Armenia, explained.
Armenian soldiers take part in a military parade during Armenia's Republic Day in Yerevan on 28 May 2026. (Photo by Karen Minasyan/AFP via Getty Images)
Armenia is tilting West and Moscow is not happy – but neither side can afford to push too far.
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Armenia: the next Ukraine?Armenia: the next Ukraine?
Could Armenia become the next flashpoint of tension between Russia and the West?
Moscow has made plain its unhappiness over Yerevan’s pivot to diversify away from dependence on Russia by strengthening ties with the European Union and United States.
This comes amid a flurry of high-level EU and US visitors seeking to encourage Armenia’s pro-Western course under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.
Early May saw the first-ever EU–Armenia summit (Opens in new window), held alongside the European Political Community (Opens in new window) summit in Yerevan. Soon after, US Secretary of State Rubio visited Yerevan (Opens in new window), signing agreements on the planned Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a transit corridor through southern Armenia linking Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhchivan – and beyond that to Türkiye. Vice President JD Vance (Opens in new window) visited Yerevan in February, foreshadowing bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation. All this in the wake of President Donald Trump’s brokering of a deal last August (Opens in new window) ending the decades-long conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Moscow’s response has been sharply negative – and admonitory.
Armenia is not intrinsically as important to the Kremlin as Ukraine, a country viewed as part of Russia’s national identity and historical patrimony.
President Vladimir Putin warned last week that Armenia would have to choose between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union. Ominously, Putin recalled that the Ukraine crisis had started back in 2013 with Kyiv’s efforts to move closer to the EU – a clear rebuke and veiled threat to Yerevan (Opens in new window).
Putin pointedly underscored Armenia’s heavy energy (gas and nuclear) and economic (35% of Armenia’s foreign trade and substantial remittances) dependence on Russia, while Moscow recalled (Opens in new window) its ambassador from Yerevan to signal its unhappiness.
Armenia, like its South Caucasus neighbours, Azerbaijan and Georgia, lies at the historical intersection of competing great powers – Russia, Iran (earlier, Persia) and Türkiye. For the past 200 years, Russia has been the dominant power. There are deep and long-standing ties between Russia and Armenia: political, economic and security, underpinned by extensive people-to-people and elite connections.
Post-Soviet Armenian politics have been notably fractious, but the country’s Russia-aligned business elite long played a dominant role in Armenia’s government. The coming to power of populist democracy activist Pashinyan as Prime Minister in 2018, though, irked Moscow, and relations with Yerevan have been cool and suspicious ever since.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, right, with US President Donald Trump and Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev at the White House in August 2025 (Daniel Torok/Official White House Photo)
Armenia’s disenchantment with Russia intensified in late 2020 with Azerbaijan’s surprise attack on the contested Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, held since 1991 by Yerevan but never accepted by Baku. Yerevan’s disappointment at Moscow’s equivocal response, contrary to its alliance obligations to Armenia, was palpable. Yerevan’s dissatisfaction deepened in September 2023 after Azerbaijan’s lightning seizure of all of Nagorno-Karabakh, while Russian peacekeepers stood by, leading to the enforced exodus of some 100,000 Armenian Karabakhi.
Disillusionment with Russia has accelerated Yerevan’s moves to diversify its international connections: strengthening Armenia’s ties with Europe and the United States, but also looking to improve hitherto-acrimonious ties with both Azerbaijan and Turkey.
What’s in it for the US, Europe and Türkiye (Opens in new window)? Improved relations with Armenia open up trade and energy connectivity between Europe and Eurasia (bypassing Russia), provide access to strategic minerals, and strengthen the West’s foothold in a contested region.
Tensions will come to a head in the parliamentary elections on 7 June. Pashinyan enjoys a strong lead in pre-election polls, but Armenian politics are volatile, and there remains considerable unhappiness among Armenians over his pragmatic acknowledgement of Azerbaijani sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh.
As in Moldova’s elections last year, there are allegations (Opens in new window) of aggressive Russian interference in the election (Opens in new window) – disinformation campaigns and facilitation of large-scale diaspora voting.
Is Yerevan likely to break ties decisively with Russia? How far will Moscow go to prevent Armenia’s growing tilt to the West?
Talk of Armenia as the next Ukraine seems overblown: Armenia is not Ukraine. While offering Moscow a foothold in the strategic South Caucasus region, and historically part of Russia’s sphere of influence, Armenia is not intrinsically as important to the Kremlin as Ukraine, a country viewed as an inalienable part of Russia’s national identity and historical patrimony, and fundamental to Russia’s security.
And both Armenia and Russia face hurdles constraining an outright rupture of relations.
Armenia’s heavy dependence on Russia, especially in trade and energy, makes it impracticable for Yerevan to contemplate breaking with Moscow completely. For all the positive EU and US rhetoric, there’s no immediate prospect of early EU membership or substantial Western economic assistance large enough to offset the damage Armenia’s economy would suffer were its energy supplies and market access to Russia to be cut long-term.
Equally, there are limits to what Moscow can do. The lack of a contiguous border, coupled with Russia’s heavy commitments in Ukraine, argue against a Ukraine-style military intervention in Armenia – although it does maintain a permanent military base at Gyumri. And Moscow will be conscious of the Trump administration’s strong support for Pashinyan.
More likely, Armenia will try to maintain its balancing act, expanding ties as much as possible with both the EU and US, but without alienating Russia completely. Likewise, Moscow will apply sustained political and economic pressure to deter Armenia from pushing its pro-Western orientation too far, – but stop short of military intervention.
Rather than Ukraine, the greater risk might be that Armenia shares the fate of Moldova, where for years Russian interference has fuelled instability and dysfunction, impeding (until recently) efforts to move closer to the EU.
Armenia, Ukraine, Moldova: the common thread is the Kremlin’s refusal to accept the Soviet empire’s gradual disintegration.
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