The Bougainville Peace Agreement, signed in August 2001 after extensive consultation and negotiation, has stood the test of time. There has been no return to conflict, and many of the agreement’s most substantial terms have been met.
Weapons disposal measures are assessed to be largely complete. A new homegrown Bougainville Constitution was written, with the Autonomous Bougainville Government first elected in 2005, and five elections held since. The public service has been stood up, along with local courts and powers to regulate mining and lands.
And a referendum on Bougainville’s political future was held at the end of 2019 – with 97.7% of voters choosing independence over greater autonomy.
Despite this progress, many provisions of the peace agreement remain unfulfilled. The agreement presents a perplexing case study. Peace has been sustained for almost 30 years, yet many critical parts of the agreement’s terms have not been fully realised.
In dozens of fieldwork interviews in Bougainville and Papua New Guinea that I’ve undertaken as part of my doctoral research, several key themes have emerged around this partial implementation. The agreement itself is seen as an enduring symbol, its presence alone serving as a reminder of war and the need to continue on a path to “peace by peaceful means”. But what has also stood out is the extent of subterranean frustration regarding the implementation of the agreement to date.
Issues around joint coordination have been raised often; many of the 64 interviewees expressed concern that coordination mechanisms between the two governments – the ABG and Port Moresby – often failed to work.
The lack of development of critical institutions such as an Ombudsman Commission and an Auditor-General’s Office were seen to have undermined the region’s efforts to achieve good governance. Public servants felt that capacity-building and training commitments set out in the agreement had failed to materialise, and fragmented leadership at all levels was cited as a contributor to mixed implementation success.
There is little certainty regarding Bougainville’s future, with growing concern about potential tensions that may arise should a final political settlement not be reached soon.
The referendum was seen as a moment of “historical justice”, but delays in progressing post-referendum consultations were consistently raised. There is little certainty regarding Bougainville’s future, with growing concern about potential tensions that may arise should a final political settlement not be reached soon. Confusion around the non-binding nature of the referendum, and the obligation for the two governments to consult, has led to increasing levels of anxiety, with some fearing what might happen if the governments cannot agree on an independence pathway.
Others expressed a view that the consultations require a “pan-Bougainville” approach, similar to that used in reaching consensus on a unified Bougainville position when negotiations for the 2001 agreement occurred.
Many of these observations are supported by analysis that I have undertaken as part of my research where I have mapped 73 implementation mechanisms contained in the agreement that require specific actions to aid implementation. These include the formation of mechanisms, coordination arrangements, periodic consultations and reviews.
Of the 73 mechanisms identified, less than half have achieved “partial implementation”, 34 remain unimplemented, and a further seven are unclear with respect to their implementation status. Those unimplemented include the establishment of oversight bodies, equitable arrangements for fisheries revenue sharing, arrangements to ensure consultation on foreign affairs, and contributions to negotiations of international agreements. Others include agreed arrangements for cooperation in the exercise of powers and functions at sea, consultation on central banking arrangements, and provisions for the appointment of a panel of experts to make recommendations on capacity or economic circumstances related to the transfer of powers. Requirements for five-yearly reviews of fiscal arrangements remain unimplemented, and a mechanism to coordinate restoration and development is yet to be established almost 25 years after the agreement was signed. Significant constitutional funding arrangements remain subject to an ongoing slow-running dispute.
My research shows that the Bougainville Peace Agreement is a robust and well-designed agreement that incorporates many of the measures deemed necessary for successful implementation. Yet my preliminary findings suggest the enabling environment remains fragile, particularly in the context of the post-referendum process.
With President Ishmael Toroama re-elected in a landslide last month and declaring Bougainville’s intent to become independent on 1 September 2027, the next phase of the region’s journey will place significant pressure on the agreement’s design and the capacity of its institutions to deliver lasting outcomes. It will also challenge the ABG’s ability to translate aspiration into implementation. Achieving clarity on the post-referendum consultation process, particularly the role of parliament, will be critical. How that process unfolds will shape not only Bougainville’s political future, but the legacy of the agreement itself.
