Stablecoins could provide an alternative channel for remittances if correspondent banking links continue to erode, potentially mitigating the loss of services where conventional channels are closing –though this would come with significant new risks if left unregulated. Their ease of transfer and global reach make them attractive for money laundering and scams, problems already on the rise in Australia’s domestic crypto sector. Pacific Island regulators often lack the institutional capacity and resources to monitor such flows effectively, leaving gaps that illicit actors could exploit. For Canberra, this presents a potential challenge: Australian agencies such as AUSTRAC and the AFP are already stretched, and wider uptake of unregulated stablecoins in the Pacific would add another layer of pressure on enforcement and supervision.
US dollar stablecoins are also likely to carry a geopolitical dimension as their use expands globally. With a federal framework now in place in the United States under the GENIUS Act, stablecoins are becoming more tightly regulated and, as a result, more credible as digital dollars abroad. Their spread reinforces dollar primacy and, for Washington, represents a victory in the competition over the future of money. For Canberra, it highlights that stablecoins are not just a financial innovation but a development that could shape the region’s monetary order.
In practice, however, most potential use in the Pacific will come through offshore intermediaries such as global crypto exchanges or unlicensed remittance platforms, that operate outside both US and local regulatory reach. Without proactive engagement from Australia and its partners, the region risks fragmented and unregulated stablecoin use if adoption grows without oversight.
Australia’s choice lies in its level of engagement as stablecoins expand. Canberra has announced forthcoming draft legislation, expected in mid- to late-2025, which will introduce a licensing regime for stablecoin issuers, require robust reserve management and disclosure, guarantee redemption rights, and impose custodial and governance standards. Those rules will shape how Australian institutions and payment providers operate AUD- or USD-linked tokens at home. The question is whether Canberra also leverages this framework to help Pacific partners prepare for the risks and opportunities that stablecoins could bring.
Rather than treating this purely as a domestic regulatory exercise, Australia could share its framework with Pacific partners and support them in building their own supervisory capacity. This might involve providing technical expertise to central banks, harmonising standards through regional forums, testing new arrangements in controlled pilot programs, and even trialling AUD-denominated stablecoins for settlement in Pacific remittance corridors. By doing so, Canberra would not only safeguard financial stability but also turn stablecoins into a tool that strengthens Australia’s role as a constructive partner in the region. Otherwise, the Pacific risks becoming reliant on offshore stablecoins with limited transparency, exposing households to greater vulnerabilities and limiting Australia’s ability to help shape the region’s financial future.