contrast, trust in China has risen eight points from last year to 28%, narrowing the gap with the United States to just three points. That gap was 53 points in 2022.
Australians remain trusting of liberal democracies. For the sixth year running, Japan is the most trusted power, with 89% of Australians saying they trust Japan to act responsibly in the world. Germany has emerged as the next most trusted power (83%), followed by the United Kingdom at 81%. Trust in Indonesia (57%) and India (50%) remains moderate.
On 28 February, President Donald Trump announced that the US military had, alongside Israel, launched strikes against Iran. By the time this Poll was taken (2–15 March), US–Israeli strikes had killed senior Iranian leaders (including Ayatollah Ali Khamenei) and destroyed numerous missile and nuclear targets. Theshock to global energy markets was becoming apparent.
Australians are almost equally divided on whether they approve (49%) or disapprove (50%) of the US–Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. There is slightly less support for strikes on regime targets, with only 39% of Australians saying they approve of those actions. Eight in ten Australians say they disapprove of the way President Trump has handled the US military campaign in Iran.
Support for Australia’s alliance with the United States remains resilient but has declined in 2026. A narrow majority of Australians (51%) now say Australia should distance itself from the United States under President Trump. Six in ten (60%) say they have ‘no confidence at all’ in the US president ‘to do the right thing in world affairs’. However, nearly three-quarters of Australians (73%) still say the alliance is either ‘very important’ or ‘fairly important’ to Australia’s security, albeit down seven points from last year’s Poll.
In this year’s Poll, a clear majority of Australians (61%) say they see China more as an economic partner than a security threat, an 11-point increase from 2025. Support for the bilateral trade relationship is accordingly strong, with a significant majority of Australians saying we should be trading with China ‘more’ or at ‘about the same’ level as we are now (77%).
On Australia’s foreign policy towards China, Australians support firm positions. A clear majority say Australia should be doing more to pressure China to improve human rights (62%). A smaller majority say Australia should work more with allies in deterring China’s use of military force (54%), a six-point drop from last year’s Poll. Six in ten Australians (62%) say it is ‘somewhat likely’ or ‘very likely’ that China will be a military threat to Australia in 20 years.
In the event of conflict between the United States and China, Australians largely support helping Taiwan. Strong majorities say they would support imposing diplomatic sanctions on China (69%), sending arms and military supplies to Taiwan (61%), or deploying the Royal Australian Navy to help prevent China from imposing a blockade on Taiwan (60%). A slim majority (53%) say they would ‘oppose’ sending Australian military personnel to help defend Taiwan, with a large minority (44%) saying they would support it.
More than half of Australians (54%) identify China as being the most important and powerful country in ten years’ time. By contrast, only 31% of Australians think the United States will be the most powerful in a decade (up four points from last year’s Poll). Few Australians see an alternative to either of the two superpowers — small minorities identify Europe (8%) or India (5%) as the most important and powerful actors in ten years’ time.
Australians are divided on which superpower relationship should be prioritised. A bare majority (51%) say Australia’s relationship with China is more important than its relationship with the United States, an eight-point increase from 2025. A significant minority (45%) say Australia’s relationship with the United States is more important, a seven-point drop from2025.
Australian foreign minister Penny Wong has said that Australia is in a ‘permanent contest’ with China for influence in the Pacific. Australia is easily the largest aid donor to Pacific Island countries, accounting for 38% of total aid flows over the past 15 years, dwarfing China’s contribution of 9% over the same period. Australia has also signed numerous security agreements with Pacific Island countries, including the Papua New Guinea–Australia Mutual Defence Treaty (Pukpuk Treaty) in October 2025.
However, when asked which country has the most influence in the Pacific Islands, 39% of Australians say China. Only one-third (33%) say Australia — a reversal of last year’s results, where 39% said Australia and 34% said China. In 2026, the proportion of Australians who nominate either the United States (18%) or New Zealand (7%) remains the same as in 2025.
