Japan, explained.
Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in talks with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in Kuala Lumpur, 26 October 2025 (Kyodo News via Getty Images)
With strong security ties, both countries can influence Washington’s strategy and constrain Beijing’s options.
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Australia-Japan ties are about shaping outcomes, not hedging betsAustralia-Japan ties are about shaping outcomes, not hedging bets
For the United States and China, the 21st century is an age of strategic competition. For the countries that must exist and operate in an international system defined by their competition, it is, as the poet W.H. Auden said, an “age of anxiety”.
Anxiety is felt in both Australia and Japan about America’s staying power in Asia, as structural changes have occurred to the US-China relationship, with Beijing’s growing economic power and expanding military.
Last month, I travelled to Japan as a Japan-Australia Dialogue Exchange Fellow, where it was evident that there is an element of hedging behind the increasing ties between Australia and Japan. When the credibility of a common security partner is increasingly brought into question, junior partners will seek reassurance elsewhere. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but conceptualising the Australia-Japan relationship in terms of hedging is as unhelpful as it is incorrect.
Japan views changes in the United States with less anxiety than in Australia.
Thinking of the two countries as shaping powers is more useful. This is an acknowledgement that Washington remains the most important security partner for both Tokyo and Canberra, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. There are, however, some important differences between Australian and Japanese perceptions of both the US and China which will colour the relationship. By tightening their cooperation, Japan and Australia can inform US decision making and shape China’s range of effective choices.
Discussions in Tokyo gave me the sense that Japan views changes in the United States with less anxiety than in Australia. Polls may have Japanese trust in the United States lower than in Australia, but the higher tariffs levied on Tokyo undoubtedly colour this assessment. Japan sees a passing phase, where Australia sees a fundamental shift in personality.
There is also a crucial difference due to the simple fact of geography. Because of its proximity, Japan contends with China as a territorial threat as well as a structural one. Despite the fact that it is within range of PLA Rocket Force weapons and PLA Air Force long-range bombers – a trend that will increase – at the periphery of Asia, Australia primarily perceives the structural challenge to international order posed by China.
Neither of these differences is cause for alarm. In fact, they present great opportunity.
Australia and Japan have already set up mechanisms to deepen their security cooperation – the Reciprocal Access Agreement in 2022 for example along with various commitments made in this year’s 2+2 joint ministerial statement. My conversations in Tokyo made clear that Australia must carefully prioritise what avenues it advances, and focus on areas where it can complement rather than duplicate existing and developing Japanese capabilities.
Given the intelligence community experience of the incoming Australian ambassador to Japan, Andrew Shearer, Australia will likely take a keen interest in the development of an independent Japanese intelligence service – a commitment of the new Takaichi government.
The new government has also brought forward the timeline for the revision of its three primary strategic documents. This work will likely herald increased defence spending focused on enhancing both the size and readiness of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces. Japan needs to be mindful of a military threat to its territory in a way that Australia does not. The constant need for the JSDF to push back against Chinese grey zone tactics, notably around the Senkaku Islands, can be a distraction from traditional military preparation. Australia’s distance means that it can play an important role as Japan’s strategy evolves – in logistics and supply, dispersion of forces, and counter-coercion.
The Scope, Objectives, and Forms Dialogue, which both countries committed to establishing in their recent 2+2 statement, should work toward a short-term goal of drafting a joint counter-coercion plan to push back against Chinese grey zone tactics in the region in a coordinated fashion.
Defence industry cooperation is equally vital. The upgraded Mogami frigates deal must be a success – both for Japan’s credibility as an exporter and Australia’s maritime capability. The two countries must institutionalise forums like the Defence Materiel and Industry Cooperation Meeting that was held in August. Australia is – thanks to its track records of delays, cost overruns, and cancellations or reductions – perceived in Japan as a “difficult customer” when it comes to defence acquisitions, and while interests will prevail, ensuring a reputation for productive cooperation should be achievable.
In an age of anxiety, Australia and Japan can work together to produce some measure of calm in what will remain an unstable century.
About the author
David Vallance
David Vallance is a Research Associate in the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute.
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