Australia–Malaysia defence relations go arm in arm

Australia–Malaysia defence relations go arm in arm

Originally published in the East Asia Forum

The year 2025 will be significant for Malaysia as the country is set to take over the Chair of ASEAN and celebrate 70 years of diplomatic relations with Australia. Australia has been an important actor in Malaysian history, especially in defence. Malaysia values its defence relations with Australia. It views Australia as a middle power that understands the concerns of small power states.

The endurance of defence relations between Australia and Malaysia is deeply rooted in historical precedence and memory. Older generations of Malaysians remember the ultimate sacrifices that Australian soldiers made in defending Malaysian territories — from the Second World War to the communist insurgency throughout the 1950s and the military confrontation with Indonesia in the 1960s.

While the Cold War ended decades ago, an umbilical cord linking the two states’ defence interests remains. Malaysia and Australia are members of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), along with three other partners — Singapore, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Formed in 1971, the FPDA is designed to provide a platform for all members to consult each other in the case of an external threat to Malaysia or Singapore.

Joint military exercises between Australia and Malaysia through the FPDA increase their interoperability and understanding of each other. For Malaysians, FPDA exercises enable them to gain capabilities to operate in a multinational environment and learn operational and tactical skills from the more experienced Australians.

Australia has also benefited from the close defence relations with Malaysia. For example, Operation Gateway gave Australia a defence foothold in Southeast Asia, enabling it to monitor vital waterways in the region.

Australia’s proximity to Southeast Asia is a positive attribute. Malaysian defence officials share a common belief that, unlike the United States, Australia is a resident power with vested interests in Southeast Asia’s stability and security and is a state they can trust and work with. The continued deployment of Australian troops and assets at a Malaysian airbase in Butterworth since the Cold War years is a testimony of that trust.

Australia can advance defence relations with Malaysia further by understanding Malaysia’s strategic culture. Malaysia prefers quiet rather than megaphone diplomacy. This is reflected in Kuala Lumpur’s approach to dealing with China’s overlapping maritime claims in the South China Sea. Malaysia’s choice to be less openly critical of China than other South China Sea claimants does not mean Kuala Lumpur is closer to Beijing nor that Malaysia is moving away from Australia or the West. Malaysia simply has a different approach from Australia in managing threats from China.

Malaysian defence and foreign policy officials find comfort in Australia’s approach to dealing with China under Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong. Canberra is respected for its restraint and efforts to avoid unnecessary provocation which could destabilise the Indo-Pacific strategic environment. Malaysia is not alone in this regard — defence officials from several ASEAN member states have expressed similar views regarding Australia’s approach to dealing with China.

Malaysia also recognises its limited defence capabilities. Most Royal Malaysian Navy warships have been in service for over 30 years and their numbers are limited. This situation shapes Malaysia’s non-confrontational response to Chinese incursions in Malaysian waters. Malaysia is also concerned that the Philippines’ more assertive stance in South China Sea disputes with China may lead to a potential military conflict in the region.

Australia could work with Malaysia to improve Malaysia’s maritime defence capabilities. Although Malaysia has installed coastal radars to monitor its waters, there are still blind spots in East and West Malaysia. The range of some of the radars is limited and is unlikely to extend to the Malaysian oil platforms operating further out in the South China Sea. Technical training and human resource development are some areas where Australia could provide assistance to Malaysia.

Australia and Malaysia could raise public awareness on the significance of their defence cooperation. One potential avenue for this would be to hold ANZAC Day and FPDA-related events and exhibitions at Malaysia’s learning institutes, involving Malaysian media organisations and social media influencers. Stories of successful joint operations such as Orkim Harmony and Operation Redback can be leveraged for this purpose.

But there are some potential challenges to closer defence cooperation. Australia and Malaysia have different positions on Israel’s war on Gaza and its neighbours in the Middle East. Australia has stood closer to Israel than Malaysia, while Malaysia’s stance under Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim is based on close relations with Hamas — Israel’s nemesis. It is possible that differing positions on this conflict or others could impact bilateral relations in the long-term.

Malaysia is also concerned that Western partners are aiming to expand the role and scope of FPDA, which may attract China’s ire. Policymakers in Canberra must exercise prudence when planning the future of the FPDA.

Australia–Malaysia defence relations must be carefully maintained and reaffirmed periodically to ensure their endurance in a more uncertain world.

Areas of expertise: Southeast Asian defence and security
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