Xi Jinping's victory lap in Southeast Asia

In the current tumult of global politics, the challenge for any analyst is to separate important signals from the froth and bubble. Here's one signal we should take seriously: China's leader, Xi Jinping will make bilateral visits to Cambodia, Malaysia and Vietnam later this month.

Since the pandemic, Xi's international travel has been selective. Last year, he visited no country in Southeast Asia. In 2023, he visited only Vietnam. And in 2022, he visited Indonesia and Thailand, but only to attend the G20 and APEC summits.

So, Xi's decision to make a tour of Southeast Asia is an important signal. It suggests that China sees now as the right time to advance its interests in each of the three countries, different though they are.

Phnom Penh is China's staunchest supporter in Southeast Asia, with Beijing's financial assistance having helped solidify the political dominance of Hun Sen, who in 2023 handed formal power to his son Hun Manet. But in 2025, the main concern in Cambodia is not that China's influence is too strong, but that the money has dried up. And Chinese tourists have been scared off travel to Cambodia by safety concerns. Most importantly, the Trump administration threatened Cambodia with 49% tariffs, now suspended to 10 per cent. Some 37% of Cambodia's exports go to the United States.

Vietnam was likewise threatened with 46% tariffs. As my colleague Roland Rajah describes, this is enough to call into question Vietnam's entire export-led development model. Vietnam's foreign policy strategy, meanwhile, has been what it calls "multialignment": simultaneously pursuing multiple partners to support its development. Though relations with China are contentious over the South China Sea, more broadly, relations seem to be tracking better between the two countries: Vietnam recently approved a rail link that will deepen industrial integration between northern Vietnam and China. This trend is likely to accelerate.

Malaysia would be more resilient than Cambodia or Vietnam to the new US tariffs. But Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has not even had a phone call with Trump since the latter's election, and high-level contact is likely to remain in abeyance owing to differences on Middle East issues. Anwar is favorably disposed to China already, and last year called China "a voice for the global South, one that champions the interests of the developing world." As an original member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and current chair of the group, Malaysia's positioning on regional issues, in particular the South China Sea, matters.

And while it might be tempting to dismiss leader-level diplomacy as purely symbolic, real outcomes have followed China's recent high-level engagement with Southeast Asian countries. For example, during his visit to Beijing in December, new Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto signed a joint statement conceding long-standing Indonesian positions on the South China Sea and agreeing to consider joint development, a move that the Indonesian Foreign Ministry was later compelled to retract.

Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra's visit to Beijing likewise seemed to accelerate security cooperation between the two countries, With China subsequently sending its assistant minister for public security to Thailand to accelerate cooperation on cyber scam centers. And in February, Thailand returned a group of at least 40 Uyghurs to China, delivering on a long-standing request from Beijing.

So, what can we expect from Xi's three-country tour? Certainly, China will look to exploit the current moment, by capitalizing on doubts about U.S. reliability, especially in the wake of the announcement of new tariffs targeting Southeast Asia. Xi will position China as a status quo country, a steady, long-term partner, an opponent of protectionism and an indispensable support for Southeast Asia's economic growth.

Yet what will the tangible outcomes be? One thing seems likely: The era of big new spending announcements on state-backed megaprojects seems to be over. The Lowy Institute Southeast Asia Aid map shows China's official development finance for the region has been steadily tracking downward, to the point that if China were to support a grand new project, like the Funan Techo canal, a signature initiative of Cambodia's Hun Sen, it would mark a major reversal of fortune.

In fact, even the underreported trend of growing private Chinese investment in Southeast Asia could take a hit from U.S. tariffs, which may make Southeast Asian countries a less attractive destination for Chinese companies seeking to export to the United States." China won't be able to directly replace the U.S. market as the ultimate destination for goods exported from Southeast Asia anytime soon either.

Instead, the announcements from Prabowo's recent Beijing visit might provide a template for what to expect: a series of sector-specific agreements in areas of high priority to Southeast Asia like green technology, the digital economy or incentives to encourage greater tourism. Whether these agreements deliver tangible outcomes will only be known in the long run, but in the short term they will send a message that China, unlike the United States, is focused on listening to the priorities of Southeast Asia. In the area of development assistance, China's ambassador to Cambodia has already announced support in areas vacated by USAID, like demining and child health. It is possible that we may hear more such announcements, although they will not come close to "filling the gap."

We don't yet know the trajectory of Trump's tariffs. But whatever comes to pass, this episode will likely come to be seen as an inflection point in the geopolitics of Southeast Asia. China's influence in the region was already increasing steadily; the trend is likely now irreversible.