Nikolai Patrushev, Russia’s powerful Security Council secretary and close aide to President Vladimir Putin, visited Jakarta this month to push for deeper ties between Russia and Indonesia. The two countries signed a memorandum of understanding that expanded bilateral defence cooperation in shipbuilding, maritime education and energy transition.
Notably, defence publication Jane’s reported earlier this year that Moscow had sought permission to station military aircraft at a base in the Indonesian province of West Papua. Not surprisingly, this idea stirred concern in Australia before Jakarta dismissed the claim.
The episode was an example of Russia’s diplomatic moves in Southeast Asia, showing that its overtures in the region have been far from isolated. In recent months, Moscow conducted military exercises with Laos, renewed its arms deals with Vietnam, pledged assistance in nuclear technology to Myanmar and sailed across the South China Sea.
Against a regional landscape largely shaped by American and Chinese influence, Russia’s “pivot” prompts deeper questions about its purpose, means and long‑term impact.
Ian Storey, a seasoned scholar of the region, examines Moscow’s engagements with Association of Southeast Asian Nations states over the last decade in his newly-published book Putin’s Russia and Southeast Asia. The book covers historical ties, Southeast Asia’s place in Russian foreign policy within the wider Indo‑Pacific, economic and defence relations, and Russia’s interactions with ASEAN as a regional body. He also draws in country‑specific case studies, grouping states with shared characteristics, such as the Mekong continental countries or the majority‑Muslim coastal nations.
Storey argues that Russia views itself as a great power on par with China and the United States and that some regional countries regard Moscow as a useful hedging partner in an increasingly multipolar order. Although he concludes that Russia’s pivot has been more aspirational than successful, he contends Moscow will remain an option for the region, sustaining influence mostly through defence cooperation.
The book also delves into key dynamics shaping Southeast Asia’s regional order. Storey notes Moscow’s support for Hanoi through oil and gas exploration, set against Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea. Some drilling sites fall within China’s nine-dash line, where Vietnam continues to press forward and Russian companies have engaged in joint exploration. Russia does not appear to seek China’s approval, and that may remain a point of contention in the evolving Moscow-Beijing partnership. The South China Sea is not a core Russian interest, and Moscow has so far offered no constructive solutions to the disputes. This suggests that Moscow’s engagement is bilateral, issue-specific and less interested in conflict resolution.
Second, Moscow positions itself as a counterweight to China and the United States, promoting multipolarity and courting Southeast Asian elites and public in countries such as Indonesia or Malaysia. While part of Russia’s argument holds some ground, particularly in nominally recognising the agency of regional states and their capacity to navigate great power competition in pursuit of a more inclusive order, Moscow’s rhetoric often drifts into a pronounced anti-Western posture. Russia’s institutions and media reinforce this, amplifying messaging about the West’s perceived decline and hypocrisy, often through active and opportunistic disinformation. The book does not explore this dynamic in too much detail, but local scholars are increasingly looking at Russia’s role in their own countries.
Only a handful of regional states, such as the Philippines and Singapore, have condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as many governments continue to view Russia as relatively “benign.” Storey’s explanation of this perception offers valuable insights for Western diplomats engaging in the region.
But he also explains why Russia struggles to secure a stronger foothold in Southeast Asia. Despite being the region’s largest arms supplier and having some ideological appeal, its trade links remain modest. Regional interest in the BRICS – the bloc of emerging economies including Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, with Indonesia now a member and Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam recently becoming partner countries – stems more from expectations of Chinese largesse than by Moscow’s economic clout. Some Russian policy documents designate Southeast Asia as a priority, but it remains uncertain whether Russia can sustain a genuine pivot amid domestic economic strains.
Storey does not delve into Russia’s potential role in a Taiwan contingency, perhaps staying within the geographical definition of “Southeast Asia”. But the impact of a cross-Strait conflict would be highly consequential and could involve the region directly or indirectly. As the Philippines, Japan and South Korea weigh their options, Moscow may also consider its own, mindful of its foothold in Northeast Asia. While open‑source Russian reporting rarely addresses a Taiwan contingency, Moscow is nonetheless likely to play some role – perhaps more indirect than direct. A key consideration here is the extent of Sino-Russian security cooperation (or as some say “quasi-alliance”) and in what ways Russia and China are equals, like-minded or merely pragmatic partners. It is worth noting that recent Russian opinion pieces drew parallels between the deployments of US Typhon missiles (missile launchers loaded with mid-range projectiles such as the Tomahawk system that have both offensive and defensive capabilities) by Tokyo and Manila, which may suggest at least overlapping threat perceptions by Moscow and Beijing given their reach.
The book is essential reading for historians, scholars of Asian geopolitics and practitioners based or interested in the region, including Western audiences who are interested in how Russia is seen elsewhere. By providing a general overview, the book also encourages local voices to critically reflect on Moscow’s role in Southeast Asia.
Putin’s Russia and Southeast Asia: The Kremlin’s Pivot to Asia and the Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War, by Ian Storey (ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2025)