When asked about the performance of the Albanese government on foreign policy, a slim majority of Australians (54%) rate it as either ‘quite poor’ or ‘very poor’, up 13 points from 2024. A large minority (43%) say the Albanese government has done ‘quite a good job’ or a ‘very good job’, down 13 points from 2024.
For the fourth year in a row, ‘cyberattacks from other countries’ (62%) were listed as the leading threat to Australia, closely followed by ‘a severe downturn in the global economy’ (60%). ‘The rise of authoritarian systems of government around the world’ and ‘international terrorism’ were also cited as critical threats (both 59%).
‘Conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan’ fell four points from last year’s Poll, with 57% of Australians listing it as a ‘critical threat’ to Australia in the next ten years. Concerns about ‘foreign interference in Australian politics’ and ‘conflict in the Middle East’ followed closely behind (both 56%).
Australian defence spending currently sits at around 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) based on the historic measures, but according to a new method adopted in the National Defence Strategy, Australia’s expenditure sits closer to 2.8% of GDP. Half of Australians (50%) say they would support an ‘increase’ in defence spending. Four in ten (42%) say they would support defence spending remaining ‘about the same’ as it is today.
Support for AUKUS, the security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, held firm in this year’s Poll. Two-thirds of Australians (68%) say they support Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed but nuclear-powered submarines.
Four in ten Australians (39%) say they are ‘in favour’ of Australia acquiring nuclear weapons in the future, a three-point increase since Australians were last polled on this question in 2022. The proportion of Australians (58%) who say they are ‘against’ Australia acquiring nuclear weapons has softened, falling five points since last polled in 2022.
Amid Russia’s ongoing invasion, Australian public support for Ukraine has held firm. More than eight in ten Australians (83%) say they support the Australian government maintaining strict sanctions on Russia, while seven in ten (70%) say they support providing military aid to Ukraine. Three-quarters of Australians (75%) support admitting Ukrainian refugees to Australia and Australia’s participation in a European-led peacekeeping mission in Ukraine (74%).
When asked whether the Australian Defence Force should protect allies or partners under attack, over nine in ten (94%) say Australia should come to New Zealand’s defence. Eight in ten (79%) say Australia should come to the defence of Papua New Guinea. Majorities of Australians would also support coming to the defence of the United Kingdom (74%), Japan (66%), Indonesia (60%), the Philippines (57%), and the United States (55%).
Against a backdrop of persistent inflation and rising global energy prices, six in ten Australians (59%) say they are pessimistic about Australia’s economic performance, a 12-point increase from the 2025 Poll. This is the highest recorded result on this question in the history of the Lowy Institute Poll — 11 points above the rate of economic pessimism registered during the Covid pandemic in 2020, and 46 points above that recorded after the Global Financial Crisis in 2009.
On climate change, Australians are less supportive of strong action. In an eight-point drop since 2024, just less than half of Australians (49%) now say ‘climate change is a serious and pressing problem that needs to be addressed even if this involves significant costs’. Australians are also divided on what achieving the net zero target will mean for the economy, with 38% saying the economy will be ‘better off’, and the same proportion saying it will be ‘worse off’ (22% say it will ‘make no difference’).
Support for democracy remains strong, with nearly three-quarters of Australians (73%) saying it is preferable to any other system of government. But on other societal issues, such as migration and the value of cultural diversity, attitudes are changing. A majority of Australians (55%) say the total number of migrants coming to Australia is ‘too high’, a record for the Lowy Institute Poll. On cultural diversity, nearly three-quarters of Australians (73%) say they view it as either ‘entirely positive’ or ‘mostly positive’. This represents a near 20-point drop from 2024 and the largest movement on any societal question in the history of Lowy Institute polling.
Australians are also wary of the growing deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) throughout the economy, with a clear majority of Australians (64%) saying the risks of AI outweigh the benefits. This marks a 12-point increase since the last time this question was asked in 2024.
About the author
Charles Lyons-Jones
Charles Lyons-Jones is a Research Fellow in the Lowy Institute’s Foreign Policy and Public Opinion Program. He oversees the annual Lowy Institute Poll and the Global Diplomacy Index.
