Penny Wong targets Asia’s missing middle
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Penny Wong targets Asia’s missing middle

As the PM talks to NATO, Penny Wong has toured the anxious middle nations of South-East Asia keen to hedge their bets with the great powers. Originally published in the Australian Financial Review.

This week, Penny Wong delivered her first major address in South-East Asia since taking office. Speaking shortly before visiting her birthplace, Kota Kinabalu in Malaysia, the foreign minister invoked her own story to redefine Australia’s regional engagement, as a partner tied to South-East Asia through not just geography but tangible lived connections.

More than the past, Wong was focused on the future.

The foreign minister spoke of the need to achieve a “strategic equilibrium” that enables countries to make their own choices regarding their partnerships and alignments. And she spoke of ASEAN as the foundation of this equilibrium – with its institutions and member states holding the political centre of the Indo-Pacific.

The speech provided an early indication of how the new government is nuancing a one-size-fits-all strategic approach to the Indo-Pacific in favour of a more regionally tailored articulation of Australia’s national interests.

Canberra is seeking to square the circle between two objectives: building a strategic counterweight to China with like-minded partners on the one hand and, on the other, co-operating with a more geopolitically diverse set of countries in shoring up the regional order.

There are in fact three concentric rings in Australia’s Indo-Pacific strategy, each defined by a distinct set of circumstances and challenges. The first is our Pacific “inner ring” where Australia must reinforce its position as the leading provider of public goods – whether in terms of addressing security challenges or the threat posed by climate change to the Pacific Islands.

Then there is an “outer ring” of major powers, the members of the Quad or AUKUS. Australia’s standing among democracies fringing the Indo-Pacific has never been stronger.

“We must rid ourselves of the notion that South-East Asian powers will eventually assimilate our anxieties about China.”

The prime minister’s presence at the NATO summit in Madrid shows a broad convergence of strategic interests is at hand. Amid Russia’s war in Ukraine, there is stiffening of resolve by liberal democracies in standing up to authoritarian states including China.

But the fact remains that there is a missing middle in our Indo-Pacific strategy. Australia has experienced a loss of relevance and strategic drift at the centre, in South-East Asia.

A new bipolar front in Europe has galvanised Western unity. But the ripple effect from the Ukraine war has played out differently in South-East Asia, hastening the arrival of what Richard Maude at Asia Society has termed a “trifurcated order”.

There are clear geopolitical antagonisms, but on the main axis in South-East Asia this does not add up to consolidated blocs. What we are seeing is the formation of polarities rather than blocs. Most resident countries will hedge doggedly in between.

Balancers and hedgers: bridging the gap

The challenge for Canberra then is to communicate a vision of our strategy that resonates beyond a coterie of the converted. In particular, we must look for ways to bridge the divergence between two camps of middle powers: between the balancers and the hedgers.

Wong’s call for strategic equilibrium in that sense marks an interesting departure from the usual articulation of Australia’s objective of forging a balance of power.

It creates space to recognise that middle powers, including Australia, will take different positions in respect of the great powers but can still find common ground on the role and purpose of the ASEAN-led regional architecture, and the importance of ensuring the sovereignty of smaller states within it.

Australia’s divergence with South-East Asia stems from different threat perceptions. For Canberra, China’s economic and military power, and its willingness to use both in coercive ways, poses the greatest threat to regional security, whereas ASEAN members are inclined to view US-China rivalry as the main driver of regional instability.

There is little point and some hypocrisy in denying our differences. Rather, we should be upfront and seek to move beyond them.

Equally, we must rid ourselves of the notion that South-East Asian powers will eventually assimilate our anxieties about China and become net contributors to a broader Indo-Pacific balance of power.

Disappointment that the region fails to weigh more decisively on the big strategic challenges stems not from ASEAN itself — which as an institution is often less than the sum of its parts — but rather from the strategic inclinations of its member states.

Balance of power and the regional order

President Joko Widodo’s trip to Moscow this week should shed any expectations that Indonesia — despite its geography and potential — will join us soon in counterbalancing China and Russia. We should remember that South-East Asia’s non-alignment policies are grounded in the region’s history and an interpretation of their strategic realities often more plausible than what passes through Canberra and Washington.

Above all, we should recognise that shaping the balance of power and shaping the regional order are distinct pursuits. In fact, in the absence of a functioning, broad-based regional architecture, a balance of power tout court is a negative proposition. It portends a return to the Cold War.

Australia must engage the middle powers of South-East Asia on their own terms and concerns. Whether the region can continue to be defined by a common peace and a common prosperity that maximises the options for all its players, large or small, should be a first-order concern for Canberra.

Navigating a path through our differences and forging constructive ties with our neighbours should be the work of a high-level roving regional ambassador. Preferably one who is also a serving politician with a direct line to government decision making.

Some have queried the justification for the role, or suggested expanding the envoy’s scope to make it Indo-Pacific-wide. That misses the point. What’s needed now is greater differentiation in Australia’s engagement in the three theatres of the Indo-Pacific, and a greater appreciation of the types of diplomacy required in each.

Areas of expertise: Strategy and geopolitics; global governance; Australian foreign policy; Southeast Asia; Data analysis
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