Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi plans to tighten measures related to foreign tourists and residents in Japan. She pledged stricter immigration policies during the Liberal Democratic Party presidential race and they form part of the coalition agreement with the Japan Innovation Party, which includes the formulation of a “population strategy” by the end of fiscal year 2026, including numerical targets for accepting foreigners.
Takaichi has ordered relevant ministries to draft revisions of policies affecting foreigners by January 2026, with expectations this will address unpaid pension and health insurance premiums, visa overstays, land purchases and illegal logging. Foreigners who fail to pay their insurance premiums may be denied residence status renewals or changes.
Takaichi said the public feels “anxiety and a sense of unfairness” over “illegal actions” by some foreigners, although she recognised the need for foreigners amid labour shortages. Kimi Onoda, the minister in charge of “a society of well-ordered and harmonious coexistence with foreign nationals”, has offered even tougher remarks. Onoda argued that the actions by a small number can “cause reputational damage for the rest,” and strong enforcement is needed to ensure that “discriminatory views are not targeted at foreigners who are working hard and properly.” She also said that the government will “create a situation in which foreigners who do bad things will no longer exist in Japan”.
According to the results of the latest Asahi Shimbun telephone survey published on 17 November, 66% of respondents viewed Takaichi’s tougher immigration policies as promising, while 24% expressed concern. 56% said Japan needs fewer visitors and immigrants, compared with 26% who said the country needs more.
While these figures suggest strong anti-immigrant sentiments, how accurately do these survey results reflect true beliefs?
Several studies have shown that anti-prejudice norms prevail in North America and Western Europe. In these democracies, people often hide negative attitudes toward immigrants and ethnic minorities because expressing such views can lead to formal or informal sanctions, including reputational harm. In other words, social desirability works in favour of immigrants.
These anti-prejudice norms, however, are not everywhere. Japan offers a unique case, where pro-prejudice norms prevail. With a far smaller immigrant population of around 3%, fewer ethnic minorities and a wide belief in ethnic homogeneity, social expectations push in the opposite direction. Here, social desirability works against immigrants.
A study conducted by researchers at the University of Tokyo and Osaka University offers insights. It compares responses to direct questions – which contain social desirability bias – with list experiments to ensure anonymity. The aim is to reveal true beliefs by having a control group which receives only insensitive questions, and a treatment group which also receives the target question. The results show that Japanese respondents express more than 20% more negative attitudes toward immigrants when their responses are visible to researchers compared to their privately held beliefs.
On the direct question, 59.2% of respondents agreed to restricting immigration, while in the list experiment, only 32.6% agreed. Meanwhile, on the direct question, 79.3% opposed Chinese and 73.2% opposed South Koreans. In the list experiment, opposition falls to 54.3% for Chinese and 42.7% for South Koreans. In both cases, negative sentiment toward Chinese residents is higher. The study also finds that respondents with higher education levels are no less susceptible to the pro-prejudice norm.
Japan faces a paradox: while its demographic and economic challenges require immigrants, social pressures compel the public to express only ambiguous support for them.
The gap between survey responses and true beliefs can become wider when the government tightens rules on foreigners, when there are ongoing diplomatic and economic disputes, and during surges in online anti-immigrant rhetoric. An example is the backlash following Takaichi’s remark in the Diet on 10 November suggesting that a Taiwan Strait conflict could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” under Japan’s 2015 security laws, potentially allowing the deployment of collective self-defence forces. The remark drew strong protests from Chinese officials and prompted a series of punitive measures, including travel and study warnings, free flight cancellations and changes by airlines, and the suspension of Japanese seafood imports. The dispute has, in turn, fuelled a surge of online anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan.
Therefore, although recent media reports suggest strong anti-immigrant sentiment in Japan, these figures – derived from direct questions rather than list experiments – are likely inflated. Media surveys, especially those using telephones, place respondents under pressure to conform to the long-standing pro-prejudice norm and exaggerate their negative attitudes. Recent heightened diplomatic tensions with China and the push for stricter rules on foreigners has further contributed to this inflation.
Even as Japanese people acknowledge the need for foreigners to offset population aging, declining birth rates and labour shortages, social pressure encourages them to express more negative views toward immigrants in public. Therefore, Japan faces a paradox: while its demographic and economic challenges require immigrants, social pressures compel the public to express only ambiguous support for them. More broadly, the discussion reminds us not to take any survey results – including cabinet and party approval ratings – at face value but to consider the methodology and sampling process behind them.
