ASEAN, explained.
Anwar Ibrahim, Malaysia's prime minister, will host ASEAN as chair in 2025 (Hilary Wardhaugh/Bloomberg via Getty Images)
Can Malaysia drive ASEAN like the pony express?
Or does the regional grouping remain stuck in the stable?
ASEAN, explained.
Anwar Ibrahim, Malaysia's prime minister, will host ASEAN as chair in 2025 (Hilary Wardhaugh/Bloomberg via Getty Images)
Or does the regional grouping remain stuck in the stable?
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Can Malaysia drive ASEAN like the pony express?Can Malaysia drive ASEAN like the pony express?
The vivacious Singaporean diplomatic Kausikan Bilahari once famously argued that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is more like a “cow” than a “horse”, meaning it’s more sluggish and wavering than speedy and decisive. In fairness, the unusually outspoken Singaporean diplomat argued from a position of empathy by claiming how “far too much criticism of ASEAN amounts to criticising a cow for being an imperfect horse.”
The problem, however, is that ASEAN consciously presented itself as a “horse” not long ago, projecting itself as the “main driver” of regional integration in Asia-the Pacific and confidently marching towards establishing nothing less than a “common market” by 2025. At the risk of straining the analogy, one could argue that Bilahari also presented a “false binary”. After all, the least ASEAN can do is to become a “donkey” similar to “Dapple” in Don Quixote: a tad slow and lacking flair, but impeccably sturdy and reliable.
Otherwise, the regional body risks being consigned to a laughing stock among major powers and a marginal player in shaping the broader Indo-Pacific region.
And this brings me to Malaysia’s chairmanship of ASEAN this year under the theme “Inclusivity and Sustainability”. In theory, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, a bona fide internationalist, is an ideal leader to steer the region in the right direction. Malaysia, as a founding member, and one of the most developed nations in the region, also has the gravitas to nudge ASEAN towards more internal coherence and decisive response to geopolitical challenges in the region. A toxic combination of opportunistic complacency, greed, and fear, however, could torpedo hopes for reasserting “ASEAN centrality”.
Incidentally, I spent the opening week of the new year in Kuala Lumpur to attend the Asean Economic Opinion Leaders Conference, which was hosted by the Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry (MITI). The recurring theme in panel discussions had less to do with industrial policy and semiconductors than the hackneyed line on “neutrality”.
Speaker after speaker – predominantly businessmen and technocrats, and mostly “manels” – boldly claimed that all ASEAN has to do in the coming years is to avoid taking sides and just focus on attracting investments and developing its own economic foundations. Tan Sri Nazir Razak, the chairman of Malaysia’s branch of the Asean Business Advisory Council (BAC), even argued that “decoupling” between the United States and China provides immense opportunities for ASEAN nations. Meanwhile, political scientist Cheng-Chwee Kuik argued that regional states should just continue to “hedge” in an era of geopolitical uncertainty – and that the alternative is worse.
Even if ASEAN states don’t want to choose, the superpowers will force them to do so (Nhac Nguyen/AFP via Getty Images)
The problem, however, is that even if ASEAN states don’t want to choose, the superpowers will force them to do so. Aside from trying to dominate adjacent waters, China is pressing its advantage and reportedly building its first regional naval base in Cambodia, while the United States is expanding its military presence in northern Philippines bordering Taiwan. A more mercurial and hawkish second Trump administration will only exacerbate this dynamic, raising the cost of strategic indecision and complacent opportunism.
Since coming to power, Anwar has been more busy bashing the West for supposed “Sinophobia” than expressing solidarity with fellow ASEAN countries such as the Philippines bearing the brunt of China’s bullying in the South China Sea. If anything, Malaysia’s leadership has been more than eager to promote China as a regional “big brother” and an indispensable partner for development. To make matters worse, most ASEAN states have couched strategic diffidence as wise “hedging”, naively assuming that by talking softly to revisionist superpower they can preserve their core interests.
Confronted by China’s constant harassment in the South China Sea, and receiving minimal support from ASEAN states, the Philippines may eventually be forced to join an America-led containment strategy against China. But naked pragmatism is also at play. From Malaysia to Vietnam, Singapore and Indonesia, key ASEAN states are benefiting from massive inflow of Chinese investments. If anything, they are leveraging the “China card” to lure counter-investments from the West with varying degrees of success.
ASEAN may not be a horse, but Malaysia is in a position to make the regional body more of a donkey: a frustratingly sluggish but sufficiently efficient organisation.
Malaysia, in particular, is bracing for massive influx of investments from neighbouring Singapore, a conduit of Chinese investments, ahead of Trump’s expected tariffs on Beijing and other major Asian economies. With Malaysia on the cusp of attaining the much-vaunted “high-income” status in the coming year, it has every reason to keep relations with major economic partners on an even keel.
The final factor is fear. The Philippines aside, no ASEAN regional state has a mutual defence alliance with any external power (Thailand has a “friendship” treaty with the United States). Moreover, Malaysia is acutely aware of the asymmetry of military power in the South China Sea, hence its general reluctance to confront the Asian juggernaut both diplomatically and operationally. At times, Kuala Lumpur seemingly chose to criticise the AUKUS (Australia-United Kingdom-United States) pact, or throw shade at the Philippines’ uncompromising stance in the South China Sea in order to please Beijing even as it directly benefited from Manila’s historic arbitration case against China’s excessive claims in disputed waters. At other times, Malaysia has simply parroted Beijing’s talking points on the maritime disputes.
Since majority of ASEAN states are non-claimants, they have even less incentive to take a decisive stance on the issue. Thus, there is little chance of a breakthrough on the most pressing geopolitical conflict in the region, especially since the regional body operates on a consensus-based decision-making process.
Nevertheless, the Philippines’ chairmanship of ASEAN next year – following Myanmar junta’s disqualification from hosting the events – could have a constructive effect on ASEAN’s proceedings this year. Manila is expected to proactively lobby its ASEAN counterparts to not succumb to Chinese pressure. Accordingly, the ASEAN is expected to continue to negotiate a legally-binding Code of Conduct and will likely raise the festering South China Sea disputes in its joint statements this year. Otherwise, the Philippines has the option of taking the region in a radically different direction next year, thus exposing deep fault lines within ASEAN.
ASEAN may not be a horse, but Malaysia is in a position to make the regional body more of a donkey: a frustratingly sluggish but sufficiently efficient organisation capable of tabling pressing regional concerns as well as asserting a measure of “ASEAN centrality” amid intensified US-China rivalry in Asia.
About the author
Richard Javad Heydarian
Richard Javad Heydarian is a Manila-based columnist, academic, and author.
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