Chinese ship visits to Australia don’t always generate alarm and controversy.
Last Friday, Hobart hosted the arrival of Chinese ice-breaker Xue Long 2, more than five years after its previous visit. Xue Long 1 visited last March. Tasmanian Premier Jeremy Rockliff said last November that an upcoming visit to China had “the clear purpose to invite Xue Long 1 and 2 vessels to reengage and utilise the Port of Hobart as part of their Antarctic Program”.
Visits by Chinese scientific research vessels are also a reminder that the benefits of such visits might also prove worthwhile in the security arena.
In contrast to the Premier’s enthusiasm, last month Prime Minister Anthony Albanese told journalists he would “prefer” another Chinese research vessel, this one owned by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, was not navigating along Australia's southern coastline.
This was just weeks after a Chinese naval task force, which included a cruiser and frigate, circumnavigated Australia. Retired Navy Admiral and former Chief of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), Chris Barrie, was a conspicuous public voice in lamenting that the task force “didn’t come and give us the honour of a port visit so we could … further try to strengthen our relationships”.
It is difficult to imagine that today’s domestic politics would allow Canberra to contemplate approving a Chinese naval task group visit to an Australian port like the one that Sydney Harbour hosted in 2019. With China’s activities in Antarctica having become more contested in Australia’s public debate, it cannot be discounted that even a future visit by a Chinese ice-breaker might be contentious.
In February 2022, after political relations between Canberra and Beijing had hit rock bottom, then prime minister Scott Morrison declared that while “Australia works in partnership with so many other nations who share our objectives”, China had “different objectives”, particularly around environmental stewardship.
National security commentators have warned that under the guise of “scientific research” allowed by the Antarctic Treaty, China has been deploying equipment and technologies with intelligence collection and military applications. It has even been suggested that China sees its activities in Antarctica as the basis upon which it could make a future territorial grab.
To date, Australian officials and scientists have tended to look sceptically on such allegations, particularly in the absence of any compelling evidence that China has breached the Treaty’s non-militarisation provisions.
Nonetheless, scholars have urged China to provide greater detail and clarity around its strategic interests in Antarctica. There was widespread disappointment last October when China joined Russia in blocking the establishment of new marine protected areas and the renewal of krill catch limits.
Still, in addition to the economic benefits that will accrue to Hobart, port visits and broader engagement provide an opportunity for differences to at least be better managed. When the Xue Long 2 visited Christchurch last month, Chinese official news outlets reported that scientists from the two sides had held discussions around “polar marine biology, chemistry and geology”. Similar exchanges have often accompanied previous Chinese ice-breaker visits to Australia.
There is also the possibility the visit might help to progress negotiations on the renewal of a Memorandum of Understanding that Australia and China signed in 2014 that had “reaffirmed a long tradition of collaboration in Antarctic diplomacy, science, logistics and operations”.
Scholars have urged China to provide greater detail and clarity around its strategic interests in Antarctica.
This is not merely flowery rhetoric.
In 2005, after Chinese expeditioners became the first to reach Dome A, the highest point in East Antarctica, and subsequently established a research station there, some national security commentators highlighted the potential strategic value of the location. It was left to scientists and other analysts to note that an automatic weather station and telescope installed there were collaborative research projects with Australia.
The Xue Long 2 also played a key role in the successful medical evacuation of an Australian scientist in 2020.
Visits by Chinese scientific research vessels are also a reminder that the benefits of such visits might also prove worthwhile in the security arena.
When PLA Navy vessels stopped in Sydney in 2019, Morrison emphasised that it was a “reciprocal visit”. HMAS Melbourne had docked in Qingdao less than two months earlier. The ADF also stated that such port visits were “routine” and “conducted by all navies”.
It is instructive that the governments of the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia, which all have more acute maritime disputes with China than does Australia, continue to welcome port visits and do not consider them as somehow turning a blind eye, much less endorsing, China’s military behaviour in places like the South China Sea.
Rather, they are seen as part of the suite of measures that can help manage tensions. Last week, Chinese and Indonesian defence and foreign ministers went a step further and announced a new agreement involving greater maritime security cooperation.
The Australian and Chinese navies will continue engaging in activities to which the other side objects. Yet Canberra and Beijing both recognise the value of the newly restored military-to-military dialogue. Extending this engagement to once again welcoming reciprocal port visits would be a modest but useful next step.
