The presidency of Donald Trump posed serious challenges to the legitimacy of America’s global leadership. A recent Lowy Institute Poll found that 64 per cent of Australians expressed diminished trust in the United States. In Japan, a Yomiuri Shimbun survey conducted on 18 May reported that 73 per cent of respondents were concerned about the future of US–Japan relations. These numbers point to a broader reputational deficit facing the United States among key allies.
China has sought to exploit this credibility gap. President Xi Jinping has portrayed Beijing as a defender of global multilateralism in contrast to Washington’s unilateralism. The Global Times cited the Democracy Perception Index, which suggested that a significant proportion of surveyed countries viewed China more favourably than the US. While the veracity of these claims is questionable, they underscore a perceptual shift that Beijing is actively encouraging.
However, China’s effort to position itself as a responsible stakeholder is complicated by its assertive behaviour in the South and East China Seas, the Taiwan Strait, and its opaque alignment with Russia. For many countries in the Indo-Pacific – particularly Southeast Asian nations – these actions have raised serious concerns. Despite scepticism about Washington’s global conduct under Trump, the US remains a key security partner and a symbol of the rules-based order. Regional states, therefore, face a dilemma: growing wariness of both great powers but continuing dependence on US strategic assurances and China’s economic relations.
Ishiba’s visit to Washington in February aimed to reaffirm continuity in the alliance, even as Trump criticised its asymmetry and imposed reciprocal tariffs.
This evolving strategic environment presents Japan with a pressing diplomatic challenge. As American leadership becomes more erratic and Chinese influence expands, Tokyo must navigate an increasingly fluid regional order. The erosion of US legitimacy does not merely affect bilateral ties; it also disrupts the foundation of Japan’s post-war foreign policy of creating and maintaining a rules-based order. Whether Japan chooses to reinforce the alliance, hedge through multilateral, regional and minilateral institutions, or adopt a more autonomous leadership role will shape the contours of Indo-Pacific diplomacy in the years ahead.
In the first six months of his leadership, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has prioritised bilateral stability with Washington. The administration has focused on advancing the military alliance, separating economic tensions from broader strategic cooperation, and maintaining direct channels of communication with the Trump administration. His ambition for an Asian NATO is shelved. Ishiba’s visit to Washington in February aimed to reaffirm continuity in the alliance, even as Trump criticised its asymmetry and imposed reciprocal tariffs.
Japan has also continued to operationalise its “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” vision through practical initiatives. The defence budget increased to $70 billion in the financial year 2025, and Official Security Assistance grew from ¥2 billion in FY2023 to ¥8 billion. The Japan International Cooperation Agency has delivered over ¥145 billion (approximately US$28 billion) in aid to Southeast Asia since 2013, including 24 patrol vessels. Institutional reforms such as the establishment of a Joint Operations Command, and increased multilateral exercises, including the recent Quad table-top logistical exercise have further reinforced Japan’s regional presence.
Nonetheless, many of these developments are extensions of trajectories set by previous administrations. While they reflect continuity, they may not be sufficient to counteract the broader disruption caused by US unpredictability. For example, several proposals for minilateral institutionalisation – such as AUKUS Pillar Two Plus Japan, the more advanced US–Japan–South Korea trilateral, and NATO’s IP4 initiative – were largely shaped by institutional advocates in the Biden administration. With those figures having left office, sustaining and adapting these frameworks may require more proactive leadership from Tokyo.
Thus far, Japan has been cautious in articulating a broader strategic vision. Unlike Singaporean Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, who has publicly addressed the implications of US retreat from multilateralism, Tokyo has largely refrained from making forward-looking or critical statements. The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” continues to serve as a useful conceptual anchor, but as US commitment to liberal norms becomes less consistent, the concept demands further policy elaboration.
There are, however, opportunities for Japan to assert a more ambitious role. With USAID scaling back its operations, Japan could propose a trilateral development mechanism with Australia and New Zealand to coordinate infrastructure and capacity-building in the Pacific Islands. Similarly, Japan might take a leading role in revitalising multilateral platforms where US disengagement has stalled progress, particularly in trade and rule-making fora. Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi’s remarks at the Munich Security Conference – that “Russia must not be the victor in the Ukraine conflict” – reflect a principled stance aligned with the rules-based order while the question remains how Japan will operationalise such commitments within material and legal constraints.
Japan can provide previous lessons from American and Chinese unilateralism. Though people tend to forget the US unilateral actions against Japan in the late 1980s and 1990s, the United States applied the Super 301 provision against Japan, restricting trade in supercomputers, satellites, and wood products in 1989. Japan had faced and dealt with China’s assertive maritime expansion since the early 2000s, especially after 2007. Japan’s historical experiences provide intellectual lessons for many governments that face great power’s unilateral actions.
Notwithstanding these opportunities, it is unlikely that Tokyo will promulgate an ambitious foreign policy vision. The Ishiba administration’s approval rate hit a record low 27.4 per cent in May, and little sign of potential recovery by the upper house election in July. Though still uncertain, the election dramas watched in Canada and Australia may not be screened in Japan.
While questions about US reliability have long shaped allied security thinking, the current debate is no longer simply about trust. For Japan, the issue is less one of willingness and more a question of how much strategic uncertainty it can afford to absorb and how much responsibility it is willing to take.
