Pacific Islands, explained.
A Kiribati Police Service Parade in Betio during a 2023 visit by Australian Governor-General David Hurley (Jake Sims, Teemwa Rereniti via DFAT)
The new regional policing bloc will be judged on everyday cooperation, not on its usefulness against Beijing.
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Governance, not geopolitics, will make or break PACPOLGovernance, not geopolitics, will make or break PACPOL
A new era for Pacific policing has launched. Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police (PICP) last week announced PACPOL (Opens in new window), unifying the PICP with the Pacific Policing Initiative (PPI) under one umbrella.
PACPOL will seek to improve how Australia and its Pacific neighbours organise regional security by strengthening leadership, coordination and capability across the region. Success will be determined by how well these new regional arrangements can deliver against the many facets and requirements of policing. They should not be defined by a narrow lens focused on geopolitics or even just the ability to detect and disrupt crime.
When the Pacific Policing Initiative was announced two years ago at the 2024 PIF leaders meeting, geopolitics dominated (Opens in new window) the media reaction. At first glance, some may look to PACPOL as another successful effort to counter China’s growing influence in Pacific security – a geopolitical win for Australia and like-minded partners. But effective regional partnerships inherently mean a reduced dependence on other foreign supports for support. Geostrategic benefits can sometimes be a by-product of delivering workable regional solutions. Reducing policing partnerships in the Pacific to strategic competition obscures their long history and the multiple purposes they serve.
The Development Intelligence Lab’s recently published brief “Six faces of Australia’s Police Cooperation in the Pacific (Opens in new window)” identifies six interrelated “faces” of Australia’s police cooperation in the Pacific, each reflecting a distinct purpose.
Alongside the geopolitical face, there are five others: diplomacy, security, stability, development and governance. Together, these faces provide a more nuanced framework for understanding investment in, and the evolution of, Pacific policing.
Governance is where PACPOL could make the most immediate contribution. The Pacific already has the PICP meeting, a transnational crime network, and arrangements for training and deployments through PPI and other mechanisms. The challenge is to make those arrangements work together to their fullest potential. PACPOL could provide clearer responsibility for implementing collective decisions and coordinating assistance across participating police services.
Reducing policing partnerships in the Pacific to strategic competition obscures their long history and the multiple purposes they serve.
Comparisons with Europol are useful, provided expectations remain realistic. Europol supports national authorities through intelligence sharing, operational coordination and specialist assistance with no independent arrest powers. PACPOL’s early development, however, may more closely resemble ASEANAPOL, which facilitates coordination among sovereign police services. Establishing common governance can happen relatively quickly. Building trusted information systems and routine operational cooperation will take longer.
Security threats point to the urgent need for greater coordination across the region. Criminal networks are exploiting jurisdictional boundaries and uneven enforcement capabilities. Drug trade driven transnational crime is reshaping and threatening Pacific communities. A stronger regional policing body could further improve information sharing to connect vessel and financial data where needed. Success also depends on coordination beyond investigations, including in evidence handling and support for prosecutions.
Stability contributions from the PPI are already visible but should be enhanced through greater coordination and governance. In September, 119 Pacific Police Support Group (Opens in new window) personnel under the PPI supported Palau’s hosting of the Pacific Islands Forum leaders’ meeting. PACPOL could make cooperation like this more predictable and easier to coordinate by setting guidance and clarifying how assistance is requested, assembled, supported and prepared for across the region.
Development will be critical in ensuring that these gains endure and that police forces across the region are up to the task of tackling global and emerging threats. Large collaborative deployments, such as the support to PIF meetings, are impressive. But without continued investment in national policing capabilities, including equipment, training and career progression, these gains are mostly symbolic.
Samoan emergency services and police during a simulated disaster relief exercise with Australian counterparts in October 2025, in Samoa (Dana Millington/Defence Imagery)
Diplomacy helps to connect these purposes. Decades of professional relationships across the region have built the trust and confidence needed for Australian and Pacific officers to work towards shared goals for the region. PACPOL can enhance those relationships, particularly between Pacific services, by providing more opportunities for structured and sustained engagement. Collective priorities may not always mirror Canberra’s first preferences, but this should be welcomed as a sign of Pacific ownership and sovereign decision-making.
Geopolitics will inevitably shape perceptions of any initiative in the region, and PACPOL could reinforce Australia’s position as a preferred policing partner. But treating PACPOL primarily as an instrument for excluding China would risk weakening the Pacific ownership on which it depends.
At the PPI’s 2024 announcement, then Vanuatu Prime Minister Charlot Salwai said (Opens in new window) that the region needed “to make sure that this PPI is framed to fit our purposes and not developed to suit the geostrategic interests and geostrategic denial security postures of our big partners”. This warning remains relevant today, as Pacific governments will judge PACPOL by the problems it helps them solve.
Effective implementations require an understanding of how all six faces of policing partnerships deliver impact. Seizures and arrests tell us something about security, deployment readiness supports stability, and stronger institutions contribute to development outcomes. Counting activities or overemphasising one face risks obscuring real benefits for Pacific communities. Giving PACPOL the best chance of success requires an appreciation of all faces of police partnerships.
About the author
Blake Johnson
Blake Johnson is a collaborating expert at the Development Intelligence Lab.
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