History teaches us 'land for peace' deals do not end well
Originally published in Nikkei Asia
U.S. President Donald Trump's bargaining with Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the war in Ukraine by forcing Ukraine to concede its occupied lands and deny Kyiv's ambition to join NATO, is closer to appeasement than clever dealmaking. The way Trump is dealing with the conflict could also undermine Taiwan's stability in the long run.
History teaches us that "land for peace" deals generally do not end well.
In September 1938, leaders from Germany, Britain, France and Italy met in Munich and signed an agreement to maintain peace in Europe. The Munich Agreement allowed Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler to annex the Sudetenland, a region of Czechoslovakia with a large ethnic German population.
In exchange, Hitler promised no further territorial expansion. Returning from the negotiation and perhaps feeling triumphant that he had avoided another European war, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain proclaimed that he had brought "peace for our time" -- by sacrificing Czechoslovakia's territories.
However, this policy of appeasement failed miserably. A few months after the Munich Agreement, Hitler's Nazis marched into Czechoslovakia in March 1939. The events emboldened Hitler, leading to further Nazi aggression and, ultimately, the outbreak of World War II.
The 1938 Munich Agreement is not the only example of a "land for peace" deal failing. The Vietnam War is another, and it hits closer to home for Indo-Pacific states.
In the late 1960s, Richard Nixon shaped his campaign for the White House based on ending American involvement in South Vietnam, which was fighting against the communist North.
After lengthy and secret negotiations, Nixon, as president, announced in January 1973 that "peace with honor" had been achieved with North Vietnam -- American troops would pull out from South Vietnam, while the North Vietnamese promised not to invade the South.
Yet South Vietnam did not willingly endorse the agreement. It was flawed -- the agreement allowed North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam to remain in exchange for freezing the conflict -- another "land for peace" deal. To force the South Vietnamese to accept the peace agreement, Nixon threatened Saigon that he would completely cut off American aid if the South Vietnamese did not acquiesce to the agreement.
We all now know what happened next. Two years later, North Vietnamese soldiers marched into the South, leading to refugee outflows for years.
Fast-forward to today. The "land for peace" ideal underlines Trump's approach to peace in Ukraine -- peace (or the perception of it) at all costs, even if it undermines Ukraine's sovereignty. Trump's proposal rewards aggressive states. He is trading Ukrainian land for his desire to be recognized as a peacemaker, even if the peace he secures is just an illusion.
Putin will likely use Trump's "peace for our time" moment to rearm. Once the depleted Russian army has been replenished, Moscow could use the captured Ukrainian territories as launching pads to move into the rest of Ukraine in the future, just as Hitler moved into the rest of Czechoslovakia in 1939.
The proposed settlement teaches the aggressor (and other belligerent states) that military aggression has its reward, come what may. It will not stop Putin's vision of challenging Ukraine's right to exist as a sovereign state, which he articulated in his essay "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians."
Any policy that rewards military aggression, such as Trump's "land for peace" deal, undermines international order, especially in the Indo-Pacific. There is already a plethora of territorial disputes in the region.
The South China Sea territorial disputes are one example, pitting China against Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan. Across Northeast Asia, South Korea and Japan face extensive Chinese maritime claims.
The tension between China and Taiwan is another major concern, where Chinese President Xi Jinping has consistently pledged to achieve "reunification" with Taiwan.
If Washington could reach a "grand bargain" with Moscow and disregard Ukrainian and the broader European interests, it could also reach a consensus with Beijing to advance Washington's interests, with repercussions on the territorial integrity of Taiwan. If China threatens or occupies Taiwan-held islands near the mainland, it is likely Trump will apply "land for peace deals" over Taiwan instead of coming to the island's defense.
Events in Czechoslovakia and Vietnam highlight a significant point. A "land for peace" deal with belligerent states does not stop a conflict. It merely pauses the conflict momentarily, allowing the aggressor to regroup and launch the next attack at an appropriate time of its choosing.
For belligerent states such as Hitler's Germany and Putin's Russia, any concession the international community makes to them will be theirs forever, while they consider any compromise they would make only temporary. Peace, therefore, is not sustainable.
