Since US President Donald Trump first attempted to end the war in Ukraine in February, China has been sending subtle signals that it is considering deploying peacekeepers – or at least discussing the idea – once a ceasefire or peace deal has been reached.
Despite Chinese state officials indicating that it is far too early to talk about peacekeeping, the country’s security experts are discussing the topic at international forums, analytical essays are being written on the issue by Chinese experts, and a visit by Beijing’s defence chief Dong Jun to Berlin and Paris had peacekeeping firmly on the agenda. Dong’s attendance at the 6th UN Peacekeeping Ministerial Conference in Berlin was the first visit to Europe by a Chinese Minister of Defence in more than four years. It took place just before the Ukraine–Russia talks in Türkiye, and the Chinese side kept it rather low-profile.
China's preferred endgame in Ukraine is a hybrid peace: not war and not peace, but something in between, similar to a frozen conflict.
Meanwhile, China has been discreetly intensifying its cooperation with Ukraine to avoid provoking Russia. The newly appointed Chinese ambassador to Ukraine, Ma Shengkun, who was formerly the deputy director-general of the Arms Control Department at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has been actively engaging with business and academic circles, as well as the Ukrainian administration. He was also among the group of more than 60 foreign diplomats who visited the site of the Russian missile strike in Kyiv’s Solomyanskyi district.
It is a skillful and delicate game that China has been playing, particularly with Europe and the United States. A recent comment by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, made during his conversation with the EU’s Kaja Kallas in Brussels, that China does not want Russia to lose the war exemplifies Beijing’s view. Not wanting Russia to lose the war does not mean wanting Russia to win it. This is where the problem lies. China's preferred endgame in Ukraine is a hybrid peace: not war and not peace, but something in between, similar to a frozen conflict. This would neither strengthen Russia (as victory would) nor cause it to implode and collapse (as defeat would). As Wang mentioned, it would also keep US attention squarely focused on Russia rather than China. The frozen conflict still needs to be monitored, as it could easily thaw.
There are further political reasons why Beijing might consider peacekeepers to Ukraine. Chinese officials often emphasise the importance of a UN mandate when discussing such operations. This focus on the UN is noteworthy because it highlights China's desire to reinforce the organisation’s role as the cornerstone of the global order. It is important to note that China makes an artificial distinction between the so-called US-led rules-based international order, which it wants to dismantle, and an international order centred on the UN, of which China is a founding member and which it wants to preserve. China’s increasing engagement within the UN is intended to bolster the position of the Global South, a group of countries that China considers to be potential political allies.
Regardless of whether the UN Security Council accepts or vetoes the Chinese peacekeeping mission in Ukraine, the outcome will be advantageous for China. Of note, the UN's vote on the mission may only take place once Russia has approved it, which seems highly likely given the close relationship between the two countries. Moreover, Ukraine may view the Chinese mission positively, as Volodymyr Zelenskyy has been employing a delicate “carrot and stick” approach with China and is keen to avoid straining ties with Beijing. I was even told by an expert on Ukraine that the government in Kyiv sees China as its last resort.
China is interested in a symbolic peacekeeping presence and is likely to deploy only a small number of personnel.
If the Security Council accepts the mission, China will establish itself as a responsible stakeholder and reduce (or even end) Western criticism for supporting Russia. However, this does not mean that China is eager to actively protect a ceasefire or peace in Ukraine. In fact, the goal is purely political: to gain strategic advantage. China is interested in a symbolic peacekeeping presence and is likely to deploy only a small number of personnel, such as police officers or military engineers. Yet regardless of the numbers or whether the peacekeepers actually materialise, it would be a serious test for the West.
Conversely, if the Security Council vetoes the deployment, Beijing could accuse the West – specifically the United States, France or the United Kingdom – of hindering its peace efforts. This would reinforce China and Russia's view that the West is not interested in achieving peace in Ukraine and is responsible for the conflict.
Apart from strengthening its position within the UN and among Global South countries, China is interested in Ukraine's post-war reconstruction. It has openly signalled this interest since at least early 2023, when it released its 12-point “peace plan”. A potential peacekeeping mission could serve as a preparatory phase in this regard. This would also enable China to observe the use of Western weapons on a European battlefield and assess Ukraine's rebuilding requirements. Given the enormous scale of Ukraine's reconstruction needs, China's early involvement could give it an advantage in securing the best contracts and establishing a stronger political presence in Eastern Europe on the EU's doorstep. This would pose a significant challenge to the West, particularly Europe.
