Late last month, a United Nations General Assembly High-level Conference renewed attention on the continuing persecution of the Rohingya and other ethnic minorities in Myanmar. Julie Bishop, now Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar, noted that accountability for crimes against the Rohingya was “critical for reconciliation”. Marking the eighth anniversary of attacks against the Rohingya, now alleged in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) to amount to genocide, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade reaffirmed Australia’s support for accountability.
As Australia calls for accountability for international crimes, our credibility depends on whether we act at home.
Last week, the UN Human Rights Council extended the mandate of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Sri Lanka Accountability Project (OSLap). The High Commissioner urged states to ensure that individuals could safely share information with OSLap and to support diaspora-led truth-telling. In Australia, politicians have expressed solidarity with the Tamil community’s pursuit of justice following the discovery of new mass graves at Chemmani in northern Sri Lanka.
As Australia calls for accountability for international crimes, our credibility depends on whether we act at home.
Australia has long contributed to accountability efforts abroad. We advocated for a strong ICC at Rome Statute negotiations, financially supported the hybrid Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), and more recently backed an important innovation: the UN’s evidence-gathering mechanisms, including for North Korea, Sri Lanka, Syria and Myanmar. These bodies collect, analyse and preserve information for use in legal proceedings. Notably, the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) has already provided information for cases before the ICJ, ICC and courts of Argentina.
At home, however, our record is inconsistent. Between 1945 and 1951, Australia conducted military trials of World War II war crimes. Decades later, after investigative reporting revealed Australia as a “safe haven” for alleged Nazi war criminals, the Hawke government created the Special Investigations Unit in 1987. Three individuals were charged; none was convicted, and the unit was dissolved in 1992. In 2009, the Lowy Institute warned that Australia likely remained home to suspected perpetrators from Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Rwanda and East Timor “among others”. In 2023, the Australian Centre for International Justice renewed calls for permanent capacity to investigate and prosecute international crimes. This has yet to be a political priority.
This is despite Australia having incorporated genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity into the Commonwealth Criminal Code, with section 15.4 granting Australian courts jurisdiction regardless of where such crimes occurred or who committed them. Few legal systems are as potentially effective, yet these provisions remain unused.
Given our support for efforts abroad and a strong legal framework at home, Australia has every reason to do more.
Legally, treaties including the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the UN Convention against Torture, oblige us to investigate credible allegations and to prosecute or extradite suspects.
Diplomatically, “doing more” would reinforce Australia’s standing as a principled middle power. Tangible action would give credibility to our commitment to “a world guided by the rules that are agreed between nations”, complement our humanitarian reputation, and demonstrate leadership in a system too often paralysed by great power politics.
As the broader system experiences strain, Australia’s role in international criminal justice matters especially now.
Domestically, Australia is home to significant numbers of Afghan, Burmese, Sudanese, Sri Lankan and Syrian Australians, among many other atrocity-affected communities. Among them are survivors and witnesses whose knowledge of atrocities is vital for truth-telling and, in some cases, for future prosecutions.
Therefore, “doing more” means stepping up efforts to investigate and, where possible, prosecute perpetrators on Australian soil. It also means investing in the machinery that makes prosecutions possible: credible investigations, survivor and witness engagement, and evidence preservation.
Australia can enhance our contribution by strengthening cooperation with the IIMM and OSLap (as well as the newly established mechanism for Afghanistan) by safely identifying and referring individuals with relevant information. We could also fund more protection for survivors and witnesses assisting prosecutions abroad.
Further, existing expertise can be leveraged. The Australian Federal Police (AFP), for example, has significant experience tackling cross-border trafficking, fraud and corruption. Expanding that capacity to identify the nexus between atrocity and transnational crimes, or integrating atrocity-crime investigation training into the AFP’s Pacific Policing Development and Coordination Hub would be valuable steps.
Finally, Australia could contribute in contexts with significant numbers of missing persons by seconding forensic and legal experts, facilitating training and exchanges, or funding local authorities to engage independent specialists. Even modest technical or financial contributions can make a tangible difference.
As the broader system experiences strain, Australia’s role in international criminal justice matters especially now. Accountability for international crimes was never meant to operate solely at the international level. From the Singapore War Crimes Trials to the ECCC and prosecutions under universal jurisdiction in Europe and South America, domestic jurisdictions have always been central. By “doing more”, Australia can both uphold the principles it promotes globally and help ensure accountability for international crimes, both here and abroad.
