Myanmar, explained.
People gathered on the banks of the Irrawaddy River in front of the collapsed Ava Bridge, also known as the Inwa Bridge, in Mandalay, days after an April 2025 earthquake struck central Myanmar (Sai Aung Main/AFP via Getty Images)
Five years after the coup, Myanmar’s instability is bleeding across borders. Canberra’s policy hasn’t kept up.
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Beyond humanitarian aid: Rethinking Australia’s Myanmar policyBeyond humanitarian aid: Rethinking Australia’s Myanmar policy
In Burmese kitchens there is a saying that adding ginger to a curry can sometimes disguise the smell of ingredients that have already gone bad. It’s an apt truism as Myanmar enters a new phase of its crisis. Following elections organised under military supervision, the country’s authorities are now preparing to convene a new parliament and form a government. Institutional arrangements can create the impression of stability, but they do not necessarily resolve the deeper political crisis.
The intention of the generals is clear: to offer the appearance of constitutional order after years of conflict and international condemnation. Even if the electoral process lacks credibility in the eyes of many observers, the creation of a parliamentary structure allows the regime to argue that Myanmar is moving toward political normalisation.
For regional diplomacy, this raises a difficult question: how should governments respond when an unresolved civil conflict is repackaged as political order?
In this part of the world, instability rarely stays politely within national borders.
Five years after the 2021 coup, Myanmar’s crisis has evolved into one of Southeast Asia’s most complex challenges. At a time when global attention is increasingly drawn to other geopolitical crises, including escalating conflict in the Middle East, Myanmar risks slipping further from the centre of international policy debates. Yet the consequences of its instability continue to unfold across Southeast Asia.
Armed conflict continues across large parts of the country. Millions remain displaced. The breakdown of governance has allowed criminal networks and humanitarian pressures to spill across borders.
Australia’s response has been principled and compassionate, centred on humanitarian assistance and support for civil society. Yet as Myanmar’s political situation shifts toward attempted normalisation, a broader policy question emerges:
Is Australia’s Myanmar policy prepared for the next phase of the crisis?
Myanmar’s prolonged instability therefore represents not only a humanitarian concern but also a strategic challenge, intersecting with regional security, migration pressures and transnational crime networks.
Australia’s official framework is articulated in the Australia–Myanmar Development Partnership Plan 2024–2029, released by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
The strategy makes several clear commitments.
First, Australia condemns the military takeover and calls for a return to democracy. It also emphasises the need for humanitarian access and the protection of civilians.
Second, Australia deliberately avoids direct engagement with the military regime. Development assistance is delivered through the United Nations, international organisations and local civil society partners rather than state institutions.
Third, the policy frames Myanmar as a “protracted and multifaceted crisis”, signalling that instability is likely to persist for the foreseeable future.
This approach reflects a careful balance: supporting the people of Myanmar while avoiding actions that could legitimise the military authorities. It is a sensible policy foundation. However, the strategy is also largely humanitarian in orientation, focusing on relief, resilience and development assistance. What it does not yet fully address is the regional spillover of Myanmar’s collapse.
Fighting a fire that engulfed a house after an airstrike carried out by the Myanmar military in November (Swe Lin Tun via Getty Images)
Myanmar’s internal conflict is increasingly producing consequences beyond its borders.
Millions of people have been displaced internally since the coup, while hundreds of thousands have sought refuge in neighbouring countries such as Thailand, India, Bangladesh and Malaysia.
At the same time, the breakdown of governance across large parts of the country has allowed criminal networks to expand. Scam centres, trafficking routes and cross-border organised crime have proliferated in territories where state authority has weakened.
For Southeast Asian governments, these developments are becoming as consequential as the political crisis itself.
Regional actors are therefore beginning to view Myanmar not only through the lens of democracy and human rights, but also through the lens of security and stability. In Southeast Asia, humanitarian crises and security challenges rarely remain neatly separated for long.
This shift in perspective matters for policymakers in Canberra.
For Australia, ASEAN engagement must be complemented by additional regional initiatives rather than relied upon exclusively.
