Australia lies firmly in the Southern Hemisphere, yet it is not part of the Global South. It is also farther east than Japan, yet is widely seen as part of the West. India, by contrast, is located in the Northern Hemisphere but belongs to the Global South. It is also described as part of the East, yet as External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar once put it, India today sees itself as a “South-Western power”.
These examples capture the paradox at the heart of our geopolitical vocabulary. The familiar labels of North, South, East, and West that are invoked almost daily in global politics do not align with geography. They reflect histories of power, colonialism, inequality, ideology, and identity. Thus, making sense of these is essential to understanding how nations position themselves in the contemporary world.
The language of the Global South has evolved through several stages of the 20th century’s shifting world order. The earliest term, the “Third World”, was coined in 1952 by French demographer Alfred Sauvy to describe countries that belonged neither to the capitalist “First World” nor the communist “Second World”. By the late 1960s, American activist Carl Oglesby introduced the phrase “Global South” as a more neutral and less hierarchical alternative, avoiding the implication that these nations were “third” in rank.
The expansion of the European Union and NATO, the resurgence of Russia, and the rise of China have all revived old civilisational and ideological boundaries under new guises.
The concept gained sharper expression in 1980, when the Brandt Commission released its report dividing the world along a line roughly near 30–35° N latitude that separated the wealthy, industrialised “North” from the poorer, developing “South”. The term soon overlapped with the membership of the Group of 77 (G77), which now includes 134 countries advocating the collective economic interests of developing states.
Critics have pointed out that the term Global South is too heterogeneous to hold any analytical coherence. In its ideology, it attempts to group democracies and autocracies; and economically, it includes both oil-rich Gulf monarchies as well as the world’s least-developed economies. Yet the term endures because it captures a shared experience of postcolonial marginalisation and a common aspiration for a fairer international order. It has become, in effect, not just a geographic or economic label but a political identity based on solidarity and reform.
In contrast to the North–South division, the East–West division is more cultural and civilisational in nature. It predates the North–South division and is primarily based on Europe’s self-perception as the centre of the world since the times of the ancient Greeks and the Romans, who drew a symbolic line between the Occident (meaning the West in Latin) and the Orient (meaning the East). It was a way to distinguish themselves from the vast, unknown lands of Asia that lay beyond. The Occident was associated with reason, order, and liberty, while the Orient came to represent mystery, despotism, and tradition.
These associations were later reinforced through centuries of imperial expansion. During the medieval and early modern periods, Christendom defined itself in opposition to the Islamic empires of the East, giving the term a religious connotation. With the rise of European colonialism, this worldview hardened into a hierarchy of civilisations. The West came to stand for modernity, progress, and enlightenment, while the East was portrayed as timeless and exotic, a framing that Edward Said famously termed Orientalism.
By the mid-20th century, these older civilisational distinctions found new expression in the lexicon of the Cold War. The “Iron Curtain” that Winston Churchill spoke of in 1946 symbolised a continuation of this history of the East–West imagination, which was now refracted through the ideological contest between capitalism and communism.
It is in the second half of the 20th century that the East–West distinction worked in tandem with the North–South one. The end of the Cold War was expected to diminish the East–West divide, just as globalisation and economic interdependence were presumed to blur the North–South distinction. Yet both axes continue to dominate contemporary international relations.
Being cognisant of the historical evolution of these terms offers a framework to better understand the resultant complexity.
The expansion of the European Union and NATO, the resurgence of Russia, and the rise of China have all revived old civilisational and ideological boundaries under new guises. Phrases such as “the liberal West” and “the rising East” echo the Cold War vocabulary. Economic power has somewhat shifted towards Asia, but political and institutional dominance remains concentrated in the North Atlantic. As a result, the countries of the Global South that were once marginalised now demand recognition as agenda-setters in global governance. Hence, what we witness today is the reconfiguration of the categories of North, South, East, and West.
This reconfiguration has taken the form of hybrid identities along the North–South and East–West axes. Instead of the binaries that were characteristic of the 20th century, the contemporary world order has given way to fluid overlapping identities. It is in this context that one can make sense of countries like India positioning themselves as “South-Western”.
In an interview, Jaishankar, clarified that the term “south-western” was partly a response to Western think tanks that continue to view global politics through the binary lens of East versus West. Through this term, he sought to highlight India’s dual role as a leading voice of the Global South and as an increasingly engaged partner of the West.
Such a hyphenated self-definition is still rare in official discourse. However, like the Australian example, it defies simple categorisation. Being cognisant of the historical evolution of these terms offers a framework to better understand the resultant complexity. More than geography, the coordinates of a state are effectively a combination of its ideological leanings, historical experiences, and standing in the contemporary world order.
