Outer space, explained.
The Thailand National Science and Technology Fair 2026 to promote science, technology, innovation, and sustainability, held in Nonthaburi, Thailand, 19 August 2026 (Nathalie Jamois via Getty Images)
A Chinese cubesat launch for Thailand offers a case study in the contest over Southeast Asia’s potential US$100 billion space economy.
Subscribe to The Informer for monthly expert analysis, and to Events for advance notice of visiting world leaders and distinguished guests.
You may unsubscribe from Lowy Institute newsletters at any time. For information on our privacy practices and how to unsubscribe, see our Privacy Policy.
A small Thai satellite tests China’s next big space exportA small Thai satellite tests China’s next big space export
The real significance of Thailand’s latest small satellite launch may lie in what stayed on the ground.
On 25 August 2026 (Opens in new window), a Chinese Long March-6C rocket carried (Opens in new window) Lingzhi-09 – also known as GISTDA CubeSat-1 – into orbit for Thailand’s Geo-Informatics and Space Technology Development Agency, GISTDA (Opens in new window). The satellite was built by GalaxySpace (Opens in new window), a Beijing-based commercial company founded in 2018 (Opens in new window) that produces communications and remote-sensing satellites at industrial scale. Yet GalaxySpace provided much more than a spacecraft. The package included (Opens in new window) ground systems and training for Thai engineers and university students. GalaxySpace also sent teams (Opens in new window) to Thailand to help build and test the ground system.
The spacecraft is the visible centrepiece, but the systems, skills and supplier relationships left behind could shape Thailand’s space sector for far longer.
Suppliers that build domestic capability will offer more lasting value than those that merely install proprietary systems.
GalaxySpace describes the project (Opens in new window) as the first complete, in-orbit satellite delivery by a Chinese commercial space company to a Southeast Asian customer. More than a corporate milestone, it offers an early test of whether China’s emerging commercial space sector can turn domestic manufacturing scale into durable overseas relationships.
China has exported satellites (Opens in new window) for decades, usually through large state-owned enterprises (Opens in new window) working within government-backed agreements. GalaxySpace represents a different route: a commercial supplier offering an integrated service rather than a spacecraft alone. Thailand is a demanding test case.
By bundling spacecraft development, launch, ground infrastructure and training, the company removes much of the integration burden from the customer. Placing a satellite in orbit is, after all, only one part of an Earth-observation program. Operators also need communications links, control software, data-processing systems and institutions able to turn imagery into useful information.
Those less visible elements may carry the greatest long-term value, however. Maintenance, upgrades, continuing support and university training can keep a supplier involved long after launch and position it for the next mission.
Thailand is an unusually demanding first customer because it is not a newcomer to Earth observation. GISTDA has operated remote-sensing satellites and geospatial services for many years. Airbus built (Opens in new window) THEOS-1 and the more capable THEOS-2, launched in 2023, while Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd worked with Thai engineers (Opens in new window) on the smaller THEOS-2A.
A Long March-12 carrier rocket, carrying low-orbit internet satellites, blasts off from the Hainan commercial spacecraft launch site on 16 August 2026 in Wenchang, China (Luo Yunfei via Getty Image)
The latter program included extensive training in satellite design, manufacturing, integration and testing. THEOS-2A was lost (Opens in new window) in an Indian launch failure in January 2026, but the expertise gained during its development remained in Thailand. That distinction between acquiring hardware and retaining knowledge is precisely what the new GalaxySpace partnership will be judged against.
GISTDA already applies (Opens in new window) satellite data to floods (Opens in new window), water management (Opens in new window), agriculture (Opens in new window), urban development (Opens in new window) and air pollution (Opens in new window). It has ground infrastructure, experienced personnel and domestic users. That context means Thailand can ask harder questions than a first-time buyer: Does the new system integrate with existing capabilities? Does the training enable Thai operators to work independently? Can the technology support new, locally led missions?
Success in Thailand would give GalaxySpace a powerful reference customer. Failure to add much beyond what GISTDA has already achieved would expose the model’s limits.
The regional prize is much larger than a sequence of CubeSat sales. A recent Deloitte study (Opens in new window) estimated that wider use of Earth-observation data could contribute as much as US$100 billion to Southeast Asia’s GDP by 2030. Much of that value would be created on Earth, in agriculture, infrastructure, insurance, resource management and disaster response, rather than by spacecraft.
Many countries will not need a large national satellite. They need affordable data, trained people and enough domestic capacity to adapt space technology to local problems. A smaller spacecraft combined with ground support and education can provide an accessible entry point.
This puts Chinese companies into direct competition with established European, American and Japanese suppliers. GalaxySpace’s advantage may lie not in any single technology, but in integrating the spacecraft, ground systems, training and support into a single service. To keep convenience from becoming lock-in, customers should specify data rights, open interfaces, maintenance arrangements and measurable training outcomes from the outset.
Southeast Asian customers could magnify their leverage through ASEAN cooperation (Opens in new window): comparing procurement terms, aligning technical standards and jointly demanding interoperability, local participation and a clear path to operational independence. Suppliers that build domestic capability will offer more lasting value than those that merely install proprietary systems.
As such, Lingzhi-09 is a small spacecraft carrying a large business proposition. If the model succeeds, Chinese commercial firms will have shown that they can export much of the technical scaffolding around a national space program rather than merely satellites.
For Western governments and space companies, the implication is uncomfortable. They may still focus on launch performance and spacecraft specifications while China learns to compete across the entire relationship: software, technical standards, training and the supplier ties that shape the next procurement. Better hardware – or warnings about dependence on China – will not be enough on their own. Western suppliers will need to match affordability with interoperability, skills transfer and a credible path to local control. Thailand is therefore more than a test of GalaxySpace’s export model. It is also a test of whether China’s competitors really understand what the competition has become.
About the author
Richard de Grijs
Richard de Grijs (Opens in new window) is Professor of Physics and Astronomy at Macquarie University and former Executive Director of the International Space Science Institute–Beijing.
The most-pressing world events explained by Lowy Institute experts and global contributors, in your inbox, every Thursday.
You may unsubscribe from The Interpreter at any time. For information on our privacy practices and how to unsubscribe, see our Privacy Policy.