Australia has consistently supported ASEAN’s efforts to address the crisis, particularly through the Five-Point Consensus agreed in April 2021. However, ASEAN’s institutional structure limits its ability to respond decisively.
The organisation operates on a consensus principle, meaning that all member states must agree before collective action can be taken. This often leads to cautious diplomatic language and incremental steps rather than strong enforcement measures.
Furthermore, ASEAN’s rotating chairmanship creates inconsistency in leadership. As one regional observer once joked, it is difficult to run a marathon when the baton changes hands every twelve months. Each year brings different priorities and diplomatic approaches.
The result is a regional mechanism that is valuable for dialogue but ill-suited to resolving a complex civil conflict.
For external partners such as Australia, this means ASEAN engagement must be complemented by additional regional initiatives rather than relied upon exclusively.
Myanmar's junta chief Min Aung Hlaing, centre, poses during a ceremony to mark the 10th anniversary of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in Naypyidaw in October 2025 (AFP via Getty Images)
Australia is not the only country grappling with how to respond to Myanmar’s crisis, and different governments have adopted markedly different strategies.
Japan, for example, has maintained a policy of continued engagement with Myanmar’s institutions, arguing that sustained dialogue and development assistance may help preserve long-term channels of influence. Western governments such as the United States and members of the European Union have taken a more sanctions-focused approach, targeting military-linked individuals and businesses.
Australia’s policy sits somewhere between these two models. Canberra has imposed targeted sanctions and avoided direct engagement with the military authorities, while continuing to fund humanitarian assistance and civil society programs.
This middle-ground approach reflects Australia’s desire to balance democratic principles with regional diplomatic realities. However, it also highlights the need to ensure that humanitarian engagement is accompanied by a broader regional framework that addresses the regional consequences of Myanmar’s prolonged instability.
Another notable feature of Australia’s Myanmar policy is the emphasis placed on stakeholder consultation.
In developing the Australia–Myanmar Development Partnership Plan, DFAT reports that it engaged a wide range of stakeholders including United Nations agencies, international NGOs, civil society organisations and members of the Myanmar diaspora.
These consultations are an important step toward ensuring development programs reflect the realities faced by Myanmar communities.
However, the consultation process itself is largely opaque.
Due to security concerns, the identities of local implementing partners and many consultation participants are not publicly disclosed. While this approach may be necessary to protect individuals operating in conflict environments, it also creates a significant challenge: it becomes difficult to assess how inclusive or representative these consultations truly are.
Myanmar’s political landscape is extraordinarily diverse. It includes ethnic political organisations, resistance groups, civil society networks, women’s organisations, youth movements, humanitarian actors and a global diaspora with varying perspectives on the country’s future.
When consultation processes occur largely behind closed doors, an inevitable question arises: whose voices are being heard and whose may be missing?
For policymakers in Canberra, this presents a delicate balancing act. Protecting partners from retaliation by the military regime is essential. Yet at the same time, transparency and inclusivity remain critical to building trust among the wider Myanmar community.
Without broader visibility into consultation processes, diaspora communities and emerging civic actors may feel disconnected from policy discussions that directly affect the future of their country.
Strengthening mechanisms for inclusive and transparent engagement (while still protecting the safety of participants) could therefore become an important next step in Australia’s Myanmar policy.
Such engagement would not only improve policy design but also reinforce Australia’s long-standing reputation as a partner committed to democratic values and accountable governance.
Members of Myanmar's Union Election commission count ballots after the closing of polls in Yangon in the first phase of Myanmar's general election on 28 December 2025 (Lillian Suwanrumpha/AFP via Getty Images)
Myanmar’s diaspora communities have become one of the quiet engines sustaining humanitarian response since the coup – a community with untapped potential.
Across Australia, North America, Europe and Southeast Asia, diaspora communities have become an important source of humanitarian assistance, advocacy and political engagement since the 2021 coup. Many individuals have mobilised resources, organised international awareness campaigns and supported communities affected by conflict inside Myanmar.
Yet diaspora participation in formal policy processes often remains limited and fragmented.
