Third, resource the foreign service properly. “Nuclear submarines and Joint Strike Fighters can deter aggression and respond when deterrence fails,” Gyngell wrote in 2021 with John McCarthy, “but they don’t do much to address trade coercion, respond to climate change or set global rules for emerging issues such as cyber.” Gyngell clearly and consistently warned of the dangers of marginalising the civilian elements of Australian statecraft, including through the budgetary decline of DFAT. In addition to his extensive commentary on this, he chaired a Blue Ribbon Panel in 2009 that produced a key report, Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit, that opened up a vital line of work by the Lowy Institute over several years on Australia’s diplomatic capabilities. Gyngell’s call to “invest in the institutions and instruments of Australian foreign policy – our overseas posts, our trained diplomats, our soft power potential to influence and encourage – with the same calculation that we invest in our defence capabilities” is as relevant as ever.
Fourth, use foreign policy speeches on hard challenges. A feature of Gyngell’s sophisticated views on Australia’s relationship with China was his insistence on the value of Australian political leaders speaking more clearly and openly about the relationship. In 2022, he argued on the Australia in the World podcast that it would be valuable for the Australian government “to make a formal statement about its relationship with China”, noting that “it’s as important for our own policy processes as it is for the message it sends to Beijing.” He later elaborated that while ambiguity can be appropriate in international affairs, and foreign policy must of course adapt to a changing international environment, “in a case like the Australia-China relationship where there are so many strategic, economic, societal issues at play, and where China is so central to so much of what Australia wants to accomplish in the world … there is a strong case for clarity, at least on the main structural issues.” A speech could set out the parameters and depth of Australia’s interests and objectives – and help overcome misreading – for the benefit of Beijing, other states, Australian policymakers and the public at large.
Fifth, don’t securitise everything. Given the spectre of multiple threats, from terrorism to natural disasters, there is a temptation for policymakers to see multifaceted problems through a narrow security lens – and thus to respond with ill-suited tools. Gyngell avoided this trap. “The effective use of the ADF is always going to be properly very limited and governments should be very careful about the ways in which they try to use the military,” he cautioned in 2020. Gyngell worried about the militarisation of American society due to gun culture, and encouraged Australian governments to work hard to “prevent that happening here”.
What I love about these ideas is the way they reflect the mind of someone thinking deeply on many levels: syncretic but rooted in a robust and fresh worldview. Gyngell saw things with his own eyes, rather than slavishly following others, and was thus able to combine and recombine nuanced solutions pertaining to identity, relationships, values, and power – the things that characterise global affairs and Australia’s role in influencing the direction of history.
In his magisterial history of Australian foreign policy, Fear of Abandonment, Gyngell asked whether Australian political leaders can “bridge the perpetual and necessary tension between a tragic imagination that contemplates catastrophe and an inspired imagination that envisions a better world”. Today, Australia’s contribution to global progress must be reimagined to meet the moment we’re in. It will be considerably harder without Gyngell illuminating the possibilities.