Coal: Australia and Canada’s next middle‑power energy play

When Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney addressed Australia’s parliament last week, he offered a striking vision for how middle powers can navigate a fracturing global order. Canada and Australia, he argued, should not behave as competitors but as “strategic collaborators” in key sectors such as mining and critical minerals.

He noted that through collaboration, rather than competition, the two countries could collectively boost investment, strengthen supply chains, and reinforce their autonomy. The scale of this collaborative opportunity is undeniable. As Carney noted, together Canada and Australia produce roughly one‑third of the world’s lithium and uranium, and more than 40% of global iron ore. These are among the minerals expected to underpin not just the energy transition, but the next era of industrial competition.

But if the countries are serious about becoming resource “superpowers”, that influence, and that title, should extend well beyond the minerals of the future. It also lies in the energy commodities that power the present.

Australia is one of the world’s largest exporters of liquefied natural gas, while Canada is a major producer and exporter of oil from its shale and oil sands resources. Both countries are also major coal exporters. Together, the two economies sit at the centre of the global energy system – not only in the minerals required for the transition, but in the fuels and industrial inputs whose ongoing supply will determine its pace.

Recognising this reality opens an opportunity that fits squarely within Carney’s desire to engage in a “variable geometry” of like-minded countries acting together on key global challenges.

One such opportunity lies in coal.

Rather than treating coal purely as a domestic transition challenge, middle powers could together experiment with trying to align global trade with the global transition.

For Australia and Canada, this could start with a simple but high-impact step: a collabortive agreement to end new thermal coal mines. This collective agreement would then expand to work with other global exporters to limit the approvals of new thermal coal mines, while allowing existing operations to run their economic course. In tandem, the two countries would work with key trading partners such as India, Japan and South Korea to reinforce this through a parallel commitment as importers.

This kind of collaboration would not only help to accelerate the global shift away from coal, it would also increase the asset value of existing mines, and limit the destabilising boom-and-bust cycles that have plagued the sector.

By collaborating to manage the trajectory of future global coal supply, middle powers like Australia and Canada could strengthen their position. Rather than merely reacting to structural demand shifts, they could give themselves a seat at the global table and strengthen their supply chain resilience.

Through greater coordination with other coal export partners, rather than a race to the bottom, Australia and Canada could better manage demand transitions and reduce the risk of sudden market shocks. This would give governments and investors the clarity needed to manage existing assets, retrain workers, and diversify regional economies. It would transform coal from a potential source of instability into a managed transition pathway.

This already aligns with Canadian policy. Ottawa has committed to no longer approve new thermal coal mines, and Carney’s Liberal Party has already pledged to end coal exports by 2030. However, this action alone will not shape global markets; for that, it needs partners with shared interests. If Australia were to join Canada to create a new global initiative ahead of its role co-hosting COP31, it just might.

Other major exporters, including Indonesia, South Africa and Colombia are reeling from the challenges of managing global import demand shifts, and would likely be open to such a coalition. In April alone, Colombia is due to host a global conference to discuss the challenges and opportunities of transitioning away from fossil fuels, and the South Korean government is the host of Asian Climate Week. Both represent critical opportunities on the road to COP31 that could build such a coalition of likeminded middle powers.

But this would not be just another climate agreement. The benefits would be tangible. By establishing clear limits on new supply, we would reduce uncertainty for investors, safeguard the value of existing mines, and reinforce our credibility as resource superpowers able to shape global energy outcomes.

Such an agreement such as this would be a pragmatic, targeted step towards building supply chain resilience and enhancing market stability. It would also create a level playing field that could collectively manage the pace and nature of the global coal transition.

Carney is right that Australia and Canada should act as collaborators rather than competitors. The next step is to apply that collaboration not only to the minerals of the future, but also to the energy resources that drive the wheels of industry today. Critical minerals will shape the coming industrial era, but coal, gas, and oil still power the world today and will do so for years to come.

As major global suppliers of these resources, Australia and Canada have an opportunity not just to react to changes in demand, but to lead a collaborative transition as the resource superpowers of today.