While consultation with diaspora representatives did occur during the development of Australia’s Myanmar Development Partnership Plan, the structure and breadth of this engagement remain difficult to assess publicly.
This matters because diaspora communities can play a unique role in bridging international policy discussions with the complex realities inside Myanmar.
Diaspora professionals frequently possess deep cultural understanding, linguistic ability and social networks that allow them to interpret developments on the ground in ways that external observers may find difficult. Many also maintain close connections with civil society organisations, humanitarian actors and emerging political networks within the country.
At the same time, diaspora communities often reflect the diversity (and divisions) of Myanmar’s political landscape. Different groups may prioritise different strategies for political change, humanitarian response or international engagement.
For policymakers, this complexity can make diaspora engagement appear challenging.
If Myanmar’s instability continues for years rather than months, its consequences for Southeast Asia will grow more severe.
However, excluding or underutilising diaspora expertise carries its own risks. When diaspora voices feel disconnected from formal policy processes, frustration can grow and opportunities for constructive collaboration may be lost.
As Myanmar’s crisis continues to evolve, there is an opportunity for Australia to explore more structured mechanisms for diaspora engagement. This could include advisory forums, policy dialogues or thematic working groups that allow diaspora experts to contribute perspectives on humanitarian access, governance reform and regional stability.
Such initiatives would not replace the voices of communities inside Myanmar. Rather, they could complement them by ensuring that Australia’s policy framework draws on the widest possible range of informed perspectives.
In a protracted crisis where reliable information and trusted networks are often difficult to access, diaspora communities represent an underutilised asset.
Australia’s policy currently recognises that Myanmar’s crisis will be long-term. The Development Partnership Plan explicitly notes that development and humanitarian programs must operate within a humanitarian–development nexus due to the protracted nature of the conflict.
Yet if Myanmar’s instability continues for years rather than months, its consequences for Southeast Asia will grow more severe. Irregular migration will increase. Criminal networks will expand. Border regions will face mounting humanitarian pressure. ASEAN’s internal divisions over Myanmar will also persist.
In this environment, a policy framework centred primarily on humanitarian assistance is necessary but insufficient. Humanitarian assistance saves lives. But on its own, it cannot stabilise a region.
Penny Wong, Australian Foreign Minister (Mel Adams/DFAT)
Australia is well positioned to support a broader regional response.
Rather than attempting to resolve Myanmar’s internal political conflict directly, Canberra could focus on mitigating the wider regional consequences of prolonged instability.
Several practical initiatives could form the basis of such a strategy.
First, Australia could expand support for cross-border humanitarian assistance, particularly through partnerships with organisations operating along Myanmar’s borders.
Second, Canberra could work with regional governments to strengthen temporary protection arrangements for displaced Myanmar nationals in Southeast Asia.
Third, Australia could utilise regional mechanisms such as the Bali Process to improve coordination on migration governance and trafficking prevention.
Fourth, Australia could support local governance and service delivery in border communities hosting displaced populations.
None of these initiatives would undermine ASEAN’s central role in regional diplomacy. Instead, they would complement ASEAN’s efforts by addressing practical challenges that affect neighbouring states directly.
Myanmar’s political future will ultimately be determined by its own people. External actors cannot impose a resolution to the country’s internal conflict.
But the regional consequences of that conflict are already unfolding.
Myanmar may appear distant from Australia’s immediate interests. Geography, however, has a way of shrinking quickly when instability begins to spill across borders. Instability in Southeast Asia has direct implications for regional security, migration patterns and economic cooperation. Supporting regional responses to Myanmar’s humanitarian and governance challenges is therefore consistent with Australia’s broader strategic objectives.
Moreover, such an approach allows Australia to demonstrate constructive leadership while respecting ASEAN’s preference for regional solutions.
By complementing humanitarian assistance with a broader regional stability strategy, Australia can help mitigate the spillover effects of Myanmar’s crisis while strengthening resilience across Southeast Asia. In this part of the world, instability rarely stays politely within national borders.
Policy rarely solves conflicts overnight. But it can shape the environment in which solutions eventually become possible.
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