Australia is involved across a range of issue-based coalitions or minilateral groupings – AUKUS, the Quad, the Australia-India-France and Australia-Japan-Korea trilaterals, and more. But not all such frameworks are created equal. The most consistent and impactful tend to involve other middle-power, like-minded countries cooperating on discrete issues with clear goals, rather than those that formed around a broad mission of regional stability.
As the United States becomes more unpredictable and transactional, Australia’s partners across Asia are calling for stronger, diverse partnerships. In this context, Canberra should be more selective in its regional engagements. Australia’s increasingly limited resources mean it should consider scaling back its involvement in less focused or overly ambitious partnerships and prioritise groupings focused on strategic cooperation.
Over the past 15 years, Australia and India have more than doubled the number of jointly conducted defence exercises and activities.
One underexplored but strategically promising option of this nature is an Australia-India-South Korea partnership, focused on security and defence industry.
These three Indo-Pacific democracies rely heavily on open sea lanes, freedom of navigation, and regional stability. Geographically, the three countries form a strategic triangle with critical coverage across multiple maritime chokepoints, from the Bay of Bengal to the Taiwan Strait. All three are comprehensive strategic partners with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, capable of bolstering ASEAN-led peace and stability efforts in the Indo-Pacific. All three have recently faced varying levels of tension in their relationships with Washington, while managing common concerns on China’s growing maritime assertiveness.
A trilateral grouping would build on already strong bilateral foundations. Over the past 15 years, Australia and India have more than doubled the number of jointly conducted defence exercises and activities. There is significant dialogue between the two countries, including 2+2 ministerial meetings since 2021 and separate staff talks for the navies, armies and air forces. Engagement is diverse across the sector and includes an air-to-air refuelling arrangement, aircraft deployment from each other’s territories to enhance maritime domain awareness, and a recently announced joint research project in underwater technologies.
India and South Korea defence relations have also strengthened in recent years, with 2+2 meetings also inaugurated in 2021. The two countries have engaged in bilateral navy staff talks, exercises and port calls and there has been increased activity in defence related dialogue. Importantly, there has been significant expansion in defence industry, most recently with the announcement of a HD Hyundai and Cochin Shipyard MoU to cooperate through ship design, technical support and equipment in shipbuilding projects.
Australia and South Korea have long-standing defence relations and established their 2+2 dialogue in 2013. Last year, Hanwha Defence launched the first overseas production base established by a Korean defence company near Geelong in Australia’s south, which will build key components for the Australian Army’s artillery modernisation program. Both Australia and South Korea are engaged in joint, large scale military exercises, peace operations training and cooperation, as well as defence science and technology research projects.
The ocean is vast and can’t be patrolled by one country alone. Coordinated approaches will provide added security for repair ships and deter potential interference.
Importantly, Australia, India and South Korea bring complementary defence strengths. India offers a large and cost-effective manufacturing base and a strong IT and defence sector. Australia has advanced naval systems, cyber expertise and deep R&D capacity. South Korea leads in cutting-edge electronics, robotics and a proven track record in shipbuilding. All three are investing in indigenous defence capabilities. A coordinated industrial strategy would reduce duplication, enable co-production, and increase interoperability.
Another promising area for collaboration is undersea infrastructure. More than 98 per cent of global data traffic runs through undersea cables, making them essential, and increasingly vulnerable, components of connectivity and security. It matters which cables we use, and which cables our neighbours and partners use.
The three countries should collaborate on cable infrastructure diversification, maintenance, and data storage and protection. There is an opportunity to leverage Australia’s strategic position and maritime capabilities, South Korea’s artificial intelligence-based threat detection and defence technology, and India’s manufacturing capabilities and data centres.
Joint maritime patrols will also help build regional resilience. The ocean is vast and can’t be patrolled by one country alone. Coordinated approaches will provide added security for repair ships and deter potential interference.
Finally, coordinated exercises, particularly in maritime security, would enhance response capabilities across the Indo-Pacific. Building off the success of exercises such as AUSINDEX between the Australian and Indian navies and incorporating South Korea’s high-tech defence systems or cutting-edge submarines could elevate the complexity of the drills. Building interoperability now will allow these partners to support each other better in times of trouble.
As traditional partnerships in the Indo-Pacific are shifting, new, outcome-oriented arrangements are needed. The Australia-India-South Korea partnership is a logical next step. It connects three likeminded, capable and complementary democracies committed to a stable and secure region. In an era of US disengagement and volatility in the Indo-Pacific, Canberra should invest in building these types of partnerships that don’t just hedge against uncertainty but shape our region’s future.
