China, explained.
China and India share a disputed border in the Himalayas that has served as a source of tension since the 1960s (Getty Images0
India and China have sought to defuse their military standoff and that will limit the prospect for US interference in their relations.
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China-India ties to be more resilient in the Trump 2.0 eraChina-India ties to be more resilient in the Trump 2.0 era
Donald Trump’s upcoming engagement with China and India will be one of the key determinants of Asian affairs. While Beijing and New Delhi are emerging great powers, their bilateral ties are not immune to Washington’s geopolitical calculations. US strategic support to India and the enhancement of defence cooperation exacerbated a major downturn of Sino‑Indian ties after the 2020 Galwan conflict. Nevertheless, a recent breakthrough on border affairs and shared economic imperatives suggest that China-India relations will be more robust against US strategic interference in the years to come.
China and India share a disputed border in the Himalayas that has served as a source of tension since the 1960s. China went to war over the border with India in 1962, and the two countries fought again in 1967. After an intense military standoff on the boundary in 1986-87, guns and boots gave way to decades of precarious stability. Frictions surfaced again in the 2010s, with bloodless military standoffs occurring in 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2017. In June 2020, a deadly fight in the Galwan valley claimed the lives of at least 20 Chinese and four Indian soldiers.
In the wake of the Galwan conflict, relations went into a nosedive. Not only did China and India deploy thousands of soldiers to the border, but tensions also spilled over into other areas. India restricted the inflow of Chinese investments, banning more than 250 applications developed by companies such as Tencent and Baidu, and conducted tax raids on telecommunications companies including Huawei and ZTE. India also expelled Chinese journalists, and China responded in kind.
The previous Trump administration branded China as a “strategic competitor” and it reacted to the Sino-Indian rift accordingly. Washington aided India during the Galwan conflict by providing it with intelligence and defence equipment. After the clashes, the United States and India signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement on Geospatial Cooperation, a pact that improves interoperability between the US and Indian militaries.
The Biden administration followed a similar approach. The 2022 National Defence Strategy and Indo-Pacific Strategy reiterated US support to India vis-à-vis China on the border and in the broader Indian Ocean region. A report also stated that the US shared intelligence with India that prevented another fatal clash in 2022. The Biden administration spearheaded cooperation with India in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or “Quad”, and Biden referred to China as an aggressor at the meeting of the group earlier this year.
China watched these developments with unease. Chinese media blasted the US for destabilising Asia and cajoling New Delhi into a coalition against Beijing. Reports lambasted India for siding with the United States after the Galwan clashes, and exploiting a strategic collaboration with Washington against China.
Last month, the Indian government announced that it had reached a border patrol agreement with China. The pact defused the Sino-Indian military standoff that had persisted since 2020.
While US strategic interference worsened tensions between Beijing and New Delhi, recent developments portend greater Sino-Indian resilience to Washington’s geopolitical designs for the region.
Last month, the Indian government announced that it had reached a border patrol agreement with China. The pact defused the Sino-Indian military standoff that had persisted since 2020. The agreement does not resolve the border dispute, but it lays down the foundation for the normalisation of Sino-Indian ties and has implications for the two Asian states’ relationship.
Stable ties with China allow India to reduce its reliance on US strategic support and offset one of the key drivers of India’s commitment to the Quad. Furthermore, the border agreement allows India to re-engage with China in the economic domain, as trade and investment relations with Beijing serve New Delhi’s goal of becoming a manufacturing hub. Investment proposals by China were already being approved on a case-by-case basis before the agreement, and such clearances could increase going forward.
A steady relationship with India also benefits China, as it counteracts New Delhi’s “strategic drift” towards the United States. As tensions subside, China’s outreach to India is likely to have an economic element. Accessing the vast Indian market would benefit China as it capitalises on exports for growth amid a real estate slowdown and a decline in consumer spending.
Trump’s upcoming trade policy could also drive rapprochement between India and China. Trump pledged to impose 60-100 per cent import tariffs on goods brought in from China and 10-20 per cent tariffs on imports from any other country. Recent analysis suggests that India could also be a target of additional punitive tariffs, and Trump has a track record of trade frictions with New Delhi. The first Trump administration’s steel and aluminium tariffs affected US-India trade and the United States also revoked India’s preferential trade treatment in 2019. Against this backdrop, China and India could benefit from each other’s markets to mitigate the impact of potential import tariffs imposed by the United States.
The Galwan conflict and the Sino-Indian rift allowed the United States to boost defence ties with India and shape the Asian strategic landscape to its advantage. With China and India on the road to rapprochement, Trump 2.0 will need to take a fresh look at Asian affairs and design a strategy that is less reliant on New Delhi’s animosity towards Beijing.
About the author
Daniel Balazs
Daniel Balazs, PhD, is a Research Fellow of the China Programme at the S.
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