Myanmar remains the scene of an unending crisis. More than 6000 civilians killed, 20,000 political prisoners, and more than 3 million internally displaced persons represent the human cost of a war waged by the military junta against its own people in the four years since the February 2021 coup d'état. But the regional effects are also being felt as a consequence of ASEAN’s inertia, an organisation paralysed by structural constraints and a diplomatic culture that prioritises stability over justice, where the principle of non-interference has become a shield for autocrats.
The principle of non-interference, a cornerstone of ASEAN, was conceived in a historical context where member states feared external interventions more than their own internal fragilities. In a modern era of economic interdependence and transnational crises, this doctrine no longer guarantees stability; instead, it has become an excuse for inaction. International organisations are often instruments for consolidating state power rather than agents of transformation, and ASEAN is no exception. Its governance model protects regimes in power, even when they blatantly violate human rights, as in the case of Myanmar.
The Five-Point Consensus, adopted in 2021, serves as proof of this failure. Designed as a compromise between the diverse interests of member states, the plan was doomed from the outset due to its non-binding nature. On paper, it seemed reasonable: a ceasefire, dialogue, and humanitarian aid access. However, the military junta ignored every aspect of it, continuing to repress dissent with even greater ferocity.
The Myanmar junta used the plan as a smokescreen to buy time, escalating its repression without facing any significant diplomatic consequences. The result is that ASEAN has remained a powerless spectator.
The Myanmar junta is not a reliable negotiating partner but an actor that undermines the security of the entire region.
Malaysia, under the leadership of Anwar Ibrahim, this year holds the rotating ASEAN chair and faces the complex challenge of transforming an organisation trapped in its own inertia. Malaysia has historically taken more critical stances against authoritarian regimes, yet its room for manoeuvre is constrained by three fundamental obstacles.
First, there is internal opposition within ASEAN. Countries such as Thailand and Cambodia, which maintain pragmatic relations with Myanmar’s junta, are likely to obstruct any initiative that challenges the principle of non-interference.
Second, there is the risk of a diplomatic fracture within ASEAN itself. Recognising the National Unity Government (NUG) as Myanmar’s legitimate representative would mean directly confronting the junta, but this could divide ASEAN and render what passes for mediation efforts futile.
The third challenge pertains to the ethnic minority issue. The Myanmar crisis is not only a struggle between democracy and dictatorship but also a war between the central government and ethnic militias. Ignoring this dimension means perpetuating the state-centric perspective that has repeatedly failed over past decades.
What is needed is a new paradigm for ASEAN. To overcome its impasse, ASEAN must acknowledge that regional stability can no longer be guaranteed by the unconditional protection of existing governments. The Myanmar junta is not a reliable negotiating partner but an actor that undermines the security of the entire region.
The first step should be the introduction of conditionality mechanisms: participation in ASEAN forums must be contingent on adherence to minimum governance standards. At the same time, there needs to be a rethinking of the concept of legitimacy. The NUG and civil society organisations must be recognised as key interlocutors. The systematic exclusion of non-state actors is not only an injustice but also a strategic mistake, as without their involvement, any resolution attempt is bound to fail.
ASEAN stands at a crossroads, four years after the coup, Myanmar has become a symbol of the failure of regional institutions. The crisis in Myanmar poses an existential challenge for ASEAN. If the organisation continues to prioritise regime stability over the security of its people, its credibility will be irreparably damaged.
Anwar has the chance to initiate structural change, but time is running out. Each day of inaction means more violence, more repression, and more instability. If ASEAN aspires to be a relevant political actor, it must prove it now. The cost of inertia has become unsustainable, not only for Myanmar but for the entire future of regional integration. This is not merely a crisis within Myanmar; it is a crisis that calls into question ASEAN’s very role. Can this organisation continue to ignore the tragedies unfolding within its borders without losing credibility? If ASEAN wants to be more than just a club of governments, it must evolve, take a stand, and demonstrate its ability to manage crises.
